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Dissertation
ABSTRACT
The overall purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the association between 
corporate governance structures and agency problems in small firms. The aim 
is to address the question whether ownership structure and board composition 
are associated with growth and profitability, and whether attitudes towards and 
the use of different funding sources and the investment behaviors differ between 
family and non-family firms. 
This dissertation provides evidence that both ownership structure and board 
composition are significant determinants of firm performance in the sample of pri-
vate small and medium-sized Finnish firms.  The results imply that the ownership 
structure may be a more important determinant of the growth and profitability 
of small firms than board composition. The findings reveal that pecking order 
theory is a relevant theory in explaining the funding behavior of family firms. The 
results obtained support the prior evidence that family firms are more interested 
in maintaining control within the family. The results on the funding behavior 
could also imply that family firms may be more financially constrained than their 
non-family counterparts and they face more severe agency problems between the 
firm and potential lenders due to information asymmetry. 
The results on the investment behavior suggest that family firms are more 
likely to reject an investment than are non-family firms. However, the findings on 
the amount of investment indicate that no statistically significant difference exists 
between family firms and non-family firms. The result could imply that both fam-
ily and non-family firms may be concerned with their firm’s future performance 
and ability to survive in competition, thus, affecting their investment behavior in 
a similar way.
Keywords: corporate governance, agency problems, growth, profitability, fund-
ing, investment, small firms
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Väitöskirja 
ABSTRAKTI
Tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on tutkia corporate governancen ja agenttiongel-
mien välistä yhteyttä pk-yrityksissä. Väitöskirjassa tutkitaan vaikuttavatko omis-
tusrakenne ja hallituksen kokoonpano pk-yritysten kasvuun ja kannattavuuteen 
ja eroavatko perheyritykset ja ei-perheyritykset rahoitus- ja investointikäyttäyty-
misessä.
Tutkimustulosten mukaan yrityksen omistusrakenne ja hallituksen kokoon-
pano vaikuttavat pk-yrityksen kasvuun ja kannattavuuteen. Kuitenkin omistusra-
kenteella on enemmän vaikutusta kasvuun ja kannattavuuteen kuin hallituksen 
kokoonpanolla. Rahoituskäyttäytymisen osalta perheyritykset näyttävät käyttä-
vän ostovelkoja, rahoitusyhtiöitä ja nykyisiä omistajia rahoituslähteenään useam-
min kuin ei-perheyritykset. Kuitenkin perheyritysten omistaja-johtajien asenteet 
ovat negatiivisemmat pankkilainoja ja ostovelkoja kohtaan ja positiivisemmat 
omistajien lisäsijoituksia kohtaan kuin ei-perheyrityksissä. Yritykset näyttävät 
noudattavan pääosin pecking order- teoriaa rahoituskäyttäytymisessään. Tulokset 
viittaavat siihen, että perheyrityksillä on enemmän agenttiongelmia yrityksen ja 
rahoittajien välillä kuin ei-perheyrityksillä.
Tutkimustulokset paljastavat, että perheyritykset joutuvat hylkäämään inves-
tointeja useammin kuin ei-perheyritykset mm. rahoituksen saannin vaikeuden 
vuoksi. Tämä viittaa agenttiongelmiin yrityksen ja ulkopuolisten rahoittajien 
välillä. Investointien määrän osalta perhe- ja ei-perheyrityksillä ei näytä olevan 
tilastollisesti merkittäviä eroja. 
Avainsanat: corporate governance, agenttiongelma, kasvu, kannattavuus, rahoi-
tus, investoinnit, pk-yritykset
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1 Introduction
1.1 BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT 
This study addresses topics that have attracted increasing levels of attention in 
the corporate finance and governance literature in recent decades. Research on 
small businesses and especially family businesses has increased and developed 
remarkably during the past decade, coming to include more-established manage-
ment disciplines (Gedaljovic, Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermans, 2012). Worldwide, 
small- and medium-sized private firms are regarded as important to economic 
growth and employment and they constitute a vast majority of private firms. Their 
financial performance and success are of key importance to economic growth, 
both nationally and internationally. Furthermore, a remarkable share of closely 
held private firms consists of firms with concentrated ownership structures or 
family firms.
This dissertation focuses on investigating the association between corporate 
governance structures and the financial performance, funding, and investment 
behavior of private small- and medium-sized firms in an agency theory context. 
Agency theory suggests that agency problems arise due to the separation of own-
ership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, when ownership and 
management are separated, there is a potential information asymmetry between 
the managers and owners, because managers may possess better information 
about the likelihood of success and future returns of a project (Harris & Raviv, 
1991). Divergence of interests between the parties may lead to agency problems if 
interests are misaligned (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
As agency theory suggests, when managers´ interests are aligned with those 
of shareholders through ownership, agency problems should not exist, at least not 
between the owners and managers when ownership and management overlap 
entirely (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This applies to small and medium enterpris-
es (SMEs), which are typically characterized as having concentrated ownership 
structures and overlapping roles of owners and management. But, in closely held 
firms, such as family firms, agency conflicts may arise from altruism or diver-
gence of interest between the majority and minority owners (Schulze, Lubatkin, 
& Dino, 2003). Furthermore, an agency theory context is relevant in investigating 
private small- and medium-sized firms because agency problems due to informa-
tion asymmetry between the owner-managers and outside suppliers of funds are 
more likely to be present in smaller firms than in their larger counterparts (Myers, 
1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Furthermore, small closely held firms such as family 
firms are more susceptible to financial constraints due to information asymmetry 
(Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
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Although overlapping owner-manager roles reduce agency problems, owner-
ship concentration may lead to risk avoidance. This is supported by Storey (1994) 
who argues that owners of small businesses find growth too risky and Naldi, 
Nordqvist, Sjöberg, and Wiklund (2007) who suggest that owner-managed firms 
such as family firms are generally regarded as more risk averse because their 
business represents a significant proportion of their wealth. Also, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) propose that large and undiversified investors will exercise risk-
reduction strategies. This may also apply to firms with other kinds of corporate 
governance structures, such as firms with boards that consist of major owners. 
Lower risk taking may affect a firm s´ financial performance and the value of the 
firm. As Bammens, Voordeckers, and van Gils (2008) imply, corporate governance 
structures matter and failure of firms could be avoided by implementing good cor-
porate governance mechanisms. If firms with certain corporate governance and 
ownership structures outperform the other structures, it may enhance the overall 
performance of firms. Furthermore, if firms are financially less constrained, they 
are able to access to several funding sources and are more capable of investing 
efficiently, which may increase growth and improve their ability to survive in the 
competition. 
In comparison with many other countries, the operating and institutional 
environment in Finland is advanced. The Finnish legal environment belongs to 
the Scandinavian civil law system and it differs from the common law system. 
Legislation concerning corporate and trade laws and protection of investors is 
well-developed. The protection of investors in terms of debts is strong, whereas 
the protection of equity holders is weaker (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999). Although the Finnish capital markets are well-developed, they are bank-
based and highly concentrated with only a small number of banks operating in 
the country (Niskanen & Niskanen, 2006). Furthermore, bank loans are important 
sources of funding for small- and medium-sized firms. 
In Finland, as in other countries, most firms are micro-, small-, or middle-sized 
businesses. According to Statistics Finland, in 2012, there were over 320,000 firms 
in Finland, including primary production, which represents 17.2% of the firms. 
Large firms constitute only about 620 firms, out of which around 30% are family-
controlled businesses. Micro-, small-, and medium-sized firms represent over 99% 
of all firms in the country. Moreover, the smallest ones, micro-sized firms, con-
stitute over 94% of the firms. SMEs employ over 1.0 million persons. Family busi-
nesses represent a significant proportion of all firms; approximately over 80% of 
all firms are family firms, depending on the definition. New business formation 
activity has been declining since 2011. In 2005, the number of new formations was 
29,859 firms, but at the same time, 21,197 firms ceased their operations while the 
corresponding figures in 2011 were 32,476 and 24,448 and in 2012 those figures 
were 31,209 and 25,545. As far as the legal form of the firms is concerned, over 
40% of the firms are limited liability entities. During recent years, the number of 
limited companies among newly founded firms has increased. 
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1.2 PURPOSE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The overall purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the financial patterns 
of private small businesses in Finland in an agency theory context. The aim is 
to explore the impact that corporate governance and ownership structures may 
have on financial performance, funding behavior, and investment behavior. More 
precisely, this dissertation focuses on growth and profitability and the attitudes 
toward and the use of different funding sources as well as on the amount of in-
vestment and rejection of investments in micro-, small-, and medium-sized private 
businesses. 
In the corporate finance literature, an increasing interest during recent decades 
in exploring SMEs in a family business context has also yielded a growing number 
of studies, but there is still room for contribution, especially in a private family 
and non-family business context. Through a comprehensive inspection of the lit-
erature, it was possible to identify research gaps for this dissertation. 
The main parts of the dissertation are presented in the form of three articles. 
The focus in the first article is on how corporate governance and ownership struc-
tures affect the performance of private small- and medium-sized firms. Most prior 
studies on the relationship between corporate governance structures and financial 
performance have used data on firms in Anglo-Saxon environments and on large, 
listed firms, e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
Hermalin and Weissbach (1991), Pearce and Zahra (1992), Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), Dehaene, De Vyust, and Ooghe (2001), Andersson and Reeb (2003), Ben-
Amar and André (2006), and Lasfer (2006). Because the legal framework differs 
by country, and it may have an impact on the corporate governance structures of 
firms, including those of SMEs, it has been suggested that research on ownership 
structures should be country-specific. Furthermore, a surprisingly small number 
of studies have focused on investigating non-listed private small- and medium-
sized firms in this context, even though SMEs are recognized worldwide as impor-
tant engines of economic growth. One reason for that may be that the availability 
of reliable data on non-listed private firms such as SMEs is, in general, difficult to 
obtain. This study uses data on SMEs collected through a private survey, which 
was conducted to extract the detailed data on ownership structure and board com-
position. This study is one of the few that shed light on how corporate governance 
and ownership structures affect the financial performance of private small- and 
medium-sized firms. 
The second article approaches the funding behavior in a family and non-fami-
ly firm context from two different perspectives, those of usage of and attitudes to-
ward different funding sources. An increasing interest in the funding behavior of 
SMEs has yielded a growing number of studies, but for the most part these rely on 
data from Anglo-Saxon countries and on large and listed family firms. Although 
there are empirical studies in a European context, their focus, data, or/and meas-
ures differ from those of this study (e.g., Michaelas, Chittenden, & Poutziouris, 
1998; Poutziouris, 2001; Vos, Jia-Yuh Yeh, Carter, & Tagg, 2007; Lòpez-Gracia & 
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Sánchez-Andújar, 2007). Furthermore, the structure of the capital markets con-
stitutes the framework for alternative forms of financing. This structure differs 
by country, and, therefore, the country context should also be taken into account 
when investigating funding behavior. Also, this study uses more detailed meas-
ures of actual funding behavior than in most prior studies, which use traditional 
variables calculated from the financial statements. To be able to explore funding 
behavior more closely not only from the supply side but also from the demand 
side, attitudes toward different funding sources are also investigated using owner-
managers´ views and attitudes toward a set of alternative funding sources, which 
are based on the pecking order theory. 
The third article concentrates on investigating the investment behavior of 
family and non-family-owned firms. Many previous empirical studies have in-
vestigated the impact of liquidity on investment, e.g., Kadapakkam, Kumar, and 
Riddick (1998), Georgen and Renneboog (2001), and Audretsch and Elston (2002), 
without considering whether family ownership may affect investment behavior. 
The number of studies exploring the differences in investment behavior between 
the small private family and non-family firm context is small. Most prior studies 
use data on large listed firms, e.g., Gugler (2003) and Andres (2011). This study uses 
data on micro-, small-, and medium-sized private family and non-family firms. 
The country context should also be taken into account because the legal protec-
tion of investors, corporate governance structures, and financial markets differs 
by country. In bank-based systems, banks monitor the performance of customers 
more closely than in other kinds of systems, and small firms may be more finan-
cially constrained than their larger counterparts. This funding gap may be even 
more severe for family firms; as a number of studies (e.g., Niskanen, Niskanen, 
& Laukkanen, 2010) suggest, banks are averse to lending to small- and medium-
sized firms that can be characterized as family firms. Therefore, family firms may 
lack funds to invest unless internal funds are sufficient. The aim of the third arti-
cle is to explore whether family firms and non-family firms differ in the amount 
of investment, in the rejection of investment, and also in the reasons why firms 
have rejected investments. Finally, the data for this study are collected through a 
private survey, which consists of detailed information on the size of investment 
and on the rejection of investment. Prior studies, e.g., Gugler (2003) and Andres 
(2011), use accounting-based measures for investments while this study uses prox-
ies based on the firms´ answers on how much they have invested. Furthermore, 
information on the rejection of investment and the reasons why firms have re-
jected investments provide new insights into the investment behavior of family 
and non-family firms. 
14 15
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The main objective of this dissertation is to try to fulfill those abovementioned gaps in the literature. 
Figure 1 depicts the general concepts covered in this study, with an agency theory context being the 
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Figure 1:  The conceptual framework of the dissertation
The main objective of this dissertation is to try to fulfill those abovementioned 
gaps in the literature. Figure 1 depicts the general concepts covered in this study, 
with an agency theory context being the theoretical frame in each of the research 
papers. The concepts in the rectangles are covered in the papers. The arrows in 
the figure depict the proposed association between the c rporate governance 
structures and fina cial patterns and they are empirically tested in the research 
papers. The first objective is to examine the relationship between the ownership 
and board structure and financial performance. The second objective is to inves-
tigate whether the funding behaviors of family and non-family firms differ. The 
third objective is to explore the differences in investment behaviors of family and 
nonfamily firms.
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2 Literature Review
The theoretical framework of this dissertation is based on the agency theory. 
Within this theory, a firm can be regarded as a set of contracts and as teams whose 
members act from self-interest but who realize that their destinies depend on the 
extent of the survival of the team in its competition with other teams (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Fama (1980) argues that this insight is not wide enough because 
classical models of the firm focus on the manager who operates in the firm to 
maximize profits. In these theories an entrepreneur is both the manager and re-
sidual risk bearer (Fama, 1980). The risk bearers seem to suffer the most direct 
consequences of the failings of the team. However, such classical theories have 
subsequently been rejected. Thus, we can no longer assume managers automati-
cally act in the shareholders’ interests and to maximize firm value (Jensen, 1993). 
2.1 AGENCY THEORY IN A SMALL BUSINESS CONTEXT
Agency theory suggests that agency problems exist due to informational opacity 
and when the interests of the parties are misaligned. An agency theory context is 
relevant in exploring financial issues in private small- and medium-sized firms 
because they are more prone to agency problems than are larger firms due to 
information asymmetry between the owner-managers and outside suppliers of 
funds (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). However, the applicability of agency 
theory has been criticized for its assumptions. Agency theory is based on the 
assumption that decision makers are rational and motivated by individual goals 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). But, in closely held firms, owner-manager roles often 
overlap and owner-managers are motivated by the objectives of the organization, 
i.e., the firm and its performance and reputation, and their behavior is more col-
lective than individualistic (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). 
2.1.1 Agency problems
Agency theory suggests that the agency problem is an essential element of the 
contractual view of the firm due to the separation of ownership and control. The 
divergence of interests can result in agency problems between the parties, i.e., be-
tween suppliers of funds both in terms of equity and debt and managers (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). The key concern among shareholders is whether firm manag-
ers with no ownership stakes have an incentive problem in decision making. The 
divergence of interest may lead to a situation where managers act for their own 
interest at the expense of shareholders or other stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) when the interests of the parties are misaligned. When managers´ interests 
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are not aligned with those of shareholders and in the absence of an agreement on 
deviations from the contract, the manager may have an incentive to consume more 
perquisites or other benefits than agreed (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
As a consequence, this may lead to lower firm value and redistribution of wealth. 
Furthermore, outside suppliers of finance may also be concerned how they can 
control managers. This is the case especially in larger firms where ownership and 
management are separated. 
Free cash flow theory suggests that managers may have incentives to invest 
free cash flows in unprofitable projects (Jensen, 1986). This is an agency conflict 
between owners and management (Jensen, 1986). Jensen (1986) further argues that 
firms increase investment in response to the availability of cash flows but decrease 
with leverage because current debt and interest payments force cash out of the 
firm. Therefore, debt can be an effective mechanism to reduce the agency cost of 
free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Investment-cash flow sensitivity and the likelihood 
that a manager will waste internally generated funds can also be mitigated by 
other governance mechanisms, such as dividends (Degryse & Jong, 2006) or by 
managerial ownership (Hadlock, 1998). 
As far as firm size is concerned, small firm size is more likely to lead to agen-
cy problems between owner-managers and lenders (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Hall, 
Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 2000). Agency problems arise due to higher information 
asymmetry between the parties because, in small firms, insiders are assumed 
to possess private information on the firm s´ return streams or investment op-
portunities (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Harris & Raviv, 1991). Agency 
conflicts have several possible consequences. First, the credit availability may be 
weakened (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Second, outside suppliers of funds 
may demand an increased premium be paid for external financing, which drives 
a gap between the costs of internal and external funding (Myers, 1984; Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). Third, agency problems may lead to financial constraints and firms 
will have to forgo investment opportunities (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Hyytinen & 
Väänänen, 2006) unless the firms can rely on internally generated funds (Myers 
& Majluf, 1984; Degryse & Jong, 2006). Due to information asymmetry and agen-
cy problems, small firms may be more financially constrained than their larger 
counterparts and, consequently, they tend to follow a pecking order to cover their 
funding needs: first using retained earnings, followed by debt, and, outside equity, 
only as a last resort (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
2.1.2 Agency costs 
Agency costs are the monitoring expenditures by a principal and the bonding 
expenditures that are associated with both equity and debt (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Agency costs arise from the consequences of agents´ behaviors that are not 
in the principals´ interests. Agency costs represent the costs of all activities and 
operating systems designed to align the interests of managers with the interests 
of suppliers of funds (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004). 
Agency costs can be reduced by monitoring and other controlling activities that 
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align the manager’s interests with those of other stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). Finally, the magnitude of agency costs is limited 
by how well the owners and delegated third parties monitor the managers (Ang, 
Cole, & Lin, 2000). 
Agency problems between the firm and its lenders can be reduced by a con-
tract whereby the financier and the owner-manager sign a contract that specifies 
the use of funds and how the returns are divided between the parties (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). In a small firm, decisions and actions are made by a small number 
of owners and managers and the effect of opportunistic behavior of those deci-
sion makers will be higher than in other kinds of firms (Chrisman et al., 2004). 
Most banks require a strategic business plan and insist upon covenants to be 
able to analyze and monitor a small firm s´ activities better, but those are difficult 
to monitor and enforce (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman et al., 2004). 
Therefore, debt holders require an increased premium on debt, leading to higher 
agency costs. However, Anderson et al. (2003) find that family firms enjoy a lower 
cost of debt funding. The main cost of debt is caused by creditors when a firm is 
prevented from undertaking good projects because of debt covenants.
One mechanism to reduce agency problems between the firm and its creditors 
is for firms to have closer ties and a long-term relationship with a bank, which will 
enable the bank to generate information about the firm more efficiently (Berger 
& Udell, 1995; Degryse & Cayseele, 2000). Consequently, such relationship lend-
ing may reduce information asymmetry and agency costs (Berger & Udell, 1995; 
Degryse & Cayseele, 2000). However, empirical studies have found conflicting 
results on the effect of relationship lending on loan terms and reducing agency 
costs. Niskanen and Niskanen (2010) find that SMEs that borrow from fewer banks 
have better access to bank lending and are also less likely to be required to put up 
collateral. Degryse and Cayseele (2000) suggest that loan interest rate increases 
with the duration of a bank-firm relationship and the scope of the relationship 
decreases loan rates and collateral requirements. However, Berger and Udell (1995) 
suggest that a longer relationship decreases both loan rates and collateral require-
ments. Similarly, a prior study on Finnish data suggests that relationship length 
improves loan terms for smaller firms (Niskanen & Niskanen, 2000). 
2.2 INVESTMENT AND FINANCING PATTERNS 
The previous literature suggests that owner-managers´ beliefs, attitudes, and 
early-life experiences are determinants of financing behavior and a firm s´ capi-
tal structure (Michaelas et al., 1998; Michaelas, Chittenden, & Poutziouris, 1999; 
Gallo, Tàpiens, & Cappuyns, 2004; Malmendier, Tate, & Yan, 2011). Decisions on 
the type of finance are made on the basis of a combination of social, behavioral, 
and financial factors (Romano, Tanewski, & Smyrnios, 2001). Furthermore, firm 
age, size, industry, age of CEO, extent of family control, business planning, own-
ers´ business objectives, and plans to achieve growth influence family business 
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owners´ financing decisions (Coleman & Carsky, 1999; Romano et al. 2001; Blanco-
Mazagatos, Quevedo-Puente, & Castrillo, 2007). 
Moreover, due to information asymmetry between the firm and outside sup-
pliers of funds, small firms tend to finance their needs as pecking order theory 
implies, in a hierarchical fashion: first, using internally generated funds, followed 
by short- and long-term debt and external equity, as a last resort (Myers, 1984; 
Myers & Majluf, 1984). A pecking order approach is particularly relevant to small 
firms because most small firms are closely held and/or family-owned and they are 
more prone to financial constraints due to informational opacity than are larger 
firms. Family businesses are even more likely to follow a pecking order than are 
non-family businesses due to personal preferences concerning growth, risk, and 
ownership-control (Neubauer & Lank, 1998; Poutziouris, 2001; Gallo et al., 2004). 
Family firm decision making is also affected by family commitment (Koropp, 
Grichnik, & Kellermans, 2013). 
A minority of small business owner-managers are growth oriented (Poutziouris, 
2001). Risk avoidance and a “keep-it-in-the-family” tradition lead family firms 
to adopt conservative financing behavior and to follow pecking order theory 
(Poutziouris, 2001; Romano et al., 2001). To put it otherwise, family firms prefer to 
use retained earnings as their primary funding source and are reluctant to use 
long-term external capital (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996; Romano et al., 2001; Poutziouris, 
2001) because doing so dilutes family control and reduces financial independence 
(Neubauer & Lank, 1998). If internally generated funds are insufficient, then fam-
ily firms rely on short- and long-term debts. In case of debt, small firms prefer 
short-term debts because owner-managers adhere strongly to control and dislike 
pursuing business growth plans (Poutziouris, 2001). For example, trade credits 
are preferred because they are a more informal source of funding and do not re-
quire security arrangements or sharing of information, such as annual accounts 
with the creditors (Michaelas et al., 1998). Because family firms tend to take risks 
to a lesser extent than non-family firms (Naldi et al., 2007), they are more likely 
to avoid using long-term external capital in terms of debt (Romano et al., 2001; 
Poutziouris, 2001). 
Small firm owner-managers have a profound aversion to external equity be-
cause owner-managers dislike diluting ownership and control and sharing the 
seats on the board with outsiders, as doing so reduces management s´ freedom of 
action (Poutziouris, 2001; Romano et al., 2001). Firms might also have more pres-
sure to complete targets based on external equity requirements, such as profit, 
growth, or dividend targets. Furthermore, retained earnings are preferred in or-
der to minimize the probability of bankruptcy and avoid losing control (Mishra & 
McConaughy, 1999; McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001; Anderson et al., 2003). 
The preference for certain funding sources affects firms´ capital structure, 
growth opportunities, and long-term survival. Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) argue that the growth of small firms is constrained 
by the availability of finance. Family firms may be even more likely to suffer 
financial constraints because banks tend to be averse to lending to small- and 
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medium-sized firms that can be characterized as family firms because of agency 
problems (Niskanen et al., 2010). Furthermore, banks place a heavy reliance on 
substantial business assets that might be pledged as collateral (Berger & Udell, 
1998). Due to agency problems and financial constraints, firms’ investments and 
growth may be restricted or even hampered (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Degryse & 
Jong, 2006). Moreover, financial constraints may lead to inefficient investment 
decisions, which are based primarily on the availability of internally generated 
funds (Georgen & Renneboog, 2001) or that firms have to forgo investment op-
portunities (Hyytinen & Väänänen, 2006) unless the firms can rely on internally 
generated funds (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Degryse & Jong, 2006).
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SMALL FIRMS
Corporate governance mechanisms are economic and legal institutions that can be 
established through legal protection, such as the Corporate Act (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). The Corporate Act and other forms of regulation shape the prevailing sys-
tem of corporate governance. The primary reason for corporate governance is the 
separation of ownership and control, which potentially causes agency problems 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The fundamental question is how to assure suppliers of 
funds, i.e., shareholders and creditors, that they will get a return on their invest-
ment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and how to ensure that their interests are protected 
(John & Senbet, 1998). In firms with fragmented ownership, investors are often 
small and too poorly informed to exercise even the control rights they possess 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Or they may lack the interest or resources to monitor. 
Corporate governance aims at the protection of stakeholders and it can be seen 
as one solution to reduce agency conflicts because it deals with the mechanisms 
by which the stakeholders of a firm exercise control over management (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). Large investors both in terms of equity and debt are important 
to well-functioning governance because they are active investors who expect the 
returns on their investment to materialize and, therefore, they have a strong inter-
est in controlling the major decisions of the firm (Jensen, 1993; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). These control mechanisms provide incentives to managers and, therefore, 
mitigate agency problems (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). 
Effective corporate governance systems are of enormous practical importance 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), not only in large firms but also in SMEs. When the 
interests of contracting parties deviate from that of other stakeholders, control 
mechanisms are necessary. Monitoring and controlling mechanisms rely on par-
ties outside the firm to monitor managers and include activities such as auditing, 
formal control systems, budget restrictions, and the establishment of incentive 
compensation systems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Other mechanisms to mitigate 
agency problems between managers and shareholders are debt financing, board 
structure, the use of independent outside members on the board, and monitoring 
by the firm’s own large shareholders (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). 
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The legislation and recommendations on corporate governance are ways to 
promote better corporate governance cultures both in larger and smaller firms. 
Although organizations do not like control systems, they are, nevertheless, impor-
tant. As Jensen (1993) argues, ineffective governance is a major part of the problem 
with internal control mechanisms that seldom respond in the absence of a crisis. 
Furthermore, internal control systems react too late and they take too long to effect 
major change. Corporate governance also deals with shareholders’ rights, because 
Articles of Association may include specific provisions on shareholders’ rights, 
such as restricting their rights, e.g., in the case of proxy fights or hostile takeovers 
(Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). Shareholders accept such restrictions in hopes 
of maximizing their wealth. Moreover, Gompers et al. (2003) find that firms with 
stronger stakeholder rights outperform firms with weaker stakeholder rights. 
The development of corporate governance stems from the need for better 
stakeholder protection. In Finland, corporate governance reform began after the 
macroeconomic crises, both after the financial crisis and currency crisis, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s (Hyytinen, Kuosa, & Takalo, 2002). This reform was 
enhanced by the changes in ownership structures, such as a decrease in bank 
holdings, decrease in government holdings, and increase in foreign holdings. 
Furthermore, the full opening of capital markets for foreign investors through 
financial liberalization has reshaped corporate governance (Hyytinen et al., 2002; 
Liljeblom & Löflund, 2006). Also, changes in accounting, auditing, and disclo-
sure rules have changed corporate governance in Finland (Hyytinen et al., 2002). 
Moreover, Finnish corporate governance practices have been influenced by Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance practices (Liljeblom & Löflund, 2006). 
In many countries, legislation protects investors strongly but the level of pro-
tection differs by country. In Finland, the protection of investors in terms of debts 
has been strong, whereas the protection of equity holders has been weaker (La 
Porta et al., 1999). However, a later study by Hyytinen et al. (2002) implies that the 
Finnish legislation has become more favorable toward shareholders at the expense 
of creditors because the protection of shareholders’ rights has been strengthened, 
while the protection of creditors has been weakened.
The Corporate Act applies to all limited companies independently of whether 
those are listed or not. The amendments of the Corporate Act excluded corporate 
governance provisions that were left for self-regulation, although minority share-
holder and debtor protection was maintained (Liljeblom & Löflund, 2006). Investor 
protection has also been regulated by the Securities Market Act and the functions 
of the Financial Supervision Authority (Liljeblom & Löflund, 2006). 
The corporate governance system of listed companies is based on the legisla-
tion and it complements the statutory provisions (Finnish Corporate Governance 
Code, 2010). The aim of the Code is to harmonize the practices of listed companies 
and the information given to shareholders and other investors (Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010). Corporate governance describes how firms ought to be 
run, directed, and controlled, i.e., it sets the rules and procedures and defines the 
roles of owners and members of boards as managers as well as auditors. The key 
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features of the corporate governance recommendations include requirements for 
an independent board, CEO non-duality, establishing of board committees, re-
porting requirements on the internal control, internal audit, and risk management 
functions as well as certain disclosure requirements (Liljeblom & Löflund, 2006). 
A listed firm shall comply with all recommendations of the Code but may depart 
from an individual recommendation. However, a departure must be disclosed and 
explained. This is the so-called Comply or Explain principle.
The Central Chamber of Commerce has also issued a corporate governance 
recommendation to unlisted companies (Improving Corporate Governance of 
Unlisted Companies, 2006). Implementation of this agenda is voluntary, but it 
aims to improve the management methods and governance in unlisted compa-
nies. However, the Central Chamber of Commerce has urged unlisted companies 
to follow the recommendations of the listed companies as far as possible.
Because the legal protection may not give enough control rights to small in-
vestors, they can achieve more effective control rights by being large (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). However, large insider ownership stakes may lead to risk avoidance 
and unwillingness to engage in strategic changes (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Both 
large shareholdings and board structure play a significant role in effective corpo-
rate governance. The firm s´ board serves as a control mechanism by monitoring 
management and firm performance, because the main role of the board is corpo-
rate control (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, insider ownership and board composition 
are regarded as substitute mechanisms for controlling agency problems (Prevost, 
Rao, & Hossain, 2002).
In privately held firms, ownership structure and board composition are im-
portant elements of corporate governance. In general, in small firms ownership 
dispersion is low and the overlapping roles of owner-managers are common—in 
small family firms, even more common. Furthermore, the role of the board as a 
corporate governance mechanism may differ from that of larger firms. Small firms 
have smaller boards but they are less formal, on average, than in their larger coun-
terparts. Despite the small size, boards may be active. The presence of external 
stakeholders and outside board members represents good corporate governance 
mechanisms (Hansson, Liljeblom, & Martikainen, 2011). However, the true inde-
pendence of outside board members can be questioned, because the owner-CEO is 
likely to be involved in choosing the board members (Hansson et al., 2011). In fam-
ily firms, family councils might also be in place that monitor or assist owners and 
managers on behalf of the family (Neubauer & Lank, 1998). Also, informal social 
controls play an important role as an informal corporate governance mechanism 
in small firms, especially in family firms. 
2.3.1 Ownership structure and agency problems
Ownership structure refers to ownership by different groups of shareholders, 
while ownership concentration refers to the number of owners. The most com-
mon ownership form is insider ownership, which consists of ownership by the 
CEO, management, or/and family. Outsider ownership refers to the ownership of 
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other stakeholders, e.g., venture capitalists or other individuals or firms, who offer 
funding in terms of equity. 
Large shareholders are generally regarded as a good corporate mechanism 
because of their interest in controlling and monitoring. Large shareholdings, i.e., 
concentrated ownership structures, are characteristic for small firms. In SMEs, one 
typical form of large shareholdings is the ownership of a family. However, Dyer 
(2006) argues that owner-management is not unique to the family firms because in 
non-family firms, managers may also be owners. As agency theory implies, large 
insider ownership may lead to risk avoidance and unwillingness to engage in stra-
tegic changes. Although concentrated large ownership may reduce some agency 
problems, it may lead to unique agency problems, especially in family firms. 
Managerial ownership
One important form of insider ownership is managerial ownership, which serves 
as an important means of controlling agency problems. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest that when managers´ interests are aligned through ownership in 
their firm, they are less likely to deviate from shareholders´ wealth maximization 
by consuming perquisites, shirking, or undertaking projects that will maximize 
only their own benefits. Prior studies have found that managers´ and sharehold-
ers´ interests become more closely aligned as managerial ownership increases 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990) be-
cause managerial ownership can increase the management’s motivation to work 
toward raising the value of the firm’s stock (Hermalin & Weissbach, 1991) and 
the incentive to consume perquisites declines as a manager s´ ownership share 
increases because his/her share of the profits will increase with ownership (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Therefore, stock ownership by management will lead to a situ-
ation in which there exists less demand for alternative mechanisms to reduce 
agency problems. But, when the interests of management are misaligned with 
those of shareholders, the resources of a firm are not entirely used in a way that 
will guarantee the maximization of shareholders´ wealth. However, in SMEs the 
ownership of management is common. Consequently, the interests of owners and 
managers are more aligned, which reduces agency problems between the owners 
and managers. 
Although managerial ownership reduces agency problems between owners 
and managers, it may increase agency problems between the firm and its lenders 
due to the firm s´ closely held nature, which is generally regarded as more informa-
tionally opaque among lenders. Prior studies, e.g., that of Niskanen and Niskanen 
(2010), report that in small firms, an increase in managerial ownership decreases 
loan availability and increases interest rates and the requirements for collateral.
Family ownership
Another important type of insider ownership is family ownership. Businesses 
are regarded as family firms when certain levels of family influence are exceed-
ed. Family firms are generally defined as businesses either owned or managed 
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and operated by the family or its units. However, to date, no clear consensus 
has emerged concerning the definition of family businesses although prior stud-
ies have presented several different definitions of family firms. The most com-
monly used definitions are based on the family ownership, family s´ presence on 
the board, family members´ control over the company (distribution of capital and 
voting rights), or how family members hold top management positions. Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) suggest that a family business can be characterized as a firm con-
trolled and also usually managed by multiple family members, or from multiple 
generations, while Dyer (2006) presents four general types of family firms based 
on the following dimensions: family assets, family liabilities, agency benefits, and 
agency costs. Klein, Astrachan, and Smyrnios (2005) argue that a family business 
definition should be transparent and unambiguous. They propose that the use of 
a continuous variable should be preferred instead of using a binary variable. Klein 
et al. (2005) suggest a more appropriately measured variable, which consists of 
three important dimensions of a family business: power, experience, and culture. 
First, power refers to the family ownership ratio, the percentage of top manage-
ment positions, and the proportion of board seats held by the family. Second, 
experience refers to generations in business and the number of family members 
contributing to the business. Third, culture refers to values, commitment, atti-
tudes, and opinions. However, a unique definition of family businesses may be 
misleading due to the fact that it cannot take into account differences in legal and 
institutional frameworks in different countries (Dyer, 2006). 
As far as the characteristics of family firms are concerned, one of the prime 
objectives of family firms is to transfer the business ownership to the next genera-
tion (Anderson et al., 2003; Naldi et al., 2007). Large concentrated shareholdings, 
such as family holdings, may derive greater benefits from the pursuit of objectives 
in their own interests, such as growth, rather than from enhancing shareholder 
value (Andersson & Reeb, 2003).But, family firms have not only economic but also 
non-economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2004). Family firms often overlook growth 
opportunities (Poutziouris, 2001) and tend to take lower risks than do non-family 
firms (Naldi et al., 2007). They make decisions on longer time horizons than do 
non-family firms (Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006). Moreover, family firms may 
make better investment decisions, since families have more specific knowledge of 
the firm (James, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Families´ interest is likely to focus on 
the firm s´ long-term survival and concern for both the firm s´ and family s´ reputa-
tion (Anderson et al., 2003). Owner-managed firms and family firms may pursue 
low-risk investment strategies to moderate the level of business risk (Hutchinson, 
1995). Also, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) propose that large and undiversified inves-
tors will exercise risk-reduction strategies. In family firms, risk aversion may stem 
from the fact that their business represents a significant proportion of their wealth 
and they may wish to pass it on to the next generation (Naldi et al., 2007). 
The previous empirical literature is not unanimous on whether agency prob-
lems are more or less severe in family firms. Some studies suggest that family 
firms should be exempt from agency problems due to the intra-familial altruistic 
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element as well as the fact that management and ownership overlap (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Ang et al., 2000; Dyer, 2006). Anderson et al. (2003) argue that 
agency problems are less severe in firms with founding family ownership, because 
the family s´ interest and concern is not only in the firm s´ long-term survival but 
also in the family s´ and firm s´ reputation. Similarly, some studies suggest that 
agency problems exist but they may be less severe because family firms also have 
non-economic goals (Poutziouris, 2001; Chrisman et al., 2004), such as providing 
jobs for less-talented family members (Chrisman et al., 2004). Schulze, Lubatkin, 
Dino, and Buchholz (2001) and Schulze et al. (2003) argue that altruism may create 
agency problems unique to family firms, because family relationships may make 
it more difficult to solve conflicts or to curb unproductive behavior. However, 
altruism may increase loyalty and commitment to the firm and encourage mem-
bers within the family to take care of one another. Furthermore, it may lead to 
increased communication and cooperation. Family ownership may also bring 
common goals, higher trust, and shared values, which reduce monitoring costs, 
i.e., agency costs (Dyer, 2006). At the same time, altruism may motivate the tak-
ing of such actions as free riding and shirking (Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 
2003; Chrisman et.al., 2004) or becoming more dependent on each other, which 
may threaten the welfare of both the family and the business because it is difficult 
to punish poor performance (Schulze et al., 2001). 
Because a family firm cannot be regarded as a homogeneous group of people 
with joint interests (Sharma, Chrisman, and Chua, 1997), agency conflicts may 
arise between majority and minority shareholders (Morck et al., 1988; La Porta 
et al., 1999; Chrisman et al., 2004) because the majority owners may inefficiently 
redistribute wealth from other investors to themselves (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
It has been argued that family-controlled firms employ higher dividend payout 
ratios because families use dividends, or debt, as a substitute for independent 
directors (Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, & Skully, 2009). Family firm owners may be 
more dependent on steady dividend payments because their firms often constitute 
a primary or a significant source of income for them. 
Not only the small firm size but also family ownership may increase the likeli-
hood that agency problems arise between a firm and its outside suppliers of funds. 
Family firms may be even more likely to face agency problems between the firm 
and its potential lenders due to the closely held nature and higher information 
asymmetry (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
Outside ownership
One fundamental decision of finance is whether or not to allow external finance 
to be provided by outsiders in return for part ownership of the firm (Storey, 1994). 
Outside owners can provide finance in terms of equity and, therefore, offer the 
capital needed. As a firm grows it may become more difficult for the initial own-
ers to provide additional equity. Consequently, one alternative is to invite outside 
shareholders who can provide finance in terms of equity, which will also improve 
the firm’s capital structure. However, most small firms are owner-managed, and 
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small business owners are not motivated to share their ownership either with oth-
er individuals, firms, or financial institutions, because doing so dilutes ownership-
control and diminishes management s´ freedom of action (Storey, 1994; Neubauer 
& Lank, 1998; Poutziouris, 2001). In other words, family firms tend to follow a 
keep-it-in-the-family tradition (Poutziouris, 2001).
One form of outside ownership is ownership by venture capitalists. Venture 
capitalists are institutional or individual investors who invest large sums in a 
single business and support the firm and provide entrepreneurship with business 
skills. In general, venture capitalists invest in firms with high growth potential 
(Berger & Udell, 1998) at the founding stage. They retain their holdings and expect 
to obtain capital gains rather than dividends. Venture capitalists also contribute 
to the firm’s decision making by acting as an advisor or board member. But, they 
represent a relatively small proportion of small business finance because they 
invest very selectively and target their investments on firms with high growth 
potential (Berger & Udell, 1998). 
To sum up, outside owners can provide needed capital, strengthen the capital 
structure, and enhance better corporate governance. Moreover, depending on the 
size of the stakes, outside owners may have a role of good monitoring and control-
ling, and, therefore, the presence of outside owners may mitigate agency prob-
lems. However, small firms may be too small for the investment scope of outside 
investors, such as venture capitalists. Also, small business owners´ reluctance to 
employ outside equity and share ownership is, in general, high, for purposes of 
retaining ownership control (Poutziouris, 2001), which reduces the attractiveness 
of this form of funding. 
Number of owners and ownership dispersion
The number of owners refers to the level of ownership dispersion. Fragmented 
ownership is beneficial in terms of optimal allocation of risk bearing (Fama, 1980). 
Businesses founded by a team are more likely to grow than businesses owned 
by a single person because the management of a business requires a wide range 
of skills (Storey, 1994). However, many small business owners are strongly op-
posed to sharing their ownership because doing so dilutes ownership and con-
trol (Storey, 1994). Ownership concentration may reduce agency problems, but it 
may also increase risk aversion. This is based on the argument that an individual 
shareholder’s large stake in one firm implies lower portfolio diversification for that 
shareholder (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999), thereby reducing incentives 
for risk taking.
Agency theory suggests that shareholders are homogenous and their influence 
on firm performance is directly proportional to their ownership ratio. But, owner-
ship dispersion may also lead to a lower level of monitoring and more severe agen-
cy problems because the free rider problem increases as the number of owners 
increases (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Fragmented ownership may cause sharehold-
ers to be too diversified to have the incentive or ability to monitor a particular firm 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Berle and Means (1932) suggest that dispersed ownership 
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may also render shareholders powerless to constrain professional management. 
On the contrary, large controlling shareholders who are not managers are more 
capable of monitoring and controlling managers and have greater resources and 
incentives to acquire information (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). An extensive number 
of SMEs are closely held, i.e., owned by the founders, management, or family. 
Thus, the number of owners in SMEs is, on average, relatively low. Consequently, 
the small number of owners and an overlapping owner-management role reduces 
agency problems between owners and managers. Thus, room is still left for the 
other kinds of agency problems such as between owners and lenders or between 
majority and minority owners.
Implications
The prior empirical literature suggests that managerial ownership affects firm 
performance positively at lower levels of ownership and negatively at higher lev-
els of ownership (Morck et al., 1988; Hermalin & Weissbach, 1991; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990), because at higher levels of ownership, managers are rewarded for 
good performance or prefer to retain their ownership in a well-performing firm 
(McConnell & Servaes, 1990). But, at lower levels of ownership, managers may 
have lower executive pay or side payments and interests are not aligned (Morck 
et al., 1988). Furthermore, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find a positive relationship 
between insider ownership and firm profitability but they point out that better 
performance may also lead to higher insider ownership. As far as funding and 
managerial ownership are concerned, small business owner-managers´ attitudes 
and beliefs shape a firm s´ financing behavior (Michaelas et al., 1998), and firms 
tend first to use retained earnings to cover the funding needs to retain ownership-
control (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Poutziouris, 2001). This is supported by Hadlock 
(1998) who finds that investment-cash flow sensitivity increases with managerial 
ownership.
Morck et al. (1988) suggest that firms with high insider ownership perform 
better. However, prior studies suggest conflicting results. Large family holdings 
can have a negative impact on firm value and it may be even more negative if 
family members hold executive positions such as CEO in the firm because large 
shareholders may undertake less risk to protect their wealth (Ben-Amar & André, 
2006). However, Allouche, Amann, Jaussad, and Kurashina (2008) and Andres 
(2008) find that family ownership is associated with better firm performance, at 
least under certain conditions, such as when the founding family is still active, e.g., 
serve as board members, because families have a deeper relationship with their 
firms and they feel responsible for other shareholders (Andres, 2008). Similarly, 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) show that family firms with the founder as board chair 
have the higher performance, but performance is lower when descendants serve 
as board chair or CEO because the agency conflict between family and non-family 
shareholders is more costly. Hansson et al. (2011) and Lòpez-Gracia and Sánchez-
Andújar (2007) suggest that there is no significant difference in terms of profit-
ability between small- and medium-sized family and non-family firms. However, 
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differences exist in their funding behaviour (Lòpez-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 
2007). Naldi et al. (2007) argue that small- and medium-sized family firms take 
risks to a lesser extent than their non-family counterparts and that risk taking is 
negatively related to performance. Family firms tend to be more conservative and 
risk averse in decision making to avoid losing family wealth. 
Those mixed results may be a consequence of, as Gedaljovic, Carney, Chrisman, 
and Kellermans (2012) argue, the national economy s´ state of institutional devel-
opment, adoption of different theoretical perspectives, different types of family 
firms, the use of convenience samples, and selection bias. The differences may 
also result from differences in the definition of family influence (Miller, Le Breton-
Miller, Lester, and Cannella, 2007; Gedaljovic et al., 2012). 
Carney (2006) and Gedaljovic et al. (2012) suggest that the positive effect of 
family ownership on firm performance is related to fewer agency problems, parsi-
monious use of financial resources, adaptation of long-term investment horizons, 
increased fostering of entrepreneurial risk taking, greater intensity in scrutinizing 
business opportunities, avoidance of inefficient unrelated diversification, and the 
fact that name and personal identity are related to the family firm’s reputation. 
Agency conflicts between owners and managers are mitigated because owner-
managers regard growth opportunities and risk bearing as one and the same 
(Carney, 2005). Furthermore, when family firms utilize social capital, entrepre-
neurial cognitions, and tacit knowledge and combine parsimony, personalism, 
and particularism, it will lead to competitive advantages (Carney, 2005; Gedaljovic 
et al., 2012). Similarly, family firms may benefit from human capital, because the 
transmission of knowledge about the business among family members is easier 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006).
The negative effect of family ownership on firm performance is related to self-
ish behavior, incentive to consume perks, managerial entrenchment, and diver-
gence of interests between the majority and minority owners (Gedaljovic et al., 
2012). Furthermore, negative effects may also stem from non-family managers 
and employees. More precisely, employees with no ownership stakes may under-
take inefficient investments because only owners benefit from good investments. 
Furthermore, executives are not rewarded with performance incentives such as 
stock options because it dilutes ownership and control. Also, owners may favor 
family members, which can generate inequities. Therefore, family firms may lack 
the “best talents” because they may have difficulties in recruiting, rewarding, and 
retaining high-quality managers (Schulze et al., 2001). Family firms may also be 
less likely to achieve their goals when they rely on non-family managers because 
family firms are unwilling or unable to offer high-powered incentives (Gedaljovic 
et al., 2012). 
Moreover, nepotism, insular management, familial control concerns, and 
poor governance may also have negative effects. Family firm founders are more 
likely to hire relatives in the business than to hire more-talented professionals 
because founders may derive utility from seeing relatives involved in the business 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). Gedaljovic et al. (2012) argue that family firm managers 
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have diverse and mixed personal economic and non-economic motives. Mixed 
motives of managers may not necessarily lead to inefficient resource allocation, 
such as inefficient investments. However, family firms face capital and manage-
rial capacity constraints that will limit the resources (Carney, 2005). Furthermore, 
opportunistic investments may occur because family firm owners have the power 
and ability to allocate resources without being required to analyze their invest-
ment decisions carefully (Carney, 2005). Finally, family values and cultural issues 
such as family ties or family norms may play an important role in family busi-
nesses, leading to lower efficiency and lower willingness to make changes to their 
overall strategy (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006).
Some studies have found that family firms use less debt to minimize the prob-
ability of bankruptcy and the risk of losing control (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; 
McConaughy et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 2003). They suggest that the other rea-
son to avoid using debt could be based on the fact that family business owners 
avoid damaging both the firm s´ and the family s´ reputation and losing their own 
wealth. But, Coleman and Carsky (1999) argue that family firms use debt as much 
as non-family firms because loans are available due to the firms´ ability to fulfill 
the requirements of the lender, such as sufficient collateral, a reliable business 
plan, and financial statements. However, Blanco-Mazagatos et al. (2007) argue that 
small- and medium-sized family firms use more debt because they are averse to 
expanding the firm s´ ownership structure due to fear of losing control.
Small firm size may increase the likelihood that firms have to reject invest-
ment opportunities because small firms may be more financially constrained than 
are their larger counterparts due to information asymmetry (Myers & Majluf, 
1984; Hyytinen & Väänänen, 2006). Therefore, family firms may face even more 
financial constraints. This is supported by Niskanen et al. (2010) who suggest 
that family firms may lack financial resources because banks are averse to lend-
ing to small- and medium-sized firms that can be characterized as family firms. 
Moreover, family firms avoid using debt in order to protect the longevity of the 
family business as well as to keep control within the family and, therefore, family 
firms may forgo growth and other opportunities (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999), 
and they are more likely to postpone an investment rather than give up control 
over their company (Gugler, 2003). However, one funding form is mezzanine capi-
tal, which combines the characteristics both of equity and debt financing (Amon 
& Dorfleitner, 2013; Pratt & Crowe, 1995). It can be regarded as an alternative to 
financing capital expenditure or expansion with a lower average cost of capital 
and without losing ownership and management control (Amon & Dorfleitner, 
2013; Pratt & Crowe, 1995). 
As noted before, an increase in managerial ownership increases the value of the 
firm because managerial ownership aligns the interests of managers and share-
holders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Cho (1998) suggest that managerial ownership 
affects investments and, therefore, firm value, because the interests of the contract-
ing parties are more aligned. Cho (1998) finds that a non-monotonic relationship 
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exists between insider ownership and capital expenditures and between insider 
ownership and R&D expenditures, but in the way that investments affect firm 
value, which in turn affects the ownership structure. However, Croci, Doukas, 
and Gonenc (2009) and Block (2012) propose that family firms seem to invest more 
in low-risk, fixed-asset capital expenditure than in high-risk, R&D expenditure, 
which confirms their non-risk-seeking behavior. In general, economic goal orien-
tation may lead to higher risk taking. But, family firms also have non-economic 
goals (Chrisman et al., 2004). As a result, small- and medium-sized family firms 
are more likely to adopt more conservative and less risk-oriented investment strat-
egies (Naldi et al., 2007), and they avoid using external funding sources both in 
terms of debt and equity (Poutziouris, 2001). Consequently, if internally generated 
funds are insufficient, this may lead to financial constraints and reduce the firm s´ 
resources to invest (Gallo et al., 2004). 
Gugler (2003) finds a positive relationship between investment and cash flow 
in family firms because family firm owners seem to be unwilling to issue new 
equity and give up control over the firm. However, it has been argued that family 
firms are more likely to withdraw funds for own use, which reduces the funds 
for undertaking investment projects (Jensen, 1986; Dyer, 2006). Finally, if owners 
with different levels of ownership stakes have different goals and/or risk-tolerance 
levels, they may prefer to divert resources away from the firm, leading to the prob-
lem of underinvestment. As Block (2012) argues, second-generation family firm 
owners´ main ambition is to secure the firm s´ survival and its dividend payments.
Small firm owners, especially family firm owner-managers, avoid using ex-
ternal capital in terms of equity because owner-managers dislike diluting own-
ership, control, and financial independence and sharing the seats on the board 
with outsiders because it reduces management s´ freedom of action (Neubauer & 
Lank, 1998; Poutziouris, 2001). A minority of family business owner-managers 
are growth oriented (Poutziouris, 2001), which reduces the interest of outsiders 
such as venture capitalists in investing in a family firm. Furthermore, they tar-
get their investments on firms with high growth potential (Berger & Udell, 1998; 
Poutziouris, 2001) and the smallest firms may be too small for their investment 
scope. The avoidance of using outside equity funding may also stem from the fact 
that firms might also have more pressure to complete profit and dividend targets 
that external equity requires (Poutziouris, 2001). 
Prior studies are not unanimous whether the number of owners affects perfor-
mance. As agency theory implies, larger insider ownership, i.e., ownership con-
centration, may lead to risk avoidance and unwillingness to engage in strategic 
changes. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no 
statistically significant relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance, while some other studies find a positive association between own-
ership concentration and profitability because ownership concentration reduces 
agency problems (Morck et al., 1988; Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Andersson & Reeb, 
2003). Furthermore, when ownership is concentrated among family, those firms 
perform better because family members understand the business and act as stew-
ards of their firms (Andersson & Reeb, 2003). 
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2.3.2 Board composition and agency problems
The role of the board is of key importance in corporate governance. Boards set 
overall policy for firms, but daily decision making rests with management. The 
board is responsible for the firm’s leadership and management without actually 
interfering in day-to-day operations, which is the duty of the CEO. The board re-
cruits the CEO and represents the interests of the firm’s shareholders, providing 
the CEO with advice and counsel. The main role of the board is corporate control 
and the board serves as a control mechanism by monitoring management and 
firm performance (Jensen, 1993). Performing these activities, boards can enhance 
the performance of the firm and maximize shareholder value. The board can en-
sure that decision management and decision control are kept separate (Ezzamel 
& Watson, 1993), which promotes better corporate governance. 
In a firm with separate ownership and management, the board’s role in moni-
toring and controlling is important in the safeguarding of shareholders`  invest-
ments (Brunninge, Nordqvist, & Wiklund, 2007). In closely held firms, the role of 
the board is different than in widely held firms, because the risk of management’s 
opportunistic behavior is lower due to the overlapping of ownership and manage-
ment. Johannisson and Huse (2000) and Forbes and Milliken (1999) argue that the 
role of the board may be of more importance in private SMEs than in large listed 
firms. This argument is partly based on the idea that the information gap between 
owner-managers and other major stakeholders of the firm is especially wide in 
the case of small- and medium-sized private firms. Prior studies also suggest that 
a well-functioning board of directors may add value through several alternative 
roles, such as strategy development (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000) and control-
ling the management (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). Johannisson and Huse (2000) 
imply that because entrepreneurs value independence highly, they dislike any 
control mechanisms such as the board. They further indicate that providers of 
external finance may require a seat on the board to reduce the information gap. In 
smaller firms, the adoption of outside board members is more likely when outside 
ownership increases, because external owners demand it and to gain the service 
resource advantages outsiders can provide (Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, & Dennis, 
2000). 
Why does board composition matter? Prior research suggests that the board 
can be an alternative mechanism to solve agency problems. Furthermore, the em-
pirical literature, e.g., Pearce and Zahra (1992), suggests that a board s´ ability to 
perform their service, strategy, and control depends largely on board composition. 
Board composition impacts also board members´ ability and power to provide stra-
tegic direction and performance (Baysinger & Hoskinsson, 1990). Therefore, board 
composition may affect the firm s´ financial performance, risk taking, and value. 
Moreover, Bammens et al. (2008) suggest that failure of firms could be avoided by 
implementing such good corporate governance mechanisms as a board. 
As noted before, ownership structure and board composition can be seen as 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms. It has been argued that board size 
and composition are functions of the board members´ and the firm s´ character-
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istics (Rajeha, 2005) and that owners choose a board that is unlikely to monitor 
(Lasfer, 2006). As far as small firms are concerned, in family firms, family-related 
variables are more important than CEO-related variables in explaining board 
composition (Voordeckers, Van Gils, & Van den Heuvel, 2007), which is a reflec-
tion of the family characteristics and objectives. Furthermore, in SMEs, owners 
choose a board composition that matches their own preferences, because owners 
have most of their wealth invested in their firm and they prefer to have a board 
that makes decisions carefully (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998). 
Board size
Agency theory suggests that when a board gets too big, agency problems arise. 
Larger boards with beyond seven or eight members are less effective and easier to 
control by the CEO (Jensen, 1993). Also, Yermack (1996) suggests that smaller boards 
are better boards because they are more effective and firms with smaller boards 
exhibit better performance. Boards will be smaller when insiders´ incentives are 
aligned with those of shareholders .´ In addition, smaller boards save on the outsider 
coordination costs while these still motivate inside board members to reveal their 
private information (Rajeha, 2005). Small firms with high managerial ownership or 
controlled by founding families tend to have smaller and less-independent boards 
because board size is sensitive to the benefits and costs of monitoring managers 
(Yermack, 1996; Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Rajeha, 2007). In small family firms, small 
board size may reflect the family owners´ concern to retain control in the hands of 
the family, which may also result in having a low number of outsiders on the board 
(Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007). Furthermore, board size is positively related to firm 
size, i.e., larger firms have larger boards (Dehaene et al., 2001; Bozec, 2005). However, 
optimal board size varies because it reflects the nature of the firm, or businesses 
adjust the board size in response to their past performance (Eisenberg et al., 1998). 
Board size and independence increase as firms grow and diversify because most 
firms’ boards are tailored to suit the business s´ competitive environment (Boone et 
al., 2007). In small firms, boards are, in general, small, because in small firms agency 
problems may be less severe due to firms´ closely held nature.
Board independence 
Agency theory further suggests a need for board independence. Also, the corpo-
rate governance recommendations propose that firms should prefer independent 
boards. The degree of board independence is closely associated with its composi-
tion. Outsider presentation is used as a measure of board independence. Hence, 
the board is presumed to be more independent as the number of outside members 
increases proportionally. Outside board members are believed to be independent 
from the management and they can provide superior performance benefits to the 
firm (Fama, 1980; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johsson, 1998) and take care of the 
controlling role on behalf of stakeholders. However, Fama and Jensen (1983) imply 
that outside board members are more independent of the CEO but they are less 
informed about the firm and its projects.
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The level of board independence depends also on the affiliation of outside 
board members with the management, which may harm board independence. 
The true independence of outside board members can be questioned, because an 
owner-CEO is likely to be involved in choosing the board members (Hansson et 
al., 2011). In practice, small firm and family firm owners or owner-CEOs tend to 
appoint outside board members who are their close friends or have a good rela-
tionship with him/her or the firm. Consequently, those affiliated board members 
have close ties to the CEO, and, consequently, personal loyalty to him/her, which 
may threaten board independence. Furthermore, the board s´ effectiveness will 
decrease with the proportion of outside board members influenced by the CEO 
because they may be unable to disagree with him/her (Rajeha, 2005). However, 
the adoption of an outside board member could reduce agency costs, because the 
presence of outsiders on the board will increase board independence (Voordeckers 
et al., 2007). 
Outsiders are often thought to play a monitoring role inside the board, but, 
insiders possess superior information that could lead to better evaluation of man-
agers (Bozec, 2005). Based on the prior studies, outside directors are adopted on 
the board because of advice and control needs (Hermalin & Weissbach, 1988; 
Johannisson & Huse, 2000; Bammens et al., 2008). But, outsiders may reduce the 
influence of the board on several activities and functions due to the lack of firm-
specific knowledge and its environment, or lack of availability to the firm. Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2008) suggest that firms in which firm-specific knowledge of 
insiders is relatively important, such as R&D-intensive firms, are likely to benefit 
from greater presentation of insiders on the board because insiders may have a 
stronger commitment to the firm than have outsiders. However, diversified, large 
firms, or firms with higher leverage may have greater advising needs and they will 
benefit from the presence of outside board members (Coles et al., 2008). 
Independent board members are regarded as a good governance mechanism 
because independent members represent the shareholders’ interests and bring 
added value to the firm (Ben-Amar & André, 2006). Because in small firms man-
agers often own large stakes in their firms, it could be argued there will be less 
demand for controlling devices such as outside board members. Furthermore, 
small firms have been criticized for being slow to adopt outsiders on the board 
because owners may be more reluctant to have someone directing their actions 
and reducing their freedom of action. This is supported by Fama and Jensen (1983) 
and Jensen (1993) who suggest that managers are unlikely to prefer outside board 
members because their function is to exercise control.
As far as diversity of the board is concerned, both small and large firms could 
benefit from board diversity. Outside board members could bring their expertise, 
experience, and contacts and their role is more critical to improved performance 
than to the control function (Daily & Dalton, 1993; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000) 
because they offer advice (Bammens et al., 2008). Furthermore, outsiders from 
different backgrounds may enhance the understanding of the firm s´ internal and 
external environment and provide broader views in strategic decision making 
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(Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000). Board diversity has been discussed also by politi-
cians and the enforcement of a quota for female board members by a law has been 
suggested (Liljeblom & Löflund, 2006). However, although such a quota has not 
been stipulated, the number of female board members has increased in Finnish 
listed firms (Liljeblom & Löflund, 2006). Furthermore, boards have become more 
international because of the nomination of foreign board members (Liljeblom & 
Löflund, 2006). 
Prior studies have found that firms facing greater information asymmetry, i.e., 
smaller firms, have smaller and less-independent boards because of higher costs of 
monitoring (Bozec, 2005). Furthermore, the proportion of outside board members 
is likely to be positively associated with board size (Yermack, 1996; Dehaene et al., 
2001), while Mak and Li (2001) indicate opposite results. Hermalin and Weissbach 
(1988), Mak and Li (2001), Lasfer (2006) and Boone et al. (2007) suggest that the 
number of outsiders on the board is negatively related to managerial ownership. 
In line with them, Coles et al. (2008) report that the percentage of insiders on the 
board is positively associated with CEO ownership. Fiegener et al. (2000) find that 
outside ownership increases the likelihood that firms have boards with outside 
board members. 
Family firms are more likely to have CEO duality and a lower proportion of 
independent members on the board than are non-family firms (Bartholomeusz 
& Tanewski, 2006). Voordeckers et al. (2007) argue that small- and medium-sized 
family firms that focus more on business objectives than family-related objec-
tives are more likely to have at least one outside board member. They further 
imply that having a keep-it-in-the-family character induces firms to avoid outside 
board members. However, family firms are more likely to employ outside board 
members near generational change or to facilitate access to resources critical to 
the firm s´ success. Furthermore, in case of conflicts between family members, 
outside board members can serve as arbitrators because of their objectivity and 
expertise (Voordeckers et al., 2007). In addition, outside suppliers of funds, e.g., 
banks, may have the power to require an outsider on the board to exercise con-
trol and participate in strategic direction to control the firm and its management 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Johannisson & Huse, 2000). Consequently, this practice 
reduces information asymmetry and agency problems. The other mechanism 
that protects lenders´ rights and diminishes agency conflicts is covenants, which 
restrict the managers´ actions in the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Anderson 
et al., 2003). Based on the agency theory, outside boards should be preferred be-
cause the board s´ ability to exercise control increases with board independence. 
Voordeckers et al. (2007) argue that, in small firms, the adoption of outsiders on 
the board may diminish agency costs resulting from altruistic behavior.
CEO duality
CEO duality refers to a joint board leadership structure in which the same person 
undertakes both the roles of CEO and board chair (Bozec, 2005). The preference 
for a separate leadership structure is based on the agency theory, which states 
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that CEO duality undermines board independence because the CEO will acquire 
a wider locus of control. Also, corporate governance recommendations suggest 
that the roles of board chair and CEO should be separated (Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010). CEO duality results in managers having more power to 
influence board decisions (Lasfer, 2006). As Jensen (1993) argues, a CEO cannot 
perform the role of the board chair without of his/her personal interest. Therefore, 
an independent board chair is necessary to perform the board’s critical functions 
and its most important role, namely that of controlling and monitoring.
In small firms, the CEO is often the dominant person because he/she is one of 
the owners. A powerful CEO may be able to take the position of board chair and 
also be involved in the selection of board members, or may structure their boards 
in self-serving ways. The CEO will be able to use his/her bargaining position such 
as his/her voting stake to ensure a relatively weak board (Hermalin & Weissbach, 
1988). Prior studies suggest CEO duality increases as management ownership in-
creases (Lasfer, 2006) and as blockholder ownership, e.g., family ownership, in-
creases (Mak and Li, 2001). CEO duality may increase agency problems, at least 
between the firm and outside suppliers of funds.
Implications
The previous literature suggests that a well-functioning board may add value 
through several alternative roles, such as strategy development (Gabrielsson & 
Winlund, 2000) and controlling the management (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). 
Therefore, a corporate governance mechanism such as board independence may 
enhance performance, enable better access to financing, lower the cost of capital, 
and moderate the other terms of financing because board independence may re-
duce agency problems between the firm and its outside suppliers of funds, as it 
increases accountability and reduces information asymmetry. 
Prior studies have found that boards composed primarily of outsiders should 
be generally superior to boards of insiders (Wagner, Stimpert, & Fubara, 1998), 
because outside board members are believed to be independent from manage-
ment and they can provide superior performance benefits for the firm (Fama, 1980; 
Dalton et al., 1998). Outsiders are expected to represent the shareholders’ interests 
and bring added value to the firm (Ben-Amar & André, 2006) and they are often 
thought to play a monitoring role inside the board (Bozec, 2005). However, Bozec 
(2005) argues that it may be difficult for outsiders to understand the complexities 
of the firm since outside board members are usually part-time and they may sit 
on a number of other boards. 
As far as the relationship between financial performance and board struc-
tures is concerned, the previous empirical literature finds conflicting results sug-
gesting a positive relationship between outsiders on the board and firm profit-
ability (Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Dehaene et al., 2001) and a negative association 
between outsiders on the board and firm profitability (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). 
Furthermore, Kesner (1987) suggests that the presence of insiders on the board is 
positively associated with firm profitability, while Wagner et al. (1998) argue that 
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the presence of a mixture of both insiders and outsiders is positively associated 
with profitability because insiders have better knowledge about the firm and its 
managers and outsiders bring their objectivity, expertise, and connections. Studies 
on the relationship between board leadership structure and performance have 
also yielded mixed results. Some studies find no relationship between perfor-
mance and CEO duality (Dalton et al., 1998), while other studies suggest a nega-
tive association between profitability and CEO duality (Ezzamel & Watson, 1993; 
Bozec, 2005). Others, such as Dehaene et al. (2001), find a positive relationship 
between CEO duality and profitability, because an active CEO seeks for growth or 
extends his/her personal status. However, Hermalin and Weissbach (1988) argue 
that after a poor result, inside board members are replaced by outside members. In 
line with that, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) propose that better firm performance 
may lead to fewer outsiders on the board, because outsiders are added only to the 
boards of poorly performing firms. Hansson et al. (2011) imply that in small- and 
medium-sized family firms, a positive relationship exists between profitability 
and family CEO. They also find that in family firms, a negative association exists 
between board size and performance, which suggests that very small boards are 
better boards in simple firms. 
Board structure may have an impact on the availability of external funds in 
small firms because the board may have a role in reducing agency problems be-
tween the firm and its potential outside suppliers of finance. As Johannisson and 
Huse (2000) argue, the providers of external finance may require a seat on the 
board to reduce the information gap. When a board is entirely composed of own-
ers, it may lead to risk avoidance, for example, in the form of avoiding using debts. 
Consequently, it may lead to financial constraints and, therefore, reduce or even 
hamper investments unless internally generated funds are sufficient.
2.4 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS, HYPOTH-
ESES, AND RESULTS
The overall purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the financial patterns 
of small- and medium-sized firms in an agency theory and corporate govern-
ance context through three related articles. Those articles focus on the impact 
that ownership and board structures may have on financial performance, funding 
behavior, and investment behavior. 
The purpose of the first article is to investigate the relationship between per-
formance and ownership and corporate governance structures in small- and me-
dium-sized firms. Hypotheses on the relationship between ownership structure 
and board composition and performance are based on the prior theoretical and 
empirical literature. The aim of the second article is to explore the relationship 
between family ownership and the owner-manager s´ attitudes toward using dif-
ferent funding sources and the actual financing behavior in private family and 
non-family firms. Hypotheses are constructed both on the attitudes and usage of 
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different funding sources. The third article focuses on the investment behavior 
of private small- and medium-sized family and non-family firms. The purpose is 
to explore whether there are differences in the amount of investment and in the 
rejection of investment. The hypotheses are based on the previous theoretical and 
empirical literature on investment and financing patterns. Table 1 summarizes the 
research questions, hypotheses, and results.
Table 1: Research questions, hypotheses, and results in the articles
Article 1: Financial Performance of SMEs – Impact of Ownership Structure and 
Board Composition
Research question Hypotheses Results 
Do the ownership struc-
ture and board compo-
sition affect growth and 
profitability?
Management ownership is negatively related 
to growth and positively related to profitabil-
ity.
growth -
profitability +
Venture capital ownership is positively related 
to growth and profitability.
growth +
profitability -
Expectations on the role that outside and 
inside board members have on growth and 
profitability are open.
outsiders and 
growth -
outsiders and 
profitability -
Article 2: Behavior and Attitudes of Small Family Firms toward Different 
Funding Sources
Research question Hypotheses Results 
Do the attitudes toward 
and the use of different 
funding sources differ 
between family and 
non-family firms?
Family firms are more likely to use trade 
credits and funding from finance companies 
as their funding source than are non-family 
firms.
supported
Family firms are more likely to use additional 
equity from current owners than are non-
family firms.
supported
Family firms have more positive attitudes 
toward trade credits and funding from finance 
companies than do non-family firms.
more nega-
tive attitudes/
opposite to 
hypothesis
Family firms have more negative attitudes 
toward bank loans than do non-family firms. supported
Family firms have more positive attitudes 
toward additional equity from current owners 
than do non-family firms. 
supported
Article 3: Do the Investment Behaviors of Family Firms and Non-family Firms 
Differ?
Research question Hypotheses Results 
Do the investment 
behaviors of family and 
non-family firms differ?
Family firms are more likely to reject an in-
vestment than are non-family firms. supported
Family firms invest lesser amounts than do 
non-family firms. 
insignificant 
results
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2.5 DATA DESCRIPTION
The data for this study were collected through a private survey in autumn 2006. 
The survey was targeted on the limited liability companies that are located in four 
regions in Finland: Kainuu, Pohjois-Savo, Etelä-Savo, and Pohjois-Karjala. The fi-
nancial statement data have been collected from Voitto+ register and compiled 
by Asiakastieto Ltd., a Finnish financial and credit information company. Voitto+ 
register is a commercial and comprehensive database with financial statement 
information. The sample firms are firms with at least two employees and whose 
legal form is a limited liability. The questionnaires were sent to the CEOs. Of the 
3262 questionnaires sent, a total of 621 responses were usable, which resulted 
in an effective response rate of 19%. The final sample consists of 600 small- and 
medium-sized firms operating in Finland, because some firms that are outside the 
European Union (EU) definition of small- and medium-sized firms were dropped. 
The sample firms represent all industries, excluding primary production. 
Primary production is excluded because of its different nature of business com-
pared to other businesses. Other legal forms than limited liabilities are excluded 
because official financial statement data on them are not available. 
The firms were asked to provide information on their ownership structure, 
board composition, preferences toward different funding sources, the information 
on their use of different funding sources, the amount of investments, and whether 
they have rejected investments and if so, why. Observations include the years from 
2000 to 2005. The total number of available observations per firm per year varies 
because, in some cases, information is available for less than six years.
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3 Summary of the Articles 
3.1 ARTICLE 1: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF SMES – 
IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND BOARD COM-
POSITION
The purpose of the first article was to investigate the association between per-
formance and ownership and corporate governance structures in small- and 
medium-sized firms. The research question addressed the topic whether owner-
ship structure and board composition are associated with a firm s´ growth and 
profitability. 
The relationship between corporate governance structures, i.e., ownership 
structure and board composition, and financial performance has long been the 
subject of an important debate in the corporate finance literature. As agency theo-
ry suggests, the separation of ownership and control may lead to agency problems 
when the interests of owners and managers are misaligned (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). One way to mitigate agency problems is ownership structure, such as mana-
gerial ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). An alternative mechanism for reduc-
ing agency problems is board composition. Furthermore, the prior literature sug-
gests that ownership structure and board composition can be seen as a potentially 
important predictor of financial performance.
Panel data estimation methods were employed in the analyses. More specifi-
cally, all models were run with both random effects and fixed effects models. The 
2SLS model was used to address the endogenous nature of growth and profitabil-
ity. The findings of the study suggest that both ownership structure and board 
composition are significant determinants of firm performance in our sample of 
private small- and medium-sized Finnish firms. However, the results imply that 
the ownership structure may be a more important determinant of the growth 
and profitability of small firms than is board structure. The results further sug-
gest that the ownership structure affects both the growth and the profitability of 
small private firms. More precisely, firms with high managerial ownership levels 
exhibit higher profitability ratios but have lower growth rates. Furthermore, firms 
with high venture capital firm ownership ratios grow faster but are less profit-
able. Finally, the results on board structure suggest that board structure has only 
a slight impact on the performance of small firms. The only significant result in 
this context is that firms with outside board members have lower growth rates 
and they are less profitable.
The results of this study can be interpreted to indicate that owner-managers 
are risk averse and that venture capital firms seek investments with high growth 
potential. The results could also imply that outsiders are taken on as board mem-
bers in badly performing firms on financiers’ requests, which could suggest that 
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creditors aim at reducing agency problems. An alternative explanation for out-
siders’ presence on the board may be that they are nominated as board members 
because it is thought that they can enhance financial performance. 
3.2 ARTICLE 2: BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES OF SMALL 
FAMILY FIRMS TOWARD DIFFERENT FUNDING SOURCES 
The aim of the second article was to explore the relationship between family own-
ership and the owner-manager s´ attitudes toward using different funding sources 
and the actual financing behavior in private family and non-family firms. The 
research question was: Do the attitudes toward and the use of different funding 
sources differ between family and non-family firms? 
The theoretical framework of this article is based on the pecking order theory 
(Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). In small businesses, information asymmetry 
may induce agency problems between the owner-managers and outside suppli-
ers of funds, which may lead to financial constraints and lead firms to follow a 
pecking order (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Hall, Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 
2000). Pecking order theory can be considered a relevant approach in explaining 
especially the funding behavior of family firms because they avoid using external 
capital to retain ownership-control and financial independence (Poutziouris, 2001; 
Romano et al., 2001). 
Because of the quantitative nature of the data, logit regressions were used to in-
vestigate the usage of funding sources and ordinary least squares regression (OLS) 
analysis to investigate attitudes toward different funding sources. The results of 
this study suggest that family firms are more likely to use trade credits, finance 
company, and owners as their sources of finance than are non-family firms. The 
results also suggest that family firms have more negative attitudes toward bank 
loans and trade credits but more positive attitudes toward additional equity from 
current owners than have non-family firms.
The fact that the results on the usage of and attitudes toward trade credit differ 
suggests that the family firms in the sample may be forced to use short-term debts 
because more-preferred sources are not available. This could imply that family 
firms may be more financially constrained than their non-family counterparts 
and they face more severe agency problems between the firm and potential lend-
ers due to information asymmetry stemming from the firm s´ closely held nature. 
Although in family firms attitudes toward short- and long-term debts are more 
negative than in non-family firms, the attitudes toward additional equity from 
current owners are more positive. This contradicts pecking order theory to some 
extent, and supports the idea suggesting that family firms are more interested in 
maintaining control within the family. The finding that family firms have more 
negative attitudes toward retained earnings may result from the fact that family 
firms prefer to distribute dividends instead of using the profits to develop the firm. 
In Finland, dividends may be of more importance to small firm owners because 
dividends have been tax-free to a certain extent.
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3.3 ARTICLE 3: DO THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIORS OF 
FAMILY FIRMS AND NON-FAMILY FIRMS DIFFER?
The third article investigated the investment behavior of private small- and medi-
um-sized family and non-family firms. The purpose was to explore whether there 
are differences in the amount of investment and in the rejection of investment. 
Furthermore, this paper also explored the reasons why family and non-family 
firms have rejected investments. The research question was: Do the investment 
behaviors of family and non-family firms differ?
The theoretical framework of this article is based on the literature on agency 
theory and investment and financing patterns in family and non-family firms. The 
theory of finance implies that every positive net present value project should be 
taken, regardless of whether internal or external funds are used to cover it (Myers 
& Majluf, 1984). However, previous studies suggest that investment decisions are 
associated with both financial factors (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Poutziouris, 2001; 
Gugler, 2003) and ownership structure (Gallo et al., 2004; Naldi et al., 2007). 
The panel data estimation method and logit regression method were employed 
in the analyses. In addition, the OLS method was used. The findings of this study 
suggest that family firms are more likely to reject an investment. Furthermore, the 
reasons why firms have rejected investments could imply that family firms may 
be more financially constrained than non-family counterparts, suggesting that 
family firms may face more difficulties in obtaining financing. However, family 
firms may be reluctant to take more loans because lower debt levels are preferred 
to minimize the probability of bankruptcy and due to the fear of losing control. 
Avoidance of loans could also be based on the fact that increasing debt ratios di-
lutes family control. But, it may lead to the rejection of investments when sufficient 
internal funds are not available. The results on the amount of investment when 
using OLS regression suggest that family firms invest larger amounts than do 
non-family firms. However, the findings on the amount of investment when using 
a random effects model imply—although the sign is positive—that no statistically 
significant difference in the amount of investment exists between family firms and 
non-family firms. The results are qualitatively similar when using a continuous 
variable family ownership rate and other family influence variables. 
The findings could be interpreted to mean that although family firms are more 
likely to reject an investment, they still invest the amount necessary to maintain 
their ability to generate future earnings when they have finally decided to invest. 
The result could also indicate that both family and non-family firms may be con-
cerned with their firm’s future performance and ability to survive in competition, 
thus affecting their investment behavior in a similar way. Furthermore, taking into 
account the data used and the average size of firms, firms may be forced to under-
take investments due to lower flexibility in the timing of investments. However, 
the reasons for rejecting investments support the notion that family firms may be 
more financially constrained and more susceptible to agency problems.
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4 Conclusions and 
Contribution of the 
Dissertation
4.1 CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISSERTATION
The overall purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the financial issues of 
SMEs in agency theory and corporate governance contexts. The main focus was 
on the financial performance, funding, and investment behavior of small- and 
medium-sized private firms and how ownership and board structures are as-
sociated with these phenomena. This dissertation contributes to the literature by 
examining three related articles.
The overall contribution of this dissertation is that it narrows the gap between 
the association of corporate governance structures and agency problems in private 
small business and in family business contexts. This dissertation focuses also on 
the smallest firms, micro-sized firms, which are the least-investigated firms in 
the corporate finance literature. This study supports the prior empirical evidence 
that smaller firms are more likely to face agency problems between the firm and 
its outside suppliers of funds due to information asymmetry. Consequently, this 
affects firms´ funding and investment behavior. Family firms seem to be more 
likely to face agency problems and financial constraints than are non-family firms. 
To summarize the results of this dissertation, firms with certain corporate gov-
ernance structures are more susceptible to agency problems. More precisely, in 
small firms, agency conflicts between the firm and its outside suppliers of funds 
seem to increase with managerial and family ownership. 
More specifically, this dissertation contributes to the empirical literature in the 
following ways. The first contribution is that this dissertation sheds more light on 
the association between corporate governance structures and the financial per-
formance of SMEs and including also the smallest businesses, micro-sized firms, 
which are the least-investigated context in the empirical literature. Prior studies 
focus most often on large listed firms and their governance structures. Data used 
in this study are unique at least to some extent because the data consist of micro-, 
small-, and medium-sized firms and include more detailed variables than prior 
studies. The availability of reliable data on non-listed private firms such as SMEs 
is, in general, scarce and difficult to obtain. 
The second contribution is that this study investigates more closely the supply 
side of the funding sources because detailed variables of funding sources were 
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available. The variables used in this differ from those used in previous studies, 
e.g., Gallo and Vilaseca (1996) and Lòpez-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar (2007), who 
use variables constructed from financial statements. 
The third contribution is that this study also explores attitudes toward different 
funding sources. This study offers a new contribution to the empirical literature 
by combining both attitudes toward and the usage of different funding sources. 
Traditional variables, especially those constructed from financial statements, do 
not allow for investigating the demand side of funding sources. 
The fourth contribution of this dissertation is that this study adds to the em-
pirical literature on investment behaviors of private family and non-family firms 
and by investigating not only the size of investment but also whether firms have 
rejected investments. Furthermore, the reasons for the rejection of investments 
were also made available. Most studies investigate the relationship between li-
quidity and investment without considering whether family ownership may affect 
investment behavior. Moreover, the number of studies exploring the differences 
in investment behaviors of small private family and non-family firms is small. 
The fifth contribution of this dissertation is this study contributes to the under-
standing of funding and investment behavior of firms in the countries that have a 
similar legal and operating environment and bank-centered capital markets as in 
Finland. The legal framework and the protection of stakeholders differ by country, 
which may have an impact on firms and their corporate governance structures. 
Furthermore, the structure of the capital markets constitutes the framework for 
alternative forms of funding and this structure differs by country. 
4.2 MANAGERIAL, THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL, AND POLI-
CY IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this dissertation may have some implications for scholars, outside 
suppliers of funds, and policy makers. 
This study has implications for scholars as this thesis is suggesting and con-
firming that smaller firm size, managerial ownership, and family ownership make 
firms more susceptible to agency problems and financial constraints. The results 
of this dissertation also imply that the ideas on the role of the board mostly de-
veloped for large and/or listed firms with dispersed ownership structures do not 
necessarily apply to SMEs because owner-managers select boards that are less 
likely to monitor, reducing thereby the influence that the board has on finan-
cial performance. This dissertation also suggests that agency theory and pecking 
order theory seem to be relevant contexts explaining the funding behavior and 
investment behavior of small firms.
The results also have implications for investors and suppliers of funds because 
this dissertation shows that firms with smaller size and higher managerial or fam-
ily ownership are more likely to suffer agency problems and, therefore, they are 
more financially constrained. Outside suppliers of funds should be more aware 
of the nature of family businesses and reconsider their attitudes toward small, 
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closely owned businesses´ funding, because firms with high insider or managerial 
ownership are more risk averse. In addition, although firms with high managerial 
or family ownership seem to have lower growth rate, their performance is fairly 
stable and profitable. Furthermore, potential lenders should take into account the 
influence of family business characteristics and family commitment on a family 
firm’s decision making and strategic choices.
The results also have implications for policy makers. The empirical evidence 
of this dissertation on financial constraints suggests that policy makers should 
consider creating some tax incentives or other (financial) incentives that might 
enhance investment activity among small- and medium-sized firms and diminish 
obstacles to financing their investments.
4.3 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RE-
SEARCH
This study has several limitations. The first limitation of this study is that data on 
the real independence and affiliation of the CEO, managers, and board members are 
not available. However, board members are divided into different categories based 
on their affiliations, such as family, employment, and finance. The second limita-
tion is that the information on managers´ relationships with family is not available. 
Also, more detailed information on the affiliations of managers and board members 
could have shed more light on the real independence of the firm s´ management and 
boards. Third, information on why firms have recruited outside board members or 
why firms are reluctant to recruit outsiders on the board could have revealed more 
about the association between ownership and board structure. 
The fourth limitation of this study is that information on the family s´ presence 
on the management, i.e., family managers and the generation in power, would 
have been useful; unfortunately, this information was, again, not available. These 
could all affect the use of and attitudes toward different funding sources of firms. 
Fifth, this study could not use F-PEC (family power, experience, and culture) as 
an explanatory variable, as was suggested by Klein et al. (2005). Sixth, although 
detailed information on sources of funding was collected, two sources of funding 
are not present. It would have been useful and important to investigate loans from 
current owners and loans from family members in more detail in this context, but, 
unfortunately, this data was not available.
The seventh limitation is that more detailed information on investments and 
their classification into extension, replacement, and compulsory investment was 
not available, nor was the amount of R&D expenditure. These could all have pro-
vided more detailed information on investment behavior and the quality of assets 
firms invest in. Finally, because the data for this study were collected through a 
private survey, respondents did not answer all questions. Consequently, observa-
tions on some variables are missing, which led to a situation in which the investi-
gated topics on the same firms are not involved in all analyses. 
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The eighth limitation is related to the data used in this study. The firms in the 
sample represent four different regions within Finland but those regions may 
have their own specific business environments, which may affect the results. 
4.4 AUTHOR S´ CONTRIBUTION TO THE JOINT ARTICLES
The contribution of the present author in joint articles (1) and (2) is the following. 
She collected the data and defined the variables used in the articles. She was re-
sponsible for the statistical analyses in both articles. As agreed at the beginning of 
the project, the present author always wrote the first draft of the article submitted 
to the journal. After receiving the reviewers´ comments, the authors frequently re-
vised the articles together. The third article is written solely by the present author.
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Financial Performance of SMEs – Impact of Ownership Structure 
and Board Composition 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose This study investigates the impact that ownership structure and board composition 
have on financial performance in a sample of Finnish SMEs. 
 
Methodology The data for this study was collected through a private survey. The financial 
data were collected from the Voitto+ register. Observations were made from 2000 to 2005. 
We employ panel data estimation and 2SLS methods in our analyses.  
 
Findings Our results suggest that the ownership structure affects both the growth and the 
profitability of small private firms. Firms with high managerial ownership levels exhibit 
higher profitability ratios, but have lower growth rates. We also find that firms with high 
venture capital firm ownership ratios grow faster and are less profitable. Our results on board 
structure suggest that board structure has little impact on the performance of small firms. The 
only significant result in this context is that firms with outside board members have lower 
growth rates and are less profitable. 
 
Originality/value Our study is one of the few that shed light on how corporate governance 
and ownership structures affect the performance of small private firms.  
 
Practical implications The results of this study can be interpreted to indicate that owner-
managers are risk averse and that venture capital firms seek investments with high growth 
potential. The results could also imply that outsiders are taken on as board members in badly-
performing firms on financiers’ requests, or because it is thought that they can enhance 
performance.  
 
Keywords Ownership, Board Composition, SMEs, Performance 
 
Paper type Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
 
Agency theory suggests that the separation of ownership from control may lead to agency 
problems when the interests of managers and owners are misaligned. For example, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) suggest that managers who own a stake in their firm are less likely to 
deviate from shareholder wealth maximisation by consuming perks, shirking, or undertaking 
sub-optimal projects to maximize their own benefits. In small firms, where managerial 
ownership is common, agency problems are more likely to arise between owner-managers 
and outside suppliers of finance due to information asymmetry. It can also be argued that 
ownership concentration among the top management can lead to risk aversion and a lack of 
willingness to engage in strategic changes. Consequently, ownership structure may be 
associated with firm performance. 
 
An alternative mechanism to solving agency problems is board composition. In this context, 
the board can be seen as a key link between management and shareholders (Brunninge et al., 
2007). While agency theory suggests that independent boards should be preferred, the 
connection between board composition and firm performance is not necessarily as simple as 
is sometimes assumed. Previous results on the association between board composition and 
firm performance are mixed. Other studies suggest that managers choose boards that are 
unlikely to monitor, or tend to reduce the monitoring role of, the board by implementing CEO 
duality.  
 
Most previous studies on the relationship between board composition, ownership structure 
and firm performance use US or UK data and data on large, listed firms. The legal framework 
differs by country, and this can have an impact on corporate governance structures of firms, 
including those of SMEs. Therefore, it has been suggested that research on ownership 
structures should be country-specific. Furthermore, a surprisingly small number of 
researchers have concentrated on exploring non-listed private small and medium-sized firms 
in this context, even if SMEs are recognized worldwide as important engines of economic 
growth. This study investigates the determinants of performance in small and medium-sized 
firms in Finland, and our study is one of the few that shed light on how corporate governance 
and ownership structures affect the performance of private small- and medium-sized firms. 
Because the availability of reliable data on non-listed private firms such as SMEs is, in 
general, difficult to obtain, a private survey was needed to extract the data on ownership 
structure and board composition.  
 
We find that both ownership structure and board composition are significant determinants of 
firm performance in our sample of small and medium sized Finnish firms. More specifically, 
the overall results suggest that an increase in managerial ownership has a negative impact on 
growth and a positive impact on profitability, whereas venture capital firm ownership is 
positively associated with growth but negatively with profitability. We also find that firms 
with lower growth rates or weaker profitability are more likely to have outsiders on the board.   
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theories and 
empirical literature relevant to this study. Section 3 describes the sample, data and variables. 
Section 4 presents the empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes the paper.   
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2. Literature review 
 
The relationship between ownership structure and financial performance has long been the 
subject of an important debate in the corporate finance literature. This debate is based on 
Berle and Means (1932), who suggested that ownership concentration should have a positive 
effect on firm value and performance. Demsetz (1983) offers an alternative view: that 
ownership structure should be thought of as an endogenous outcome of decisions reflecting 
the influence of shareholders. Furthermore, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) suggest that there should be no systematic association between ownership 
structure and performance because ownership structures should be endogenously determined. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), suggest that the separation of ownership from control can result 
in potential agency conflicts stemming from the divergence of managerial and shareholder 
interests. Agency problems arise whenever managers have incentives to pursue their own 
interests at the shareholders’ expense (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) or due to the various 
forms of information asymmetry (Ezzamel and Watson, 1993) because managers possess 
private information about the firm´s future earnings, cash flows, or investment opportunities 
that the investors (i.e., shareholders or lenders) do not have (Harris and Raviv, 1991).  
 
Agency problems can be reduced by managerial shareholdings, debt financing, the use of 
outsiders on the board, and monitoring by the firm’s own large shareholders (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996). It has also been suggested in previous literature that board composition and 
insider ownership are substitute mechanisms in controlling agency problems (Prevost et al., 
2002).  
 
2.1 Ownership structure 
 
The ownership structure of a firm can be investigated from a number of alternative 
dimensions. Most commonly, ownership structure refers to the ownership by different groups 
of shareholders. Another dimension of ownership structure is ownership concentration. When 
it comes to ownership concentration, previous empirical studies have yielded conflicting 
results on the relationship between ownership concentration and performance. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no statistically significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance, while several studies find a positive 
association between ownership concentration and profitability, (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), Andersson and Reeb (2003), and Morck et al. (1988)). Ownership concentration may 
reduce agency problems, but it may also increase risk aversion. This is based on an argument 
that an individual shareholder’s large stake in one firm implies less portfolio diversification 
for that shareholder (Himmelberg et al., 1999), thereby reducing incentives for risk taking. 
Therefore, we expect that ownership concentration is negatively related to growth and 
positively related to profitability. 
 
Agency theory suggests that increased insider ownership, or the presence of a large 
shareholder, can lead to better performance because it reduces agency problems between 
owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One important form of insider ownership 
in small firms is managerial ownership. Prior empirical literature suggests that managerial 
ownership affects firm performance positively at lower levels of ownership and negatively at 
higher levels of ownership (e.g., Morck et al. (1988), Hermalin and Weissbach (1991), and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990)). Similarly, managements’ risk-taking incentives are reduced 
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as their stake in the company increases. Furthermore, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find a 
positive relationship between insider ownership and firm profitability. Based on these 
arguments, we expect that management ownership is negatively related to growth and a 
positively related to profitability.  
 
The family firm is important type of firm with concentrated ownership structures. Firms 
owned by large shareholders, such as families, have longer investment horizons and may 
make better investment decisions, since families have more specific knowledge of the firm 
(James, 1999; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Barontini and Caprio 
(2006) find family firms performing significantly better than non-family firms. Family firms 
are also generally regarded as more risk averse because their business represents a significant 
proportion of their wealth and they may wish to pass it on to the next generation (e.g., Naldi 
et al., 2007). Based on previous literature, we expect to find that family ownership is 
negatively related to growth and positively related to profitability.  
 
A further type of block holder ownership is that by Venture Capital Firms. Ben-Amar and 
André (2006) and Lasfer (2006) report that outside ownership has a positive influence on 
firm profitability. In addition, Kang and Sorensen (1999) suggest that this form of 
concentrated holdings may lead to increased performance. According to Berger and Udell 
(1998), business angels and venture capitalists represent a relatively small proportion of small 
business finance because they invest very selectively and target their investments on firms 
with high growth potential. Therefore, we expect that venture capital ownership is positively 
related to growth and profitability. 
 
 
2.2 Board composition  
 
Board composition refers to the number and the type of board members, and board structure 
can be seen as a potentially important predictor of firm financial performance (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). In firms with separate ownership and management, the board’s monitoring and 
controlling role is important in the safeguarding of shareholders’ investments (Brunninge et 
al., 2007). Pearce and Zahra (1992) find that the board´s ability to implement its service, 
strategy, and control role depends largely on its composition. However, the connection 
between board composition and firm performance may not be as simple as is sometimes 
assumed. For example, Hermalin and Weissbach (1991) find no association between board 
composition and firm performance, while Lasfer (2006) suggests that managers choose 
boards that are unlikely to monitor them. Managers are also likely to reduce the monitoring 
role of the board by CEO duality.  
 
Voordeckers et al. (2007) point out that the majority of studies on the role of boards focus on 
board practices in large listed firms, where the role of the board is to make sure that the 
managers’ interest are in line with the shareholders’ interests. Johannisson and Huse (2000), 
as well as Forbes and Milliken (1999), argue that the role of the board may be of more 
importance in SMEs than in large listed firms. This argument is partly based on the idea that 
the information gap between owner-managers and other major stakeholders of the firm is 
especially wide in the case of small and medium-sized private firms. It can also be argued 
that, in small and medium-sized firms, the role of the board is different because the risk of 
management’s opportunistic behavior is lower due to the firm’s closely held nature (i.e., 
because management and ownership overlap). Other studies suggest that a well-functioning 
board of directors may add value through several alternative roles, such as strategy 
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development (Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000) and controlling the management (Johannisson 
and Huse, 2000).  
 
Board structure can be investigated through several different dimensions. Some of the typical 
dimensions are CEO duality and whether there are inside or outside members in the board. 
CEO duality refers to a board leadership structure in which the  chief executive officer is also 
the chairman of the board (Bozec 2005). Previous empirical studies on the relationship 
between board leadership structure and performance, using for the most part data on large 
listed firms, have yielded mixed results. Some studies find no relationship (e.g., Dalton et al. 
(1998)), while other studies suggest a negative association between CEO duality and 
profitability (e.g., Ezzamel and Watson (1993) and Bozec (2005)). Others, such as Dehaene 
et al. (2001), find a positive relationship between CEO duality and profitability. Because of 
these conflicting findings, our expectations on the impact that CEO duality has on growth and 
profitability are open. 
 
Agency theory suggests a need for board independence. Boards composed primarily of 
outsiders should be generally superior to boards of insiders (Wagner et al., 1998), because 
outside board members are believed to be independent from management and they can 
provide superior performance benefits for the firm (Fama, 1980; Dalton et al., 1998). 
Outsiders are expected to represent the shareholders’ interests and bring added value to the 
firm (Ben-Amar and André, 2006), and they are often thought to play a monitoring role 
inside the board (Bozec, 2005). Few studies investigate the role of outsiders on the boards of 
SMEs. Voordeckers et al. (2007) argue that, in small firms, the adoption of outsiders on the 
board may diminish agency costs resulting from altruistic behavior. Johannisson and Huse 
(2000) imply that because entrepreneurs value independence highly, they defy any control 
mechanisms, such as the board. They further indicate that providers of external finance may 
require that firms have an outsider on the board. Fiegener et al. (2000) suggest that adoption 
of outside board members is more common as external ownership increases. This is in line 
with Linck et al. (2007), who find that small firms with high managerial ownership tend to 
have less independent boards. Previous empirical literature, using again mostly data on large 
and/or listed firms, (e.g., Pearce and Zahra (1992) and Dehaene et al. (2001)) reports a 
positive relationship between outsiders on the board and firm profitability, while Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996) find an opposite result. However, Kesner (1987) suggests that the 
presence of insiders on the board is positively associated with firm profitability. Also, 
Wagner et al. (1998) argue that presence mixture of both insiders and outsiders are positively 
associated with profitability. Based on the previous discussion and conflicting results, our 
expectations on the role that outside and inside board members have on growth and 
profitability are open.  
 
 
3. Data and Variables 
 
3.1 Data  
 
The data for this study were collected through a private survey. Of the 3262 questionnaires 
sent, a total of 621 responses were usable, which resulted in an effective response rate of 19 
%. The final sample consists of 600 SMEs operating in Finland, because we drop firms which 
are outside the EU definition of SMEs. Based on the definition, a micro-size firm is a firm 
that employs fewer than 10 people and whose maximum annual turnover or total assets are 
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<€2m. A small firm is a firm which employs fewer than 50 people and has maximum annual 
turnover or total assets of  <€10m. A medium-sized firm is a firm that employs fewer than 
250 people and whose maximum annual turnover is <€50m or maximum total assets are 
<€43m. The firms represent all industries, excluding primary production. The sample firms 
are firms with at least two employees and whose legal form is a limited liability.  
 
The firms were asked to provide information on their ownership structure during the years 
2000-2005, for each year separately. The firms were also asked to provide information on 
their board composition during the years 2000-2005. The financial data were collected from 
the Voitto+ register. This register includes data on firm age, employment, line of business, 
and the complete financial statements. Observations include the years from 2000 to 2005. 
The total number of firm-year observations available is 3519, because information is 
available for fewer than 6 years in some cases. In individual regression models, the number 
of observations varies because of missing observations on some variables. 
 
We employ panel data estimation methods in our analyses. More specifically, we run all 
models with both random effects and fixed effects models. Assuming fixed effects, we 
impose time independent effects for each entity, which are possibly correlated with the 
regressors. There are two common assumptions made about the individual specific effect: the 
random effects assumption and the fixed effects assumption. The random effects assumption 
is that the individual specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. The 
fixed effects assumption is that the individual specific effect is correlated with the 
independent variables. If the random effects assumption holds, the random effects model is 
more efficient than the fixed effects model, and vice versa. We also use the 2SLS model to 
address the endogenous nature of growth and profitability. 
 
 
3.2 Variables  
 
Dependent Variables 
Our measures of firm performance are the annual logarithmic growth rate of sales and the 
return on assets. We chose sales growth rate as our measure of growth, because firms rarely 
select employment growth as their goal per se. It could also be argued that our sample of 
Finnish firms further justifies this choice due to the excessively high labor cost imposed on 
local employers.
i
 These costs are often stated to be a major barrier for small firms to increase 
the number of their employees. In addition to our reported measure of firm profitability, we 
also run our models with the profit margin. The results of these alternative models are 
qualitatively similar to the ones reported here. 
 
Independent variables  
Ownership. We include four ownership variables in our model. Our measures in this context 
include the number of owners, share of family ownership, share of managerial ownership, 
and the share of venture capitalist ownership. Number of owners is the number of the owners 
in the firm. Family ownership means the percentage of shares controlled by the family. 
Managerial ownership refers to the percentage of shares controlled by the firm’s 
management. Ownership of VC indicates the percentage of shares controlled by venture 
capital funds.  
 
Board Structure. We include three measures of board structure into our models. CEO duality 
is a variable with a value of 1 if the roles of board chair and CEO are held by the same 
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person, otherwise the value is 0. Top Management refers to the number (ratio) of board 
members who represent the firm’s top management. Outside members indicates the number 
(ratio) of board members who are not insiders of the firm.  
 
Control variables 
Firm age. Firm age and size are the two most commonly investigated independent variables 
suggested to affect firm growth and performance. The general pattern between firm age and 
growth seems to be that young firms are more likely to grow faster. Glancey (1998), Almus 
and Nerlinger (1999) and Davidsson et al. (2002) report an inverse relationship between firm 
age and growth, suggesting that older firms grow less rapidly than younger firms. Roper 
(1999) finds that firm age and profitability are negatively related. Our measure of firm age is 
the natural log of (1+age), because it can be argued that the impact of one extra year 
diminishes as the firm gets older. Therefore, we expect to find a negative association between 
firm age and growth and between firm age and profitability. 
 
Firm size. Gibrat’s law, also called the “law of proportionate effect”, implies that the 
expected growth rate is the same across all size classes of firms (Sutton 1997). In most 
studies on small firms (e.g., Harhoff et al. (1998) and Almus and Nerlinger (2000)), Gibrat’s 
law is rejected. Other studies (e.g., Evans (1987) and Hall (1987)) suggest that deviations 
from this law diminish when data on larger firms are used, while Roper (1999) asserts that 
firm size and profitability are positively related. Our measure of firm size is the natural log of 
the firms’ total assets. Based on the discussion, we expect to find a negative relationship 
between firm size and growth and a positive relationship between firm size and profitability. 
 
Profitability and liquidity. Myers (1984) claims that capital structure is driven by a firm’s 
desire to finance investments first internally, then with low-risk debt, and finally, and only as 
a last resort, with outside equity. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) find that the growth of small 
firms is constrained by internal finance. Our proxies for the firms’ internal funding resources 
are the return on assets and the current ratio. Based on previous studies, we expect to find that 
profitability and growth are positively related, that liquidity and growth are negatively 
related, and that liquidity and profitability are positively related. 
 
Financial structure. Financial constraints have been suggested to be one of the most 
important barriers to growth (Storey, 1994). It has also been suggested that small firms in 
particular face difficulties in obtaining external funding. Becchetti and Trovato (2002) report 
that firms that have been credit rationed by their financial institutions are likely to have lower 
growth rates. Our measure for the financial structure is the firms’ debt-to-assets ratio. 
Therefore, we expect to find a positive relationship between growth and leverage and a 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
 
Industry. It is usually accepted that firms in different industries exhibit different growth rates. 
We add 15 different industry dummies to our models to control for industry-specific 
differences in growth rates.  
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4. Empirical results 
  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for the key variables. The numbers represent average rates 
across the entire period of the survey. The results show that the average firm age is 14.80 
years. The average total assets are €1,793,810  and sales €1,865,740. The average number of 
employees is 16.30 and the median is 7.00. The average ratios regarding leverage, liquidity, 
and profitability are 62.03 %, 2.35 (current ratio), and 16.55 % (return on assets), 
respectively. The average growth rate in terms of sales (i.e., change in sales) is 29.29 %. The 
firms have 5.57 owners, on average. The average family ownership is 52.34 %, and 
managerial ownership 48.71 %. The average ownership ratios of outsiders are the following: 
bank ownership 0.75 %, venture capital ownership 0.92 %, and other outside owners 11.92 
%. CEOs are also board chair in 49 % of the firms. The average board size is 2.61 and the 
median is 2. The average number of family members on the board is 1.10, while the 
corresponding number of top management on the board is 1.10, of employees is 0.28, and of 
venture capital funds 0.05. The average number of outside members on the board is 0.52.  
 
(TABLE 1) 
 
Table 2 presents board size and board composition. Panel A shows that 14.3 % of the firms 
only fulfill the minimum requirements of the Corporate Act that so that the board is 
comprised of one member and one deputy member. The most common board size is 2 
members; in 39.1 % of the firms. In 46.6 % of the firms there are at least 3 or more board 
members. Panel B presents statistics on the presence of outsiders on the board. Most firms, 
76.2 %, do not have any outsiders on the board. On the other hand, 23.8 % of the firms have 
outside board members, of which 45.5 % have one outside board member, 27.7 % have two 
outside board members, and 27.7 % have three or more outside board members. 
 
(TABLE 2) 
 
Table 3 presents Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal. The 
correlations between performance and ownership and board variables do not exceed +/- 
0.009, and variables between ROA, ownership and board do not exceed +/-0.281. Among 
ownership and board variables we observe correlations between +/- 0.001 and +/-0.465. We 
do not observe any serious correlations between the variables.  
 
(TABLE 3) 
 
We investigate the ownership and board structure variables in more detail in Table 4, where 
we have divided the data into firms with fewer than 16 employees and those with 16 or more 
employees. This division is based on the mean number of employees. We use a T-test for 
independent samples to compare the means to investigate whether our ownership and board 
structure variables may differ by firm size. On average, the larger firms have more owners. 
Smaller firms have a higher level of CEO, bank, and venture capital ownership. The rate of 
other owner ownership in larger firms exceeds that of smaller firms. As far as board structure 
is concerned, the results in Table 4 show that CEO duality is more common in smaller firms. 
The number of board members varies by firm size, and the average number of board 
members is 3.48 in the firms with 16 or more employees, as opposed to 2.50 in the smaller 
firms. The number of top management, family members, as well as venture capital funds on 
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the board is higher in larger firms, but the number of employees is higher in smaller firms. 
Furthermore, the number of outside board members is higher in larger firms.  
 
(TABLE 4) 
 
 
Table 5 presents the differences in means for the performance measures. We use a T-test for 
independent samples to investigate whether our performance variables may differ based on 
high and low insider ownership ratios. Panel A presents the results for family ownership 
levels above and below 50 %. Our results show that growth is higher in firms with low family 
ownership levels than in firms with high family ownership levels. The results also 
demonstrate that profitability is higher in firms with high family ownership levels than in 
firms with low family ownership levels. When we investigate ownership levels of above 75 
% and below 25 % separately, our results remain the same.  
 
Panel B presents the results for CEO ownership levels above and below 50 %. The results 
indicate that profitability is higher in firms with high CEO ownership than in firms with low 
CEO ownership levels. When we investigate ownership levels of above 75 % and below 25 
% separately, our results remain the same.  
 
Panel C presents the results for above and below 50 % managerial ownership levels. Our 
results show that growth is higher in firms with low managerial ownership levels and that 
profitability is higher in firms with high managerial ownership levels. When we investigate 
managerial ownership levels of above 75 % and below 25 % separately, our results remain 
the same. To sum up, in firms with high insider ownership, ratios growth seems to be lower, 
but profitability is higher than in firms with low insider ownership ratios.  
 
 
 (TABLE 5) 
 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the variables on performance when the data has 
been divided into two sub-samples by board composition. Panel A presents the results by 
board size. The results suggest that firms with smaller boards have higher growth and 
profitability. Panel B presents the results for the presence of outsiders on the board. Our 
results suggest that firms with no outsiders on the board are more profitable than firms with 
outsiders on the board.  
(TABLE 6) 
 
 
4.2 Determinants of Firm Growth 
 
Our first measure of firm performance is growth. Our measure of firm growth is the 
annual natural logarithmic growth rate of sales. We employ panel data estimation methods in 
our analyses. More specifically, we run all models using both random effects and fixed 
effects models. We investigate the impact that ownership and board structure have on firm 
growth with three different models in Table 7. Column I presents a model that includes the 
ownership variables, column II a model which includes the board structure variables, and 
column III a model which includes all the ownership and board structure variables. The 
results in column I suggest that an increase in the level of managerial ownership has a 
negative impact on growth. This result is well in line with the notion that managerial risk 
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aversion increases when its stake holdings increase and is in line with the results observed in, 
for example, Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Hermalin and 
Weissbach (1991). The results also suggest that the presence of Venture Capital Firm 
ownership is associated with higher growth rates. This finding supports our prediction and is 
in line with Kang and Sorensen (1999). When the managerial dispersion variable is dropped 
in the fixed effect model (due to the little time variance in the variable), we also obtain a 
statistically significant coefficient for our measure of family ownership. This suggests that 
firms with high levels of family ownership have lower growth rates than firms with low 
levels of family ownership. This result is in line with our expectation and with McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) and Morck et al. (1998). Again, it can be argued that when the stake of 
the stock holding family increases, the owners become more risk averse. 
 
(TABLE 7) 
 
When we investigate the impact of board structure in column II in Table 7, we observe that 
firms with low growth rates are more likely to have outside members on their boards, as 
expected. Our finding could imply that more outsiders are taken on as board members in 
badly-performing firms. Outsiders are believed to provide expertise, and they are independent 
from management and, therefore, may provide superior performance benefits. An alternative 
explanation could be that financiers may require a seat on the board in the firms they finance. 
Finally, we include all our ownership and board structure variables into one model in column 
III. As far as ownership structure is concerned, the results are similar to the ones in column II. 
The fact that our ownership variables maintain their significance, while none of the board 
structure variables are significant in column III, suggests that ownership structure is a more 
important determinant of growth than board composition. This is to some extent in line with 
Lasfer (2006), who suggests that board composition and insider (managerial) ownership are 
substitute mechanisms in controlling agency problems.  
 
As far as our firm-specific control variables are concerned, the results indicate that an 
increase in profitability increases growth rates, as expected. This is in line with the arguments 
that firms tend to finance their growth internally and, for example, Myers (1984). The results 
also show that firms with higher debt to assets ratios grow faster. This result is predicted and 
suggests that firms with easy access to outside funding grow faster. 
 
Although the correlation results indicated no significant correlation between the variables, we 
investigate a model with a VIF-test. We do not find any serious multicollinearity because the 
highest VIF value is 1.534, and in industry dummies the highest value is 4.644. 
 
 
4.3 Determinants of Firm Profitability 
 
Our second measure of firm performance is profitability. The dependent variable in the 
regression models in Table 8 is the return on assets ratio. This approach has previously been 
used in, for example, Andersson and Reeb (2003), Kesner (1987), and Pearce and Zahra 
(1992). We run three different models with both random effects and fixed effects 
specifications. Our first measure of firm ownership is ownership dispersion, which is 
measured by the number of owners in the firm. The results in Table 8 indicate that an 
increase in the number of owners reduces firm profitability. This finding is consistent with 
Berle and Means (1932) and Miller et al. (2007). Furthermore, our findings also support the 
idea that firms with concentrated ownership would be expected to reflect the interests of their 
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owners. In firms with a small number of owners, the importance of dividends is higher and, 
therefore, the firm has to be more profitable to be able to distribute dividends. Our second 
measure of firm ownership is the share of managerial stockholdings in the firm. This variable 
is significant and positive only in the absence of the ownership dispersion variable. This 
finding is in line with our expectations and with previous studies, such as Andersson and 
Reeb (2003) and Barontini and Caprio (2006). 
 
We also include a measure for venture capital firm ownership. These results suggest that 
firms with high venture capital firm ownership are less profitable. This finding is not 
expected, and contradicts Ben-Amar and André (2006), Lasfer (2006), and Kang and 
Sorensen (1999). One potential explanation could be that firms with venture capital 
ownership grow fast, which may reduce profitability, and that venture capital firms are more 
likely to invest in firms with a high growth potential. When we include our board structure 
variables in the model in column II of Table 8, the results of this variable are reversed. These 
results can be interpreted to mean that venture capital ownership, as such, improves 
profitability, but that the presence of outside board members (mostly placed at the request of 
investors) is a sign of weaker profitability. One potential explanation could be that more 
outsiders are taken on as board members in badly-performing firms.  
 
The results on our control variables suggest that the larger firms in our sample are, on 
average, more profitable, and that firms with high leverage ratios are less profitable. These 
findings are expected and in line with Barontini and Caprio (2006). Our finding regarding 
leverage is consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). As suggested above in connection 
with the growth models, we run a model with a VIF-test, but find no indication of any 
significant multicollinearity.  
 
(TABLE 8) 
 
 
 
4.4 Additional tests 
 
It is possible that the panel estimation models, random effect, and fixed effect, reported in 
Tables 7 and 8, are not collectively valid, since there might be a simultaneity problem 
between growth and profitability. We correct for this possibility of an endogeniety problem 
by re-estimating all our equations by using 2SLS. In order to satisfy the necessary 
identification requirements, the firm characteristic variable with the lowest level of 
significance in the OLS equations (not reported), treating the industry dummies as a group, is 
dropped. This entails omitting the current ratio from growth equations and the age variable 
from profitability equations.  
 
When we compare the results of the 2SLS model with our panel estimation results, we find 
that fewer explanatory variables are significant even if the variables have the same signs as in 
the panel estimation models. In the growth equations, managerial ownership and outside 
board members are negatively and significantly related to growth, while in the profitability 
equations, only ownership by venture capitalists is significant and negatively associated with 
profitability. As far as our firm characteristic variables are concerned, smaller firms are more 
profitable and younger firms grow more. Firms with higher liquidity exhibit higher 
profitability ratios. Furthermore, similar to the results in the panel estimation models, we find 
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that firms with lower leverage are more profitable and firms with a higher debt to assets ratio 
experience more growth. 
 
 
 (TABLE 8) 
 
  
5. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of board structure and ownership structure 
on the performance of SMEs. Most previous studies on the association of board composition, 
ownership structure, and performance use data on large, listed firms. Our study is one of few 
that shed light on how corporate governance and ownership structures affect the performance 
of small firms.  
 
We find that both ownership structure and board composition are significant determinants of 
firm performance in our sample of small- and medium-sized Finnish firms. However, our 
results suggest that the ownership structure may be a more important determinant of the 
growth and profitability of small firms than board structure. Firms with high managerial 
ownership levels and a small number of owners exhibit higher profitability ratios, but have 
lower growth rates. These results can be interpreted to imply that controlling owners are more 
interested in retaining profits than they are in high growth ratios. This further suggests that 
owner-managers are risk averse. We also find that firms with high venture capital firm 
ownership ratios grow faster and are less profitable. This result may reflect the notion that 
venture capital firms are more interested in firms with high growth potential. 
 
Our results on board structure suggest that board structure has little impact on the 
performance of small firms. The only significant result in this context is that firms with 
outside board members have lower growth rates and are less profitable. One potential 
explanation could be that outsiders are appointed as board members in badly-performing 
firms. An alternative explanation could be that financiers may require control of a seat on the 
board in firms that they finance. The results on our control variables indicate that an increase 
in profitability increases growth rates. This is consistent with the arguments that firms are 
willing to finance their growth internally. However, the results also show that firms with a 
higher debt to assets ratios grow faster, suggesting that firms with easy access to outside 
funding also grow faster. Our results of the 2SLS are fairly consistent with the results of our 
panel estimations. Again, we find that firms with higher managerial ownership and outsiders 
on the board experience less growth. Furthermore, the presence of top management on the 
board decreases growth rates. As far as profitability is concerned, firms with venture capital 
fund ownership are less profitable.  
 
Our findings add to the understanding of the importance of ownership structure and board 
composition in private small- and medium-sized firms. The results suggest that ownership 
structure and board composition overlap to some extent and that complex board structures in 
SMEs are not reflected in terms of enhanced performance. Our results could also suggest that 
firms with high insider (managerial) ownership are more risk averse. Overall, our results 
imply that the ideas on the role of the board mostly developed for large and/or listed firms 
with dispersed ownership structures do not necessarily apply for SMEs. One potential 
explanation could be that owner-managers choose boards that are unlikely to monitor, 
demising thereby the impact that the board has on financial performance. Whether this is the 
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case or whether there are alternative explanations, leaves room for future research. Our 
results on the effect of ownership structure and board composition on firm growth and 
profitability may be of interest to providers of finance, such as banks and venture capitalists.  
 
This study has several limitations. For example, data on the CEOs’, managers’ or board 
members’ affiliations or real independence is not available. However, we attempted to obtain 
information on a number of different types of affiliations such as family, employment, and 
finance. Unfortunately, information on affiliations outside this list is not available. 
Furthermore, we do not know whether managers may be family related or not. The fact that 
our results on family ownership and managerial ownership are, for the most part, different, 
suggests that these two types of ownership do not completely overlap on the database. More 
detailed information on these aspects could have shed more light on the real independence of 
the firms’ management and boards.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the sample firms. Column I presents the number 
of observations. Column II presents the average values of the variables, column III the 
medians, and column IV the standard deviations. 
 
  
Variables 
 
Number of 
Observations 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median Standard 
Deviation 
 
Firm age  
 
2434 
 
14.80  
 
12 
 
13.87 
Total Assets  2434 1 793.81 262.40 9 977 
Sales  2388 1 865.74 567.70 5 784 
Number of Employees  2345 16.30 7 42.13 
Leverage 2369 62.03 57.1 53.19 
Current Ratio 2366 2.35 1.5 3.70 
Return on Assets 2369 16.55 14.00 24.27 
Change in Sales 2434 29.29 5.9 322.66 
Number of Owners 3427 5.57 2 31.474 
Family Ownership (%) 3224 52.34 60 47.262 
CEO Ownership (%) 3219 48.44 50 35.148 
Managerial Ownership (%) 3226 48.71 50 42.272 
Bank Ownership (%) 3217 0.75 0 8.606 
Venture Capital Ownership (%) 3218 0.92 0 7.192 
Other Owners Ownership (%) 3211 11.92 0 24.001 
CEO Duality 3349 0.49 0 0.503 
Number of Board Members 3345 2.61 2 1.366 
Family Members on the Board 3315 0.86 1 1.116 
Top Management on the Board 3315 1.10 0 0.966 
Employees on the Board 3309 0.28 0 0.671 
Venture Capitalists on the Board 2699 0.05 0 0.306 
Outside Board Members 3225 0.52 0 1.331 
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Table 2 
Board composition by board size and by the number of outsiders on the board 
 
This table presents the board composition of the sample firms. Panel A presents board size 
and panel B the number of outsiders on the board. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Board size 
 
 
Board size 
 
 
1 
(+deputy) 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 or more 
Percentage 
of firms 
 
14.3 % 
 
39.1 % 
 
30.4 % 
 
9.8 % 
 
6.4 % 
 
 
 
Panel B: The number of outsiders on the board 
 
 
Number of 
outsiders on 
the board 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 or more 
Percentage of 
firms 
 
76.2 % 
 
10.8 % 
 
6.6 % 
 
6.4 % 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
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LnChSales  0.100 -0.023 -0.092 -0.043 -0.104 -0.023 0.040 0.031 0.051 -0.021 0.005 0.027 -0.018 0.004 -0.033 
Profitability 0.027  -0.138 0.063 0.162 0.025 0.048 -0.157 -0.185 0.079 -0.161 0.028 -0.077 0.040 -0.151 -0.153 
Number of owners -0.031 -0.095  -0.053 -0.475 0.014 -0.104 0.155 0.300 -0.313 0.440 0.172 0.120 0.040 0.028 0.061 
Family Ownership -0.087 0.116 -0.099  0.114 0.204 -0.094 -0.089 -0.246 0.190 -0.220 -0.230 -0.194 0.499 -0.048 -0.306 
CEO Ownership -0.043 0.170 -0.322 0.104  0.216 -0.121 -0.074 -0.187 0.414 -0.349 -0.074 -0.030 0.057 -0.013 -0.211 
Managerial Own -0.122 0.070 -0.052 0.205 0.219  -0.100 -0.107 -0.251 -0.005 -0.081 0.213 -0.041 -0.011 -0.022 -0.210 
Bank Ownership -0.024 0.041 -0.056 -0.096 -0.119 -0.100  -0.013 -0.054 -0.088 0.084 0.023 0.010 -0.079 0.128 0.091 
VC Ownership 0.049 -0.281 0.100 -0.090 -0.113 -0.121 -0.011  0.085 -0.048 0.127 -0.045 0.022 -0.029 0.383 0.221 
Other Owners 0.049 -0.134 0.177 -0.278 -0.274 -0.285 -0.043 0.002  -0.159 0.222 -0.024 0.174 -0.157 0.071 0.294 
CEO Duality 0.048 0.090 -0.194 0.178 0.422 -0.009 -0.088 -0.061 -0.197  -0.396 -0.209 0.019 0.094 -0.093 -0.280 
Board size -0.031 -0.197 0.289 -0.213 -0.355 -0.113 0.068 0.157 0.347 -0.380  0.162 0.218 0.063 0.112 0.405 
Manag Board -0.019 0.012 0.082 -0.222 -0.098 0.213 0.015 -0.059 -0.066 -0.226 0.110  0.058 -0.453 0.032 -0.152 
Empl Board 0.021 -0.060 0.048 -0.186 -0.059 -0.056 -0.001 0.047 0.163 0.023 0.176 0.004  -0.242 -0.022 -0.031 
Family Board -0.026 0.053 0.066 0.465 -0.005 -0.004 -0.071 -0.033 -0.163 0.064 0.157 -0.375 -0.201  -0.003 -0.233 
VC on the Board 0.009 -0.273 0.023 -0.052 -0.034 -0.048 0.295 0.274 -0.006 -0.095 0.144 0.019 -0.043 -0.031  0.054 
Outsiders -0.055 -0.131 0.078 -0.249 -0.245 -0.220 0.060 0.160 0.449 -0.258 0.617 -0.213 -0.038 -0.159 0.003  
                                  This table presents Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal. LnChSales is the natural logarithm of change in sales percentage. Profitability is the return on assets. Number of owners is the number of 
owners of the firm. Family Ownership is the percentage of shares controlled by the family. CEO Ownership refers to the percentage of shares controlled by the firm’s CEO.  Managerial Own means the percentage of 
shares controlled by the firm´s management. Bank Ownership is the percentage of shares controlled by the bank. VC Ownership refers to the percentage of shares controlled by Venture capital funds. Other Owners means 
the percentage of share controlled by other stakeholders. CEO Duality is a variable with a value of 1 if the roles of board chair and CEO are held by the same person, otherwise, the value is 0. Board Size refers to the number 
of board members. Manag Board refers to the number (ratio) of board members who represent a firm’s top management. Empl Board is the number of board members who represent employees. Family Board is the number 
(ratio) of family members on the board. VC on the Board refers to the number (ratio) of venture capital fund representatives on the board. Outsiders refers to the number (ratio) of board members who are not insiders of the 
firm. Data covers the years from 2000 to 2005. Correlations significant at the 1 percent confidence level are reported with bold characters. 
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Table 4 
Ownership and Board Structure by Firm Size 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables on ownership and board structure 
when the data has been divided into two sub samples by firm size. Column I presents the 
results for the firms with 16 or more employees and column II for firms with fewer than 16 
employees. Column III presents the p-values on t-test for the equality of means between the 
two sub samples. 
 
 
 
Employees 
 ≥ 16 
n = 752 
Employees 
 < 16 
n = 1246 
Probability of 
difference 
 
Number of Owners 
 
11.30 
 
3.81 
 
0.000 
Family Ownership 53.45 % 51.89 % 0.548 
CEO Ownership 30.45 % 51.71 % 0.000 
Managerial Ownership 45.51 % 47.15 % 0.478 
Bank Ownership  0.00 % 1.10 % 0.029 
Venture Capital Ownership 0.38 % 1.33 % 0.026 
Other Owner’s Ownership 17.10 % 12.20 % 0.000 
    
CEO Duality  0.31 0.52 0.000 
Number of Board Members 3.48 2.50 0.000 
Top Management on the Board 1.34 1.04 0.000 
Employees on the Board 0.21 0.29 0.022 
Family Members on the Board 1.08 0.83 0.000 
VC on the Board 0.14 0.04 0.000 
Outside Board Members 0.63 0.38 0.001 
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Table 5 
Performance by insider ownership 
  
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables on performance when the data has 
been divided into two sub samples by insider ownership. Panel A presents the results for 
family ownership, panel B for CEO ownership, and panel C for management ownership. 
Column III presents the p-values on t-test for the equality of means between the two sub 
samples. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Performance by family ownership 
 
 
Family 
Ownership   
>50 % 
Family 
Ownership ≤ 
50 % 
Significance of 
difference 
 
Growth 
 
2.4748 
 
2.6824 
 
0.009 
Profitability 18.351 15.050 0.001 
    
 Family 
Ownership  ≥ 
75 % 
 
Family 
Ownership ≤ 
25 %  
Significance of 
difference 
 
Growth 
 
2.4601 
 
2.7155 
 
0.002 
Profitability 18.665 14.136 0.000 
 
 
Panel B: Performance by CEO ownership 
 
  
CEO 
Ownership  
>50 % 
 
 
CEO 
Ownership ≤ 
50 % 
 
Significance of 
difference 
 
Growth 
 
2.5871 
 
2.5647 
 
0.785 
Profitability 20.275 14.478 0.000 
    
 CEO 
Ownership   ≥ 
75 % 
 
CEO 
Ownership ≤ 
25 % 
 
Significance of 
difference 
Growth 2.605 2.7339 0.251 
Profitability 20.655 12.070 0.000 
 
 
 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here http://epublications.uef.fi/. 
Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or  
hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
 23 
Panel C: Performance by managerial ownership 
 
 
  
Managerial 
Ownership  
>50 % 
 
 
Managerial 
Ownership ≤ 
50 % 
 
Significance of 
difference 
Growth  2.3730 2.7247 0.000 
Profitability 18.375 15.501 0.006 
    
 Managerial 
Ownership  ≥ 
75 % 
 
Managerial 
Ownership ≤ 
25 % 
Significance of 
difference 
Growth 2.3812 2.7555 0.000 
Profitability 18.077 15.367 0.029 
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Table 6 
Performance by board size and the presence of outside board members 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables on performance when the data has 
been divided into two sub samples by board composition. Panel A presents the results for 
board size and panel B for the presence of outsiders on the board. Column III presents the p-
values on t-test for the equality of means between the two sub samples. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Performance by board size 
 
  
Board size ≥ 3 
 
Board size < 
3 
 
 
Significance of 
difference 
Growth 2.4704 2.6149 0.061 
Profitability 13.051 19.821 0.000 
    
 
Panel B: Presence of outsiders on the board 
 
  
Outsiders on 
the board 
 
 
No outsiders 
on the board 
 
Significance of 
difference 
Growth 2.4366 2.5316 0.377 
Profitability 7.345 18.673 0.000 
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Table 7 
The determinants of firm growth 
 
The dependent variable is the annual logarithmic sales growth rate. We employ panel data 
estimation methods and run all models both with random effects and fixed effects models. 
Each column presents the results from both models. Column I presents the model that 
includes the ownership variables, column II the model with board structure variables, and 
column III includes both ownership and board structure variables. Some variables are 
dropped from the models because of little time variation. The asterisks denote the 
significance level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 (99%) level. ** denotes significance 
at the 0.05 (95 %) level. * denotes significance at the 0.10 (90 %) level. The p-value is shown 
in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
  Column I   Column II   Column III 
  
Random  
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects   
Random  
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects   
Random  
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
Coeff. Coeff. 
 
Coeff. Coeff. 
 
Coeff. Coeff.  
(p) (p) (p) (p) (p) (p) 
Constant .815 2.095  1.118 -1.69 
 
.594 1.241 
 (.369) (.063)  (.229) (.400) (.551) (.567) 
         
Firm characteristics         
Ln (Total assets) .016 .156  -.012 .282* 
 
.026 .221 
 (.738) (.279)  (.812) (.089) (.660) (.210) 
Ln (1+ firm age) -.061 .001  .008 .089 
 
-.003 .112 
 (.413) (.989)  (.925) (.475) (.974) (.439) 
Return on Assets .733*** .976*** .482* 1.259*** 
 
.607** 1.276*** 
 (.001) (.001)  (.057) (.001) (.022) (.001) 
Current Ratio .044 .005  .018 -.005 
 
.050 .003 
 (.102) (.898)  (.042) (.852) (.135) (.952) 
Debt to total assets 1.011*** 1.425*** .636*** 1.069*** 
 
.834*** 1.290*** 
 (.000) (.000)  (.005) (.009) (.001) (.003) 
         
Ownership         
Number of Owners -.015   .150  
 
.059  
 (.932)   (.497)  (.809)  
Managerial Ownership -.003** -.018**    
 
-.004** -.020** 
 (.016) (.014)    (.020) (.012) 
Family Ownership -.103 -1.267*    -.106 -2.50*** 
 (.367) (.064)    (.456) (.007) 
Ownership by VC .019** .034***    
 
.026*** .035** 
 (.014) (.003)    (.004) (.025) 
         
Board Structure         
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    CEO duality    -.041   .013  
    (.775)   (.930)  
    Top Management    -.064 .282  -.009 .320 
    (.349) (.830)  (.914) (.810) 
    Outside Members    -.111* 2.162  -.080 1.364 
    (.080) (.116)  (.340) (.360) 
                  
            
Industries      YES   YES  YES YES  YES YES 
         
         
R
2
 .0794 .044  .046 .027  .0640 .052 
Number of observations 1198 1198  988 988  894 894 
Chi
2
 statistics 75.85  
 
30.58  
 
46.60  
 (.000)  (.0810)  (.004)  
F-statistics  4.35   2.52   3.06 
  (.0009)   (.015)   (.0009) 
Breusch-Pagan 59.83   43.87   33.59  
LM-test (.000)   (.000)   (.000)  
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Table 8 
The Determinants of firm profitability 
 
The dependent variable is the return on assets (ROA). We employ panel data estimation 
methods and run all models both with random effects and fixed effects models. Each column 
presents the results from both models. Column I presents the model that includes the 
ownership variables, column II ownership and board structure variables, and column III 
board structure variables. Some variables are dropped from the models because of little time 
variation. The asterisks denote the significance level. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 
(99%) level. ** denotes significance at the 0.05 (95 %) level. * denotes significance at the 
0.10 (90 %) level. The p-value is shown in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Column I Column II Column III 
  
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
(p) (p) (p) (p) (p) (p) 
Constant .387 .071 .228 .530 .231 .657 
 (.008) (.483) (.178) (.023) (.154) (.003) 
       
Firm characteristics       
Ln (Total assets) -.003 .016 .014* .041*** .012 .046*** 
 (.684) (.215) (.093) (.005) (.103) (.001) 
Ln (1+ firm age) -.002 -.001 -.007 -.003 -.006 .001 
 (.829) (.968) (.501) (.816) (.547) (.989) 
Current Ratio .002 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
 (.151) (.640) (.329) (.527) (.366) (.729) 
Debt to total assets -.290*** -.307*** -.285*** -.296*** -.286*** -.300*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
       
Ownership       
Number of Owners -.060**  -.047  -.075**  
 (.025)  (.222)  (.034)  
Managerial     
Ownership .001 .003*** .001 .003***   
 (.878) (.001) (.466) (.000)   
Family Ownership .016 .091 -.012 .061   
 (.342) (.207) (.616) (.482)   
 Ownership by VC -.005*** -.004*** -.002* .006***   
 (.000) (.006) (.053) (.002)   
       
Board Structure       
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    CEO duality   .029  .036  
   (.240)  (.127)  
    Top Management   -.001 -.010 .008 -.006 
   (.914) (.952) (.506) (.097) 
    Outside Members   -.030** -1.532*** -.018* -1.35*** 
   (.037) (.000) (.095) (.000) 
              
          
Industries           YES    YES YES YES YES YES 
       
       
R
2
 .255 .174 .2379 .268 .225 .251 
Number of 
observations 2080 2080 1566 1566 1706 1706 
Chi
2
 statistics 529.06  445.22  477.64  
 (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  
F-statistics  47.12  47.70  72.10 
  (.000)  (.000)  (.000) 
Breusch-Pagan 434.69  436.34  558.98  
LM-test (.000)   (.000)   (.000)   
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Table 9 
Determinants of growth and profitability using 2SLS 
 
This table reports the results on LnChSales and the return on assets (ROA) using 2SLS. 
Columns I and II present the results on models which include the ownership and board 
structure variables, columns III and IV the models with ownership variables, and columns V 
and VI include board structure variables. The asterisks denote the significance level. *** 
denotes significance at the 0.01 (99%) level. ** denotes significance at the 0.05 (95 %) level. 
* denotes significance at the 0.10 (90 %) level. The p-values are shown in parenthesis. 
 
Column  
I 
Column 
II  
Column  
III 
Column 
IV  
Column  
V 
Column  
VI 
  LnChSales ROA   LnChSales ROA   LnChSales ROA 
          
 
Coeff. Coeff. 
 
Coeff. Coeff. 
 
Coeff. Coeff.  
(p) (p) (p) (p) (p) (p) 
Constant 1.422 91.320  2.410 69.930 
 
0.956 110.058 
 (0.134) (0.117)  (0.001) (0.026) (0.484) (0.314) 
        
Firm characteristics         
Ln (Total assets) 0.077 -0.639  0.054 -1.699* 
 
0.071 -2.545* 
 (0.189) (0.729)  (0.261) (0.052) (0.405) (0.084) 
Ln (1+ firm age) -0.110   -0.097*  
 
-0.085  
 (0.119)   (0.062)  (0.232)  
Return on Assets 0.024   0.009  
 
0.035  
 (0.303)   (0.585)  (0.258)  
Current Ratio  1.946   1.505*** 
 
 1.539 
  (0.108)   (0.003)  (0.304) 
Debt to total assets 0.009* -0.062  0.003 -0.079** 
 
0.012* -0.054 
 (0.063) (0.653)  (0.137) (0.032) (0.085) (0.818) 
LnChSales  -26.344   -13.471   -31.458 
  (0.344)   (0.276)   (0.525) 
         
Ownership         
Number of Owners 0.000 -0.018  -0.001 -0.026 
 
  
 (0.895) (0.805)  (0.654) (0.599)   
Managerial Ownership -0.005*** -0.087  -0.003*** -0.042 
 
  
 (0.000) (0.463)  (0.001) (0.374)   
Family Ownership -0.001 0.025  -0.002 0.014   
 (0.438) (0.512)  (0.100) (0.605)   
Ownership by VC 0.028 -0.683**  0.013 -0.840*** 
 
  
 (0.183) (0.015)  (0.412) (0.000)   
         
Board Structure         
 CEO duality -0.036 1.926     -0.173 2.639 
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i A social insurance premium of at least 25 percent is added to the wages; Source: Statistics Finland  
 Top Management -0.001 -0.010     -0.003** -0.041 
 (0.515) (0.833)     (0.041) (0.726) 
 Outside Members -0.005* -0.102     -0.005* -0.185 
 (0.074) (0.492)     (0.058) (0.490) 
            
Industry dummies YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
         
R
2
 0.036 0.059  0.044 0.102  0.018 0.027 
Number of observations 865 865  1172 1172  940 940 
   
 
  
 
  
F-statistics 2.769 3.989 4.611 9.911 2.238 2.890 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.006) (0.000) 
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ABSTRACT. This study investigates how family ownership affects the usage of 
and the attitudes towards different funding sources in micro-sized, small, and 
medium-sized private family and non-family firms. Our findings suggest that 
family firms are more likely to use trade credits, finance companies and owners 
as their sources of finance than are non-family firms. We also find that family 
firms have more negative attitudes towards bank loans and trade credits but more 
positive attitudes towards additional equity from current owners than non-family 
firms have. The fact that our results on the usage of and attitudes towards trade 
credit differ, suggests that the family firms in our sample may be forced to use 
short-term debt because more preferred sources are not available. Our results also 
suggest that attitudes towards different funding sources seem to follow pecking 
order theory.
Keywords: Family firms, Funding sources, Attitudes, Small firms
1 Introduction
Family firms are often credited for their long-term strategic commitment 
(Poutziouris, 2001) and financial prudence, but they are criticised for their con-
servative financing philosophy (Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996; Romano, Tanewski and 
Smyrnios, 2001). However, prior empirical literature on the financing behaviour of 
family firms and non-family firms has yielded mixed results. Family businesses 
follow a “peculiar financial logic” due to personal preferences concerning growth, 
risk and ownership-control (Neubauer and Lank, 1998; Poutziouris, 2001; Gallo, 
Tàpiens and Cappuyns, 2004). Consequently, they are likely to rely on internally 
generated funds (Poutziouris, 2001). Gallo and Vilaseca (1996) also indicate that 
family businesses have low debt to equity levels and they avoid obtaining loans 
from financial institutions to minimize the probability of bankruptcy and to main-
tain family control (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999; McConaughy, Matthews and 
Fialko, 2001). Blanco-Mazagatos, de Quevedo-Puento and Castrillo (2007) suggest 
contradictory that family firms have higher levels of debt than non-family firms 
which implies that family businesses prefer debt to equity for covering external 
funding. Finally, López-Grazia and Sánchez-Andújar (2007) find that there are no 
large differences between the funding behaviour of family firms and non-family 
firms. 
The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between family ownership 
and owner-managers’ attitudes towards using different funding sources and the 
actual financing behaviour.  We focus on small family and non-family firms. We 
use the pecking order theory approach in this study. Pecking order theory implies 
that small firms, both family and non-family firms, tend to finance their invest-
ment needs in a hierarchical fashion: first using internally generated funds, then 
short- and long-term debts, and finally outside equity—only as a last resort (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984).  Pecking order can be considered a relevant approach especially 
in explaining the funding behaviour of family firms because family firms are 
characterized by avoiding the use of external capital (Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996; 
Romano et al., 2001) and preferring to safeguard ownership, control and financial 
independence (Poutziouris, 2001). Furthermore, it has been suggested that infor-
mation asymmetry induces agency problems between the firm and its potential 
creditors and they are more severe for smaller firms (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Hall, Hutchinson and Michalaes, 2000). Data for this study consists 
of micro-sized, small and medium-sized private firms in Finland. 
An increasing interest in the funding of SMEs and in family businesses has 
yielded a growing number of studies in this area using data mostly on Anglo-
Saxon countries and usually data on large and listed family firms. Although there 
are empirical studies investigating sources of funding also in a European context, 
their focus, data or/and measures are different from this study. Gallo and Vilaseca 
(1996) use debt-to-equity level and investigate the capital structure of small and 
medium-sized family, but not non-family firms. Michaelas, Chittenden and 
Poutziouris (1998) and Vos, Jia-Yuh Yeh, Carter and Taggar (2004) explore different 
funding sources in small firms but not in the family context, whereas Poutziouris 
(2001) focuses on different sources of finance in small and medium-sized family 
and non-family firms but is not investigating attitudes. Finally, Lòpez-Gracia and 
Sánchez-Andújar (2007) investigate the differences in medium-sized family and 
non-family firms but use debt ratio and operating cash flow as their measures. 
The structure of the capital markets constitutes the framework for alternative 
forms of financing. This structure differs by country, and therefore, it has been 
suggested that the country context should also be taken into account. The Finnish 
capital markets are bank-based and highly concentrated with only a small number 
of banks operating in the country (Niskanen and Niskanen, 2006) and bank loans 
are important sources of funding for small and medium-sized firms. In contrast 
to many other bank-based financial markets, the Finnish market is characterized 
by a very low number of banks operating in the country, making the markets very 
concentrated. In bank-based systems banks monitor the performance of custom-
ers more closely than in other kind of systems, for example in the U.S. Schmidt 
and Tyrell (1997) provide an in-depth review on the nature of bank-based capital 
markets. This implies that bank funding is quite easily available. It also implies 
that since the market for equity is less well developed, the access to outside equity 
is scarce. 
Our findings suggest that when it comes to the funding patterns of family vs. 
non-family firms, there are three significant differences.  First of all, family firms 
are more likely to use trade credits and finance companies than non-family firms 
are even if their attitudes towards trade credits are more negative than those of 
non-family firms. This may indicate that family firms are more often forced to 
use trade credits because more preferred funding sources are not available to 
them, such as bank loans.  Family firms are also more likely to resort to increased 
funding from the current owners, as our finding suggests. Our results also sug-
gest that this may be at least partly due to the positive attitudes that family firms 
have towards additional equity from current owners. Our results further imply 
that attitudes towards different funding sources tend partially to follow pecking 
order theory. 
Our study contributes to the existing empirical literature in three different 
ways. We investigate funding behavior in the family context with a data of pri-
vate micro-sized, small, and medium-sized firms firms. Our definition of fam-
ily firms is similar to Lòpez-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar (2007) and Niskanen, 
Karjalainen and Niskanen (2010a), who suggest that a private firm is regarded as 
family firm when family ownership exceeds 50 %. Furthermore, we are able to use 
more detailed measures of actual funding behavior than most previous studies. 
We investigate also the attitudes towards different funding sources to be able to 
investigate more closely the demand of funding sources because traditional vari-
ables, especially those constructed from the financial statement, do not allow for 
this. For example, although firms might prefer to use a long-term debt, they may 
be forced to take short-term debts to cover the funding needs when long-term 
debts are not available.  This funding gap may be more severe for family firms 
because a number of studies, for example, Niskanen, Niskanen and Laukkanen 
(2010b), suggest that banks are averse to lending to small and medium-sized firms 
that can be characterized as family firms. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews theories and em-
pirical literature relevant to this study and presents our hypotheses. Section 3 
describes data, methodology and variables. Section 4 presents the results, and 
section 5 includes the discussion and concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review and 
Hypotheses
Information asymmetry refers to the fact that firm managers or other insiders are 
assumed to possess more information about the firm s´ performance (Storey, 1994), 
future earnings, cash flows or investment opportunities than financiers or other 
stakeholders (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Consequently, small firm size is likely to 
lead to agency problems between owner-managers and lenders (Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Hall et al., 2000) which may weaken the credit availability (Myers, 1984) and 
make external finance costly (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and therefore, affect the 
funding of small firms (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Firms tend to follow pecking 
order due to information asymmetry and the interests of current shareholders 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). Pecking order approach is particularly relevant to small 
firms because the costs associated with external finance are higher for small firms 
than their larger counterparts (Chittenden, Hall and Hutchinson, 1996).
However, previous literature is not unanimous on whether agency problems 
are more or less severe in family firms. Some studies suggest that family firms 
should be exempt from agency problems due to the intra-familial altruistic ele-
ment and due to that management and ownership overlap (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Dyer, 2006). Other studies imply that agency problems may be less severe 
because family firms have also non-economic goals (Poutziouris, 2001; Chrisman, 
Chua and Litz, 2004). However, Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholz (2001) and 
Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) argue that altruism may create agency prob-
lems unique to family firms, because family relationships may make it more dif-
ficult to solve conflicts or to curb unproductive behaviour. Furthermore, because 
family firms cannot be regarded as a homogeneous group of people with joint 
interests (Sharma, Chrisman and Chua, 1997), it may lead to conflicts of interests 
between majority and minority shareholders (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). In small family firms agency problems 
are more likely to be present between the firm and its potential outside suppliers 
of funds due to information asymmetry (Myers, 1984) because the quality of finan-
cial statements varies. Consequently, family firms, due to firms´ closely held na-
ture, may be even more susceptible to financial constraints and disadvantageous 
loan terms such as lower loan availability, higher costs of debts and increased 
collateral requirements (Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996; Niskanen et al. 2010b). 
Prior empirical studies imply that the characteristics of the owner and the firm 
as well as owners´ beliefs and attitudes are determinants of financing behaviour 
and firm s´ capital structure (Michaelas et al., 1998;  Michaelas, Chittenden and 
Poutziouris, 1999; Gallo et al., 2004; Vos et al., 2007). Moreover, the preference of 
certain funding sources affects firms´ capital structure (Romano et al., 2001). Small 
firms tend to finance their needs as pecking order theory implies, in a hierarchical 
fashion: first, using internally generated funds, followed by short- and long-term 
debt, and external equity, as a last resort (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
It has been suggested that there are no large differences in the funding behav-
iour between the family firms and non-family firms (López-Grazia and Sánchez-
Andújar, 2007; Coleman and Carsky, 2007). However, Gallo and Vilaseca (1996) 
propose that the family nature of business leads family firms to behave differently 
from the financing choices of non-family firms. First, family firms rely more on 
retained earnings due to their aversion of sharing ownership and due to keep con-
trol (Neubauer and Lank, 1998; Poutziouris, 2001). Second, family firms use more 
short term funding because owner-managers adhere strongly family control and 
dislike pursuing business growth plans (Poutziouris, 2001). Third, some studies 
(for example Wu, Chua and Chrisman, 2007; Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007; King 
and Santor, 2008) suggest that family firms use more loans than non-family firms 
because family firms may experience lower cost of debt than their non-family 
counterparts and owner-managers prefer to maintain control, whereas Gallo and 
Vilaseca (1996), Romano et al. (2001), Poutziouris (2001) and Lopez-Gracia and 
Sanchez-Andujar (2007) argue that family firms use less debt to retain family con-
trol. Fourth, avoidance of external capital in terms of equity is stronger in family 
firms because of reluctance to share ownership and control (Neubauer and Lank, 
1998). 
Retained earnings are the most frequently used funding sources for family 
firms (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999; Vos et al., 2007; López-Gracia and Sánchez-
Andújar, 2007). Family firms are more dependent on retained earnings because 
owner-managers are reluctant to share ownership and motivated to retain finan-
cial independence (Neubauer and Lank, 1998; Poutziouris, 2001). The preference 
to use first retained earnings is also in line with the pecking order theory (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: Family firms have more positive attitudes towards retained earnings than 
non-family firms have.
Although family owner-managers prefer to use internal finance, debt financing 
is used if retained earnings are inadequate (Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007). Trade 
credits are preferred because they are a more informal source of funding and do 
not require security arrangements or sharing of information such as annual ac-
counts with the creditors (Michaelas et al., 1998). Due to that aversion of external 
long term funding in terms of debt is particularly strong in family firms, they tend 
to prefer short-term funding when external funding is used (Poutziouris, 2001). 
Short term debts such as trade credits or funding from finance companies (leasing, 
factoring or instalment purchase) are used because they require no collateral se-
curity (Poutziouris, 2001).  These considerations lead to the following hypotheses:
H2a: Family firms are more likely to use trade credits and funding from finance 
companies as their funding source than non-family firms do.
H2b: Family firms have more positive attitudes towards trade credits and fun-
ding from finance companies than non-family firms do.
Some studies suggest that family firms attempt to maintain their control of the 
firm by adopting a highly levered capital structure (Wu et al., 2007) and that bank 
loans and bank overdraft are important funding sources for family firms (Mishra 
and McConaughy, 1999; Vos et al., 2007).  Family firms may be more dependent 
on debt funding because they avoid using external equity funding (Poutziouris, 
2001). They are even prepared to accept higher financing costs in order to preserve 
their financial independence and flexibility, for example, by using bank overdrafts 
which have higher interest rates than bank loans (Peters and Westerheide, 2011). 
Blanco-Mazagatos et al. (2007) and King and Santor (2008) argue that family firms 
have higher levels of debt than non-family firms which implies that family busi-
nesses prefer debt to equity for covering external funding. Because owner-man-
agers prefer to safeguard family ownership, control and financial independence 
(Poutziouris, 2001), family firms are more dependent on debts than are their non-
family counterparts (Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007). Based on the previous we 
propose the following:
H3a: Family firms are more likely to use bank loans than non-family firms do. 
H3b: Family firms have more positive attitudes towards bank loans than non-
family firms do. 
Yet, other studies imply that family businesses have low debt to equity levels 
(Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996; López-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar, 2007) and that fam-
ily firms use less debt to minimize the probability of bankruptcy and due to the 
risk of losing control (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999; McConaughy et al., 2001; 
Anderson et al., 2003). Furthermore, because family firms tend to take risks to a 
lesser extent than non-family firms (Naldi, Nordqvist and Sjögren, 2007) they are 
more likely to avoid using long-term external capital in terms of debt (Romano et 
al., 2001; Poutziouris, 2001). They avoid obtaining loans from financial institutions 
(Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996) to stay independent from external capital providers. In 
case of using debt small family businesses prefer to rely on family loans (Romano 
et al., 2001). An additional factor behind the low levels of debt could be the fact that 
family firms face difficulties in obtaining financing from banks (Niskanen et al., 
2010b). These considerations lead to the following hypotheses which are opposite 
to hypotheses H3a and H3b:
H4a: Family firms are less likely to use bank loans than non-family firms do. 
H4b: Family firms have more negative attitudes towards bank loans than non-
family firms do. 
Burkart, Panuzzi and Shleifer (2003) propose that families often try to maintain 
control as long as they can because the amenity potential is large. Due to the 
amenity potential an owner-manager has the ability to pursue a range of preferred 
ends through their firm’s activities, also through financing decisions. Berger and 
Udell (1998) suggest that small and young firm owner-managers rely on funding 
sources such as funds of the major owner because these firms may lack collater-
als. Moreover, family firm owner-managers prefer to safeguard ownership, family 
control and financial independence (Neubauer and Lank, 1998) and follow ´keep 
it in the family` -tradition (Poutziouris, 2001) and therefore, avoid using outside 
external capital (Neubauer and Lank, 1998).  Based on the previous we propose 
the following:
H5a: Family firms are more likely to use additional equity from current owners 
than non-family firms do. 
H5b: Family firms have more positive attitudes towards additional equity from 
current owners than non-family firms do. 
Family firms are averse to using long-term external capital in terms of equity 
(Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996; Romano et al., 2001; Poutziouris, 2001) because disper-
sion of ownership dilutes family control (Poutziouris, 2001; Romano et al., 2001). 
Firms might also have more pressure to complete profit and dividend targets that 
external equity requires and consequently, this may reduce the attractiveness of 
using outside equity funding (Poutziouris, 2001).  Outside investors such as ven-
ture capitalists represent a relatively small proportion of small business finance, 
including that of family firms, because venture capitalists invest very selectively 
and target their investments to firms with high growth potential (Berger and 
Udell, 1998; Poutziouris, 2001). Furthermore, a minority of family business owner-
managers are growth oriented (Poutziouris, 2001) and the smallest firms may be 
too small for the investment scope of venture capitalists (Berger and Udell, 1998; 
Poutziouris, 2001). Both family firm and non-family firm owner-managers have a 
profound antithesis to venture capital because owner-managers dislike diluting 
ownership, control and sharing the seats on the board with outsiders as it reduces 
management s´ freedom of action (Poutziouris, 2001). Taken this into account, fam-
ily firms tend to follow the pecking order principles and use outside equity only as 
a last resort (Romano et al., 2001; Poutziouris, 2001; Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007). 
These considerations lead to the following hypotheses:
H6a: Family firms are less likely to use outside equity than non-family firms 
do.
H6b: Family firms have more negative attitudes towards outside equity than 
non-family firms do.
3 Data,  Methodology and 
Variables 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data was collected through a private survey in autumn 2006.  The survey was 
targeted to limited liability companies that are located in four regions in Finland. We 
used Voitto+ register, compiled by Asiakastieto Ltd., a Finnish financial and credit 
information company, as our sample frame. Voitto+ register is a commercial and 
comprehensive database with financial statement information. The questionnaires 
were sent to the CEOs. Of the 3262 questionnaires sent, a total of 621 responses were 
usable, which resulted in an effective response rate of 19 %. The final sample consists 
of 600 small and medium-sized firms operating in Finland, because we drop firms 
which are outside the European Union (EU) definition of small and medium-sized 
firms. According to EU commission s´ classification (96/280/CE), a micro-sized firm 
is a firm that employs fewer than 10 people and whose maximum annual turnover 
or total assets are € 2m. A small firm is a firm which employs fewer than 50 people 
and its maximum annual turnover or total assets are € 10m. A medium-sized firm is 
a firm which employs fewer than 250 people and whose maximum annual turnover 
is € 50m or maximum total assets are € 43m. 
The sample firms represent all industries, excluding primary production. 
Primary production is excluded because of its different nature of business com-
pared to other businesses. The sample firms are firms with at least two employees 
and whose legal form is a limited liability. Other legal forms than limited liabili-
ties are excluded because official financial statement data is not available on them. 
The firms were asked to provide information on their ownership structure, 
their preferences towards different funding sources, and the information on their 
use of the funding sources in the years 2000-2005. The financial data was collected 
from the Voitto+ register. Observations include the years from 2000 to 2005. The 
total number of available observations per firm per year varies because, in some 
cases, information is available for less than six years. The number of observations 
varies in the tables because of missing observations on some variables. Also in 
individual regression models, the number of observations varies because of miss-
ing observations on some variables.
The data used in this study covers the years 2000 until 2005, but we believe 
that the age of the data is not an issue because the aim of this study is to ex-
plore the differences of funding behavior between family and non-family firms. 
Attitudes do not change easily and they remain fairly stable despite of fluctuations 
in macroeconomic conditions. As far as macroeconomic conditions in Finland 
are concerned, the Statistics Finland indicate that during the years 2000-2005 the 
change in GDP was positive and varied between  +1.2% and 6.4 %. Euribor 1 month 
interest rate varied between 2.131 % and 4.943 % and was declining towards the 
year 2005. Based on the survey of the Central Bank of Finland, during the years 
2000-2005 availability of bank loans was excellent and debt ratios and other fund-
ing terms were advantageous and inexpensive in Finland. Based on this we argue 
that the time period is suitable for investigating attitudes because the supply side 
has been more or less stable. 
We use Logit regressions to investigate the usage of funding sources because 
the dependent variables of usage are dichotomous. The use of different funding 
sources is captured in the following regression model:
1) Uset = β0 + β1familyt + β2sizet + β3aget+ β4growtht + β5profitabilityt + 
β6liquidityt +  β7leveraget+ β8interestt + β9GDPt + β10tradet + β11industryt 
+ εt,
where Uset is a dummy variable denoting whether a particular funding 
source is used or not. 
In addition to the usage of different funding sources we investigate also attitudes. We 
use OLS regression analysis to investigate attitudes towards different funding sourc-
es. We measure the attitudes towards different funding sources by retained earnings, 
trade credits, bank loans, additional equity from current owners and outside equity. 
The attitudes towards different funding sources are captured in the following 
regression model:
2) Attitudet = β0 + β1familyt + β2sizet + β3aget+ β4growtht + β5profitabilityt + 
β6liquidityt + β7leveraget +  β8industryt + εt,
where attitudet is a source of funding with a value between one and five. 
The most positive attitudes are given the value of 1 and the most nega-
tive attitudes are given the value of 5. In both regression models Familyt 
is a variable measuring family influence. Sizet, aget, growtht, profitabili-
tyt, liquidityt, leveraget, interestt, GDPt, tradet and industryt are control 
variables, and εt is a term of error.
Non-respondent tests have been performed for the database. Tests suggest that 
the firms that responded to the survey are statistically significantly similar to the 
whole sample. We also take into account the possibility of common method bias 
and apply Harman s´ single-factor test. We load all variables into a principal com-
ponent factor analysis, and examine a rotated factor solution. None of the factors 
account for over 18.1 % of the total variance.  
VARIABLES 
Dependent variables
Pecking order theory states that firms facing information asymmetry finance their 
investments first by retained earnings, followed by debt, and finally, by outside eq-
uity. Our approach as to whether pecking order applies is different from, for exam-
ple López-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar s´ (2007), who use the debt ratio. The validity 
of this approach using the debt ratio is undermined by the fact that the firms’ debt 
ratios are simultaneously determined by the firms’ demand for credit and the sup-
ply of credit from different sources.  Thus, regression models using the debt ratio as 
the dependent variable will suffer from a simultaneous equation bias. To overcome 
this bias, we use different measures for the availability of different funding sources.
The survey firms were asked to provide information on their three latest fund-
ing sources. Our six dependent variables for the usage of the six most preferred 
funding sources; bank loans, trade credits, finance company, friends and family, 
owners and other firms, have been structured based on these questions. Trade cred-
its are accounts payable, which will due within a specific time frame with alter-
native payment terms. According to Intrum Justitia, a credit management service 
company, the average payment time of trade credits in Finland is 26 days. In some 
cases payment period can be extended to two or three months. Finance company 
refers to the funding instruments such as factoring, leasing or instalment purchase, 
which are typically organized by independent finance companies. Each variable is a 
binary variable and is given a value of 1 if used, and if not used, then the value is 0. 
Even after using actual funding sources as the dependent variable and control-
ling for a number of underlying factors, it is possible that the results are driven by 
either demand or supply of each individual funding source. Therefore, we con-
tinue by investigating the attitudes towards five different funding sources which 
are based on the pecking order theory approach. We asked the respondents to 
give their subjective views on a set of alternative funding sources. The funding 
sources were: retained earnings, trade credits, bank loans, additional equity from 
current owners and outside equity. The questions were structured so that a very 
positive attitude towards a specific funding source gets the value of 1, and a very 
negative attitude a value of 5. Firms had to rank the funding sources from 1 to 5. 
Explanatory Variables
We perform the analysis by using three alternative indicators of family influence. 
First, we use a binary variable to identify family firms and non-family firms. A 
firm is regarded as family firm if family ownership exceeds 50 % and the vari-
able gets the value of 1, otherwise 0 (as for example López-Gracia and Sánchez-
Andújar, 2007).  Second, we use a continuous variable, family ownership rate. 
Third, we use the presence of family members on the board (a binary variable and 
also a ratio of family members on the board) as an alternative method to identify 
family influence. 
Control Variables 
Previous empirical studies find that factors such as firm age, firm size, growth, 
profitability, liquidity, leverage, risk, and line of business affect the sources of 
finance in small firms. Bozkaya and Pottelsberghe De La Potterie (2008) find that 
young firms use internal funds such as personal savings and those of family and 
friends as the primary sources of financing and banks as sources of external fi-
nance, while Vos et al. (2007) argue that older businesses use retained earnings. 
We use Ln (1+firm age) as a measure of firm age. 
Larger firms use more external funding (Coleman and Carsky, 1999) and they 
exhibit higher leverage (King and Santor, 2008), whereas small firms tend to use 
short term debt over long term debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Michaelas et al., 
1999; Hall et al., 2000).  Our measure for firm size is Ln (Total assets). 
High-growth firms use more loans and external funding sources (Vos et al., 
2007) and growth seems to affect short and long term debts (Michaelas et al., 1999). 
We use the annual logarithmic growth rate of sales Ln (Change in Sales) as our 
measure of firm growth. 
Profitable firms will have more internal funds available and may need to bor-
row less (Michaelas et al., 1999; Coleman and Carsky, 1999). The need for borrow-
ing is also dependent on the firm s´ potential investments and firm s´ financing 
strategy. Small firms tend to use retained profits rather than access outside fund-
ing sources (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Furthermore, improvements in profitability 
reduce the use of multiple funding sources (Vos et al., 2007). We use the return on 
assets as a measure of profitability. 
Liquidity is the firm s´ ability to fulfil its financial obligations when they are 
due. Liquidity is also viewed as increasing debt capacity. Myers and Rajan (1998) 
claim that there is a dark side to liquidity. They hypothesize that while liquid 
assets give creditors greater value in liquidation, they also give borrowers more 
freedom to act at creditor’s expense. We include current ratio as a proxy for firm 
liquidity in our analyses. 
Leverage is included as control variables because high leverage typically 
makes it difficult for a firm to obtain additional debts. For example, Niskanen and 
Niskanen (2010) find that that an increase in the existing debt ratio increases the 
likelihood of a loan application will be turned down. We use debt-to-total assets 
ratio as our proxy for leverage. 
Macroeconomic conditions may have an impact on the availability and use 
of credits (Michaelas et al., 1999). To take into account this, we add change in 
the gross domestic product (GPD), terms of trade and the annual average on the 
interest rate of Central Bank of Europe in our models on the usage of different 
funding sources. 
Harris and Raviv (1991), Michaelas et al. (1999) and Vos et al. (2007) suggest 
that capital structure of small firms is industry dependent and industry specific 
effects influence the maturity of debts. Industry dummies are binary variables 
that capture industry fixed effects. 
4 Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 describes the descriptive statistics for the variables. Panel A shows that the 
average ownership rate of the family is 52.7 %. In family firms the average family 
ownership rate is 95.43 % and in non-family firms 4.18 %. Family ratio on the board 
is almost 56 % in family firms and 15 % in non-family firms. The most preferred 
funding source is, on average, retained earnings, followed by bank loans, additional 
equity from current owners, trade credits, and outside equity as the least preferred 
funding source. Panel B shows that the most popular funding sources in terms of 
usage are bank loans 0.79, finance companies 0.27, and current owners 0.15.
Table 1: Descriptives
Panel A:Continuous variables on family influence and attitudes
Variables n min max Mean Std. deviation
Family influence
Family ownership 3218 0 100 52.7 47.275
Family ownership in family firms 1696 51 100 95.43 11.883
Family ownership in non-family firms 1522 0 50 4.18 13.352
Family ratio on the board in family firms 1663 0 100 55.90 42.495
Family ratio on the board in non-family 
firms
1446 0 100 15.11 31.103
Attitudes 
Retained earnings 2599 1 5 1.60 0.986
Trade credits 2348 1 5 3.40 1.070
Bank loans 2723 1 5 2.23 1.100
Additional equity from current owners 2399 1 5 3.11 1.125
Outside equity 2318 1 5 4.47 0.947
Panel B: Dichotomous variables on the use of funding sources
Variables n min max Mean
Usage 
Trade credits 1809 0 1 0.07
Finance company 1905 0 1 0.27
Bank loans 2366 0 1 0.79
Friends and family 1761 0 1 0.01
Other firms 1785 0 1 0.02
Current owners 1869 0 1 0.15
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics on the sample firms. Column I presents 
the variables. Column II presents the number of observations. Column III presents 
minimum values, column IV maximum values, column V the average values of 
the variables and column VI the standard deviations. 
We run Pearson and Spearman correlations (not reported) on all variables used 
in this study but do not observe any serious correlations between the variables. 
We also investigate a model with a VIF-test (not reported) and do not find any 
serious multicollinearity. 
We further investigate the variables related to firm age, firm size and financial 
ratios in more detail in Table 2, where we divide the data into family firms and 
non-family firms. We use a t-test for independent samples to compare the equality 
of means by exploring whether the variables differ between the family firms and 
non-family firms. Family firms have, on average, higher sales and more employees 
than non-family firms have. As far as profitability and leverage are concerned, 
family firms perform better than non-family firms which is consistent with prior 
studies, for example, Gallo and Vilaseca (1996), Allouche, Amann, Jaussad, and 
Kurashina (2008), and Andres (2008).  This implies that due to higher leverage 
non-family firms have higher interest expenses which may lead to lower profit-
ability. Column IV presents the average financial performance ratios available on 
the population.    
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics when data has been divided into 
family firms and non-family firms. Column I presents results for the family firms 
and column II for the non-family firms. Column III presents p-values for the t-test 
for the equality of means between the two sub samples. Column IV represents the 
average financial ratios of the population.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on sample firms by family ownership
Family firms
n=1147
Non-family 
firms
n=983
Probability of 
difference
Average 
ratios of the 
population
Firm age 13.02 13.52 0.283
Sales (T€) 2220.66** 1395.68 0.033 1673.50
Total assets (T€) 1076.25 1208.65 0.682 1287.80
Number of employees 17.76** 12.40 0.042 12.30
Profit margin-% 8.63*** 1.69 0.000 4.00
Current ratio 2.12 2.00 0.397
ROA 18.38*** 13.53 0.002
Debt-to-total assets 58.77*** 66.73 0.001 62.50
Significance at: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.
We further investigate the usage of different funding sources in more detail in 
Table 3, where we divide the sample into family firms and non-family firms. We 
used a t-test for independent samples to compare the equality of means by inves-
tigating whether the usage of funding sources differs between the family firms 
and non-family firms. Family firms are more likely to use bank loans as well as 
finance companies´ funding, trade credits, other firms and friends and family as 
their sources of finance than non-family firms do. The use of different funding 
sources is a binary variable and if used, it gets the value of 1, otherwise 0, which 
affects the means. The use of retained earnings is not included which will have 
an impact on the values of usage of other sources.
Table 3 presents results on the usage of different funding sources in family 
firms and non-family firms. Our six dependent variables for the usage of the six 
most preferred funding sources are bank loans, trade credits, finance company, 
friends and family, owners and other firms. Each variable is a binary variable and 
is given a value of 1 if used, and if not used, then the value is 0. Column I pres-
ents results for the family firms and column II for the non-family firms. Column 
III presents p-values for the t-test for the equality of means between the two sub 
samples. 
Table 3: Usage of different funding sources in family firms and non-family firms
Family firms
n=1147
Non-family firms
n=983
Probability of 
difference
Bank loan 0.81** 0.77 0.050 
Finance company 0.31*** 0.23 0.000
Current owners 0.16 0.14 0.279
Trade credits 0.10*** 0.03 0.000 
Other firms 0.04*** 0.01 0.000
Friends and family 0.02** 0.01 0.013 
Significance at: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.
We investigate the variables on attitudes towards different funding sources in 
more detail in Table 4, where we have divided the data into family firms and 
non-family firms. We use a t-test for independent samples to compare the equal-
ity of means by investigating whether our variables differ between the family 
firms and non-family firms. The results of the attitudes towards different fund-
ing sources are similar in family firms and non-family firms, that is, both groups 
have ranked the sources in the same order. The most preferred funding source 
in both sub samples is retained earnings, second is bank loans, third additional 
equity from current owners, fourth trade credits and finally, outside equity. The 
funding sources that differ statistically significantly between the two sub samples 
are additional equity from current owners and trade credits. Family firms have 
more positive attitudes towards using additional equity from current owners than 
non-family firms have, and non-family firms have more positive attitudes towards 
using trade credits as a funding source. Regarding the results in Table 4 both fam-
ily and non-family firms seem to prefer additional equity from current owners 
to trade credits as their funding source. This contradicts with the pecking order 
theory, but otherwise the results follow pecking order.  
Table 4 presents results on the attitudes toward different funding sources. The 
questions were structured so that a very positive attitude towards a specific fund-
ing source gets the value of 1, and a very negative attitude a value of 5. Column 
I presents results for the family firms and column II for the non-family firms. 
Column III presents p-values for the t-test for the equality of means between the 
two sub samples. 
Table 4: Attitudes towards different funding sources in family firms and non-family firms
Family firms
n=1422
Non-family 
firms
n=1136
Probability 
of difference
Retained earnings 1.62 1.59 0.468
Bank loans 2.22 2.23 0.747
Additional equity from current owners 3.07** 3.18 0.013
Trade credits 3.46 3.33*** 0.004
Outside equity 4.50 4.46 0.288
Significance at: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.
Use of different funding sources
Table 5 reports the results from logistic regression analyses. The dependent vari-
able gets the value of 1 if firms indicated that one of their latest funding sources 
was a trade credit, finance company, bank loan, owners, other firms, or family and 
friends, otherwise 0. The measure for family firm is a dummy variable. The results 
in column I and II indicate that family firms are more likely to use trade credits 
and funding from finance companies. These findings support our hypothesis H2a 
and are in line with Poutziouris (2001). 
The results in column IV further show that family firms are more likely to use 
current owners than non-family firms.  This finding supports hypothesis H5a and 
is in line with Romano et al. (2001) and Poutziouris (2001). 
We also run our models of usage separately by dividing the firms into size 
categories, that is, micro-sized, small and medium-sized firms. The results (not 
reported) remain qualitatively similar to those with the whole sample in Table 5 
except that the micro-sized family firms are more likely to use owners as a fund-
ing source and this finding is significant. This finding supports hypothesis H5a 
and is in line with Romano et al. (2001) and Poutziouris (2001).
As far as the control variables are concerned, firms with higher leverage and 
growth are more likely to use trade credits. Younger firms and firms with lower 
liquidity are more likely to use finance companies as a funding source. Larger firms 
and firms with higher liquidity are more likely to use owners as their funding source. 
Table 5 presents results on the logistic regression analyses on the usage of dif-
ferent funding sources. The dependent variable is a binary variable which gets 
the value of one if the firm s´ most recent funding source has been a) trade credits 
in column I, b) finance company in column II, and c) bank loans in column III, 
d) owners in column IV, e) other firms in column V and f) friends and family in 
Table 5: Usage of different funding sources
Column 
I
Column 
II
Column 
III
Column 
IV
Column 
V
Column 
VI
Trade 
credits
Finance 
company
Bank 
loans
Owners Other 
firms
Friends 
and 
family
Coeff.
(p-value)
Coeff.
(p-value)
Coeff.
(p-value)
Coeff.
(p-value)
Coeff.
(p-value)
Coeff.
(p-value)
Constant -23.821
(0.996)
0.436
(0.751)
2.676
(0.013)
-4.054
(0.035)
-83.546
(0.982)
-20.588
(0.997)
Family 
firm/Non-
family firm
2.227**
(0.015)
0.594**
(0.032)
-0.135
(0.533)
0.675*
(0.080)
16.073
(0.985)
2.780
(0.202)
Firm characteristics
Ln (Total 
assets)
-0.217
(0.442)
-0.122
(0.260)
-0.064
(0.475)
0.376**
(0.015)
4.837
(0.266)
-1.230
(0.161)
Ln (1+ firm 
age)
-0.088
(0.833)
-0.336**
(0.032)
-0.009
(0.483)
-0.252
(0.225)
5.242
(0.487)
-0.460
(0.617)
Ln Change 
in Sales
0.517*
(0.063)
0.035
(0.702)
0.029
(0.703)
0.054
(0.676)
-0.596
(0.548)
0.357
(0.839)
Return on 
Assets
0.026
(0.213)
0.002
(0.731)
0.001
(0.767)
0.017
(0.114)
-0.020
(0.355)
-0.011
(0.839)
Current 
Ratio
-0.365
(0.314)
-0.572***
(0.002)
-0.166**
(0.045)
0.199*
(0.086)
-1.266
(0.618)
-2.342
(0.216)
Debt to to-
tal assets
0.020**
(0.049)
0.003
(0.482)
-0.004
(0.329)
0.010
(0.136)
-0.155
(0.474)
-0.027
(0.684)
Interest 
rate
-40.403
(0.342)
-1.842
(0.919)
-11.698
(0.390)
-19.971
(0.411)
400.306
(0.191)
-1669.67
(0.988)
Change in 
GDP
-11.374
(0.686)
-21.839*
(0.082)
1.912
(0.844)
1.619
(0.923)
-6.380
(0.942)
-692.633
(0.991)
Terms of 
trade
-16.454
(0.686)
-4.645
(0.792)
18.361
(0.169)
16.227
(0.493)
-119.924
(0.430)
-491.785
(0.992)
Industry 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Nagelkerke 
R2 0.333 0.272 0.070 0.155 0.775 0.575
# of ob-
servations 447 447 447 447 447 447
Significance at: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10, p-values are shown in parenthesis.
column VI. The explanatory variable, family firm/ non-family firm, is a dummy 
variable. Column I represents the results for regressing trade credits on family 
firm dummy. Column II represents the results for regressing finance company on 
family firm dummy. Column III represents the results for regressing bank loans 
on family firm dummy.  Column IV represents the results for regressing owners 
on family firm dummy. Column V represents the results for regressing other firms 
on family firm dummy.  Column VI represents the results for regressing friends 
and family on family firm dummy. Coefficients are unstandardized.
We also run the models with a continuous family ownership variable and the 
results (not reported) are similar to the ones obtained in Table 5. We also run our 
models using a dummy variable for family members on the board.  Again, the 
results on trade credits support hypothesis H2a. Firms with the presence of fam-
ily on the board are less likely to use additional equity from current owners. This 
finding is opposite to hypothesis H5a and with our finding when using a family 
firm dummy. One possible explanation could be that the firms are larger and have 
therefore more diverse boards or that they are in in different generational stages 
which information is not available. Overall, the differences indicate that family 
ownership and board membership are not interchangeable measures of family 
influence. We also run our model with a continuous variable indicating the ratio 
of family members on the board. The results are very similar (not reported). 
Attitudes towards different funding sources   
We turn to investigate the attitudes towards different funding sources and wheth-
er attitudes may differ between family firms and non-family firms. Table 6 pre-
sents our results from OLS regression analysis. Our dependent variable measures 
the attitudes towards each individual funding source on a scale from 1 to 5, with 
1 representing the most positive attitudes and 5 the most negative attitudes. Our 
measure of family ownership is a dummy variable. The results in column II sug-
gest that family firms have more negative attitudes towards trade credits than non-
family firms have. This finding contradicts with hypothesis H2b and Poutziouris 
(2001). The results in column III suggest that family firms have more negative 
attitudes towards bank loans. This finding supports our hypothesis H4b and is in 
line with Mishra and McConaughy (1999), McConaughy et al. (2001), Romano et 
al. (2001), Andersson, Mansi and Reeb (2003), Poutziouris (2001) and López-Gracia 
and Sánchez-Andújar s´ (2007). The results in column IV indicate that family firms 
have more positive attitudes towards additional equity from current owners than 
non-family firms have. This finding supports hypothesis H5b and is in line with 
Gallo and Vilaseca (1996), Romano et al. (2001) and Poutziouris (2001). 
We also run our models of attitudes separately by dividing firms into size 
categories, that is, micro-sized, small and medium-sized firms. The results (not 
reported) remain qualitatively similar to those with the whole sample in Table 
6 except that among the small family firms attitudes towards outside equity are 
more positive than in small non-family firms and this finding is significant. This 
result contradicts our hypothesis H6b and with Gallo and Vilaseca (1996), Romano 
et al. (2000) and Poutziouris (2001). This result could suggest that small family 
firms prefer to have moderate debt levels and avoid risks.
As far as the control variables are concerned, firms with lower profitability 
and lower leverage but better liquidity have more negative attitudes towards bank 
loans. Firms with larger size, lower age, lower growth rates, higher profitability 
and higher debt ratios have more positive attitudes towards additional equity 
from current owners. 
Table 6 presents results on the OLS regressions on the attitudes towards dif-
ferent funding sources. We have used White s´ correction. The dependent variable 
measures attitudes toward each specific funding source. The most positive atti-
tudes are given the value of 1 and the most negative attitudes are given the value 
of 5. Column I presents the results for regressing retained earnings on family firm 
dummy. Column II presents the results for regressing trade credits on family firm 
dummy. Column III presents the results for regressing bank loans on family firm 
dummy. Column IV presents the results for regressing additional equity from cur-
rent owners on family firm dummy. Column V presents the results for regressing 
outside equity on family firm dummy. Coefficients are unstandardized. 
Table 6: Attitudes towards different funding sources
Column 
I
Column 
II
Column 
III
Column 
IV
Column 
V
Retained 
earnings
Trade 
credits
Bank 
loans
Additional 
equity 
from 
current 
owners
Outside 
equity
Coeff.
(p-value)
Coeff.
(p-value)
Coeff.
(p-value)
Coeff.
(p-value)
Coeff.
(p-value)
Constant 2.158
(0.000)
2.937
(0.000)
1.917
(0.000)
2.622
(0.000)
4.699
(0.000)
Family firm/Non-family 
firm
-0.109
(0.251)
0.618***
(0.000)
0.228**
(0.022)
-0.276**
(0.024)
-0.103
(0.305)
Firm characteristics
Ln (Total assets) -0.097***
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.919)
-0.039
(0.370)
0.137**
(0.010)
0.029
(0.483)
Ln (1+ firm age) 0.041
(0.432)
0.081
(0.152)
-0.031
(0.551)
-0.144**
(0.024)
0.034
(0.509)
Ln Change in Sales 0.030
(0.407)
0.018
(0.587)
0.060
(0.102)
-0.110**
(0.017)
-0.013
(0.724)
Return on Assets 0.001
(0.756)
-0.001
(0.452)
-0.009***
(0.000)
0.005***
(0.008)
0.006***
(0.003)
Current Ratio -0.013
(0.562)
0.046
(0.161)
0.095**
(0.004)
-0.039
(0.311)
-0.101***
(0.006)
Debt to total assets 0.003
(0.116)
-0.002
(0.353)
-0.004**
(0.040)
0.007***
(0.000)
-0.003*
(0.086)
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.2454 0.2059 0.1599 0.1405 0.1278
# of observations 420 380 453 395 370
F-test statistics 11.75
(0.000)
11.39
(0.000)
6.74
(0.000)
7.69
(0.000)
7.61
(0.000)
Significance at: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10, p-values are shown in parenthesis.
In addition to the results reported here we also run the models with a continuous 
variable, the family ownership rate. The results (not reported) are similar to the 
ones reported in Table 6. We also run our models using a dummy variable family 
on the board.  The results suggest that the attitudes towards retained earnings as 
a funding source are more negative when family is represented on the board. This 
finding contradicts hypothesis H1 and Mishra and McConaughy (1999), Vos et al. 
(2007) and López-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar (2007). One potential explanation 
could be that family members on the board may prefer to distribute dividends 
and not to use retained earnings to fund future investments of the company. This 
could be the case in Finland because dividends have been tax-free to a certain 
extent during the study period. For a robustness check we also use a continu-
ous variable in our specifications, but the results are qualitatively similar (not 
reported). 
We also ran all our models without leverage due to potential endogeneity prob-
lem resulting from the possibility that our dependent variables and the control 
variable leverage might be correlated. However, the significance and signs of the 
results remain similar (not reported). 
Figure 1 summarizes our main findings on the usage of and attitudes towards 
different funding sources.
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Figure 1. Summary of the findings
The results suggest that family firms are more likely to use trade credits and funding from 
finance companies. This is in line with Poutziouris (2001). Also, family firms are more likely to 
resort to current owners and this supports the findings of Romano et al. (2001) and Poutziouris 
(2001). Concerning the attitudes our findings imply that family firms have more negative attitudes 
towards trade credits and bank loans. The result on trade credits was unexpected but on bank loans 
is line with, for example, Romano et al. (2001, Poutziouris (2001) and López-Gracia and Sánchez-
Andújar (2007). Finally, family firms have more positive attitudes towards additional equity from 
owners which is in line with Gallo and Vilaseca (1996), Romano et al., (2001) and Poutziouris 
(2001).
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Figure 1: Summary of the findings
The results suggest that family firms are more likely to use trade credits and fund-
ing from finance companies. This is in line with Poutziouris (2001). Also, family 
firms are more likely to resort to current owners and this supports the findings of 
Roman  et al. (2001) and Poutziouris (2001). Concerning the attitudes our findings 
imply that family firms have more negative attitudes towards trade credits and 
bank loans. The result on trade credits was unexpected but on bank loans is line 
w th, for example, Ro no et al. (2001, Po tziouris (2001) and López-Gracia and 
Sánchez-Andújar (2007). Finally, family firms have more positive attitudes towards 
additional equity from owners which is in line with Gallo and Vilaseca (1996), 
Romano et al., (2001) and Poutziouris 2001).
5 Conclusions
The objective of this study was to investigate the association between family 
ownership and the usage of and attitudes towards different funding sources. We 
focused on whether family firms and non-family firms differ in their funding be-
havior. We add to the existing literature by using data on small, non-listed firms. 
We are also able to use more detailed measures for the firms’ actual funding 
behavior. Finally, we extend the findings of previous studies by exploring both 
the use of and attitudes towards different funding sources. When we explore not 
only the usage but also attitudes, we are able to obtain more detailed informa-
tion on the demand side. The fact that demand and supply of funding sources 
do not always meet leads to situations in which firms are obliged to use different 
source(s) than they otherwise would, if all sources were available. Furthermore, 
our findings present evidence that family firms often rely on short-term funding 
and additional investments from current owners. We also find that funding be-
havior differs slightly by different size categories, i.e. when firms are divided into 
micro-sized, small and medium-sized firms. 
Our findings partially support prior findings that family firms are more likely 
to follow pecking order in their funding behavior. When it comes to the funding 
patterns of family vs. non-family firms, our results show two significant differ-
ences. First of all, the family firms in our sample are more likely to use trade cred-
its and finance companies than non-family firms are. This is the case, even if the 
family firms show more negative attitudes towards these funding sources. This 
can be interpreted to indicate that although family firms have more negative at-
titudes towards trade credits and bank loans, they have to use short-term funding 
such as trade credits because family firms may be more prone to face difficulties in 
obtaining loans from banks (Niskanen et al., 2010b), and they may lack collaterals 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Although in family firms attitudes towards short- and long-term debts are 
more negative than in non-family firms, the attitudes towards additional equity 
from current owners are more positive. This contradicts pecking order theory to 
some extent, and supports the idea suggesting that family firms are more interest-
ed in maintaining control within the family (Neubauer and Lank, 1998; Burkart et 
al., 2003). The finding that family firms, when using the measure of family on the 
board ratio, have more negative attitudes towards retained earnings may result 
from the fact that family firms prefer to distribute dividends instead of using the 
profits to develop the firm. This could be the case when family members are more 
represented on the board and therefore, family influence may be higher. However, 
Gallo et al. (2004) find that family firms do not pay dividends. But, dividends 
may be of more importance in Finland because dividends are tax-free to a certain 
extent and therefore, it may be an additional lower-taxed source of income to 
owner-managers. In older small family firms attitudes towards outside equity are 
more positive than in small non-family firms. Our own anecdotal evidence from 
Finnish small and medium-sized firms suggests that they prefer to use retained 
earnings and avoid extending the ownership structure. Furthermore, if outside 
funding is needed, they turn to traditional funding sources such as bank loans. 
We also find that family firms are more likely to resort to increased funding 
from the current owners. The fact that family firms are more willing to use addi-
tional funding from current owners is sometimes seen to imply that family firms 
are financially constrained and that they do not have any other choice. This is not 
necessarily the case in our sample, because the results also indicate that this may 
be at least partly due to the positive attitudes that family firms have towards this 
funding source. It can, therefore, be argued that the funding behavior observed 
here may be a result of choice, that is, to retain control (Neubauer and Lank, 1998; 
Burkart et al., 2003). The results can also imply that family firms are more likely 
to minimize the risk of default which is caused by higher leverage (Mishra and 
McConaughy, 1999; McConaughy et al., 2001).
The results of this study support the findings of prior empirical studies in that 
family and non-family firms tend to follow pecking order theory even if our re-
sults reveal slight differences compared to prior studies. The results may differ, for 
example, because of different country contexts and legal environments (La Porta et 
al., 1999). It has also been argued that the national economy s´ state of institutional 
development, different types of family firms, and the use of convenience sam-
ples (Gedaljovic, Carney, Chrisman and Kellermans, 2012) may have an impact. 
Furthermore, differences may also result from the difference in defining of family 
influence and family firm (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella, 2007). 
This study may have implications for entrepreneurs, financiers, policy mak-
ers and researchers. First, the firms´ ability to survive in the competition will be 
enhanced when firms do not suffer financial constraints induced by their own 
attitudes. Secondly, outside suppliers of funds should be more aware of how the 
nature of family businesses and family commitment affects family firm’s decision 
making and strategic choices. Small business owners often rely on traditional 
funding sources and this behavior is based on own knowledge and prior experi-
ence. Firms with high family ownership tend to be more risk averse and there 
might be a need for different types of financing products. Third, the welfare of 
national economy depends on the performance of small firms and their growth. 
However, growth opportunities may be hindered due to financial constraints. 
There have been discussions on what types of measures should be taken to en-
hance firms´ growth and mitigate financial constraints. But, not enough attention 
has been paid to the fact that firms may have negative attitudes towards financial 
instruments typically referred to as risk financing, that is, equity. Funding instru-
ments should be developed so that also entrepreneurs can accept them and are 
willing to use them. Finally, regarding the academic importance of this study, the 
results validate the prior empirical literature findings in different environment, 
in a bank based environment, such as Finland. 
As far as the generalizability and time frame of the results are concerned, atti-
tudes towards different funding sources do not change easily but economic condi-
tions may affect the use of different funding sources (Michaelas et al., 1999). This 
study used data from the years 2000-2005. This was a time period when economic 
conditions in Finland were favourable and firms were performing relatively well. 
The supply of different funding sources to an individual firm is not available but 
we believe that when including the measures of financial health of firms we are 
able to capture some of the variability in the supply of different funding sources. 
This study investigated the funding behaviour of small and medium-sized 
private family firms in one country, Finland, and therefore, it invites a further 
study in other countries. La Porta et al., (1999) suggest that the structure of capital 
markets may have an impact on the capital structure of firms. The Finnish legal 
environment belongs to the Scandinavian civil law system and it differs from 
the common law system. The protection of investors in terms of debts is strong, 
whereas the protection of equity holders is weaker (La Porta et al., 1999). Based on 
this we argue that the results are generalizable to countries which have a similar 
legal environment and bank centred capital markets (Niskanen and Niskanen, 
2006) or otherwise similar operating environment.
Although we make a contribution to understanding the differences in funding 
behavior between family firms and non-family firms in a sample of micro-sized, 
small and medium-sized firms, this study has several limitations. For example, we 
do not have the information on family s´ presence on the management, the genera-
tion in control, or values, which all could potentially have an impact on funding 
behavior in small private family firms, both the use of and attitudes towards dif-
ferent sources of finance. Also, it would have been interesting to investigate loans 
from current owners and family members in more detail in this context, but un-
fortunately, this data is not available. It might also be interesting to explore how 
the attitudes towards different funding sources are developed in family firms and 
whether there are certain characteristics common to specific types of family firms.
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to investigate whether family firms and non-family firms 
differ in investment behaviors. The sample consists of small private family and 
non-family firms. The results show that family firms are more likely than their 
non-family counterparts to reject an investment. However, the findings suggest 
that family and non-family firms do not seem to differ in the amount of invest-
ment. These results could imply that when firms have made an investment de-
cision, family ownership does not necessarily affect the amount of investment. 
Furthermore, family firms seem to be more financially constrained—or pursue 
more risk-avoiding investment strategies—because these firms are more likely 
to reject an investment. Agency theory and the pecking order approach seem 
to be relevant theories explaining the investment behaviors of small family and 
non-family firms. The findings imply that policy makers should consider creating 
some tax incentives or other financial incentives that might enhance investment 
activity and reduce financial constraints among small firms. 
Keywords: Family firms, investments, rejection of investments, small firms
Introduction
A firm’s ability to survive in the competition is dependent on its ability to gener-
ate future earnings, develop its activities and invest. Investments are important 
also to the national economy and its performance because investments increase 
employment, productivity and welfare. The impact of funding on investment de-
cisions has been investigated by policy makers and researchers. The underlying 
assumption is that the availability of internal funds, access to new debt or equity 
and other financial factors may shape a firm’s investment decisions. However, the 
empirical findings that internally generated funds and financial constraints play a 
role in determining firm investment decisions have been mixed, e.g. Cleary (1999), 
Georgen and Renneboog (2001), Audretsch and Elston (2002) and Gugler (2003). 
It has been suggested that the growth of small firms is constrained by the 
availability of finance (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). Family 
firms, in particular, may suffer from information asymmetry and agency prob-
lems between the firm and its outside suppliers of funds, which may lead to fi-
nancial constraints and not only higher cost of external funding but also disad-
vantageous loan terms (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Furthermore, family firms tend to 
rely on traditional funding sources, and they are reluctant to issue outside equity, 
as an increase in share capital will dilute their equity stake and undermine their 
controlling position (Poutziouris, 2001; Gallo, Tàpiens, & Cappuyns, 2004). Due to 
agency problems and financial constraints, firms’ investments and growth may 
be restricted or even hampered (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Degryse & Jong, 2006). 
Moreover, agency problems and financial constraints may lead to inefficient in-
vestment decisions that are based primarily on the availability of internally gener-
ated funds (Georgen & Renneboog, 2001). 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether family ownership has an impact 
on investment behavior in small private family and non-family firms. More pre-
cisely, this study focuses on whether family firms are more likely than non-family 
firms to reject investments, and whether family firms and non-family firms differ 
in the amount of investment. Family firms constitute a remarkable proportion of 
businesses around the world, and there has been increasing interest in investigat-
ing family firms in different contexts. However, the investment-behavior literature 
has paid little attention to family firms because the availability of reliable data on 
small firms is, in general, difficult to obtain. 
The rationale for this investigation is the generally held view that family firms 
are more risk-averse than are non-family firms because of the higher share of 
the owner’s wealth invested in the firm and the desire to transfer the firm to the 
next generation (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjögren, & 
Wiklund, 2007). Family firms may also be more prone to financial constraints 
than non-family firms due to agency problems between the firm and its potential 
outside suppliers of funds (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Niskanen & Niskanen, 2010), 
and they are more dependent on internally generated funds when undertaking 
investments (Poutziouris, 2001). Furthermore, family firms are more likely than 
their non-family counterparts to adopt more conservative and less risky invest-
ment strategies (Naldi et al., 2007). 
This study contributes to empirical literature in four ways. First, many studies 
investigate the relationship between the impact of liquidity on investment, such as 
those by Kadapakkam, Kumar, and Riddick (1998); Georgen and Renneboog (2001) 
and Audretsch and Elston (2002), without considering whether family ownership 
may affect investment behavior. 
Second, the number of studies exploring the differences in investment behav-
ior of small private family and non-family firms is scarce because data on small 
and medium-sized firms are more difficult to obtain than for larger firms. Most 
prior studies, such as those by Gugler (2003) and Andres (2011) use data on large 
listed firms. This study uses data on small private family and non-family firms 
in Finland. Thirdly, the country context should be taken into account because 
corporate governance structures, the legal protection of investors and financial 
markets differ by country. Ownership structures tend to be more concentrated in 
countries where the protection of investors in terms of debts is greater than that 
of equity holders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Consequently, the 
lower protection of equity holders makes investing in terms of equity riskier and 
less attractive. In contrast to many other bank-based financial markets, the Finnish 
financial markets are characterized by a very low number of banks operating 
in the country (Niskanen & Niskanen, 2006), making the markets very concen-
trated. In bank-based systems, banks monitor the performance of customers more 
closely than in other kinds of systems, and small firms may be financially more 
constrained than their larger counterparts. This funding gap may be even more 
severe for family firms because, as a number of studies (e.g., Niskanen, Niskanen, 
& Laukkanen, 2010b) suggest, banks are averse to lending to small- and medium-
sized firms that can be characterized as family firms. 
Fourthly, this study uses data collected through a private survey, which con-
sists of detailed information on the size of investment and on the rejection of in-
vestment. The data on small firms are, in general, difficult to obtain, and therefore 
a private survey was conducted. This study uses a different proxy for investment 
than do prior studies, which use proxies calculated from financial statements, e.g. 
Gugler (2003) and Andres (2011). Furthermore, the context of rejection of invest-
ment and the reason behind firms’ rejection of investments provide new insights 
on the investment behavior of family and non-family firms. In this study, “invest-
ment” refers to a fixed asset capital expenditure, and the definition of “family 
firms” is similar to that used in Lòpez-Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar (2007) and 
Niskanen, Karjalainen and Niskanen (2010a), which is that a private firm is re-
garded as a family firm when family ownership exceeds 50%. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews 
the related literature and presents the hypotheses. Then the data, methodology 
and variables are described. Next, the results are presented. The last section in-
cludes the discussion and concludes the paper.
Theoretical 
Conceptualization
The theory of finance implies that every positive net present value project should 
be taken, regardless of whether internal or external funds are used to cover it 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). However, empirical studies suggest that investment deci-
sions are associated with both financial factors (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Poutziouris, 
2001; Gugler, 2003) and ownership (Gallo et al., 2004; Naldi et al., 2007).
The theoretical framework used in this study is agency theory. Agency prob-
lems may arise from the divergence of interests between owners and managers 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which may lead to a situation in which managers may 
prefer growth to the value of the firm, and therefore, they may overinvest (Jensen, 
1986). Suboptimal investments or investments with negative net present value 
may be undertaken when interests of shareholders and managers are not aligned 
(Jensen, 1986). But, this is not the most obvious case in small firms, such as family 
firms, because of the overlapping owner–manager role. Therefore, family firms 
should be exempt from agency problems between owners and managers (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). However, agency problems may arise from altruism or because 
the managers are acting for the controlling family (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 
2003; Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Furthermore, because 
family firms cannot be regarded as a homogeneous group of people with joint 
interests (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997), it may lead to conflicts of interest 
between majority and minority shareholders (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; 
La Porta et al., 1999). Problems of underinvestment may occur if owners with dif-
ferent levels of ownership stakes have different goals, prefer to divert resources 
away from the firm or possess different risk-tolerance levels. However, Poutziouris 
(2001) and Chrisman et al. (2004) implied that agency problems may be less severe 
in family firms because they also have non-economic goals. 
In small firms, agency problems are more likely to arise between owner–man-
agers and outside suppliers of funds (Myers & Majluf, 1984). The level of informa-
tion asymmetry between the firm and potential investors may be more severe for 
smaller firms (Myers & Majluf, 1984), such as family firms, because managers and 
other insiders are assumed to possess better and more information about the firm’s 
future earnings, cash flow and investment opportunities (Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
Consequently, outside suppliers of funds may demand an increased premium 
paid for external financing, which drives a gap between the costs of internal and 
external funding (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Therefore, agency problems 
may lead to financial constraints, and firms have to forgo investment opportuni-
ties (Hyytinen & Väänänen, 2006) unless the firms can rely on internally gener-
ated funds (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Degryse & Jong, 2006). Family firms may be 
even more likely to suffer financial constraints because banks tend to be averse 
to lending to small and medium-sized firms that can be characterized as family 
firms (Niskanen et al., 2010b). 
Due to agency problems, small firms tend to finance their investment needs 
in a hierarchical fashion—first using internally generated funds, then short- and 
long-term debts and finally, only as a last resort, outside equity (Myers, 1984; Myers 
& Majluf, 1984). This pecking order approach is relevant especially for family 
firms because family firms are characterized by avoiding the use of external capi-
tal both in terms of debt and equity (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996; Romano, Tanewski, 
& Smyrnios, 2001) and preferring to safeguard ownership, control and financial 
independence (Neubauer & Lank, 1998; Poutziouris, 2001). Family firms tend to 
rely on internal funds to cover their funding needs (Poutziouris, 2001). However, 
family firms’ financial decisions are driven by owner–managers’ preferences, and 
by economic and non-economic considerations (Chrisman et al., 2004; Gallo et al., 
2004). These may be reflected in funding and investment behavior by the avoid-
ance of debt and outside equity and by lower growth orientation. 
As far as profitability and internally generated funds are concerned, the lit-
erature is unanimous about whether family firms outperform non-family firms. 
Some studies, e.g., Allouche, Amann, Jaussad and Kurashina (2008) and Andres 
(2008) found that family ownership is associated with better firm performance, 
at least under certain conditions, such as when the founding family is still active 
(Andres, 2008). Similarly, Villalonga and Amit (2006) showed that family firms 
with the founder as the board chair have the highest performance. However, 
Lopez-Gracia and Sanchez-Andujar (2007) suggested that there is no significant 
difference in terms of profitability between family and non-family firms. If family 
firms outperform non-family firms, they could have more internal funds available 
for investment projects, but owner–managers may prefer to withdraw funds for 
personal use, such as in the form of dividends that might otherwise be used for 
investment projects (Jensen, 1986; Dyer, 2006). This notion is supported by Setia-
Atmaja, Tanewski and Skully (2009), who found that family-controlled firms em-
ploy higher dividend payout ratios. Accordingly, owner–managers of family firms 
may be more dependent on steady dividend payments (Andres, 2011) because their 
firms often constitute a primary—or at least to some extent a significant—source 
of income for them. This may be even more likely in Finland, because dividends 
have been tax-free to a certain extent.
If retained earnings are insufficient, family firms tend to use debt to finance 
their investments (Blanco-Mazagatos, Quevedo-Puente, & Castrillo, 2007). Despite 
that, aversion to external long-term debt is particularly strong in family firms, and 
they tend to prefer short-term debt funding (Romano et al., 2001; Poutziouris, 2001) 
because short-term funding does not require security arrangements or sharing of 
information such as annual accounts with the creditors (Michaelas, Chittenden, & 
Poutziouris, 1999). Family firms are also reluctant to use long-term external capital 
in terms of equity (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996; Romano et al., 2001; Poutziouris, 2001) 
because it dilutes family control and reduces financial independence (Neubauer 
& Lank, 1998). Outside investors such as business angels and venture capitalists 
represent a relatively small proportion of small-business finance, including that 
of family firms, because they invest very selectively and target their investments 
to firms with high growth potential (Berger & Udell, 1998). However, Storey (1994) 
implies that small firms with growth ambitions have above-average access to ex-
ternal finance.
Empirical studies imply that the preference of certain funding sources affects 
firms’ capital structure (Romano et al., 2001). The characteristics of the owner and 
the firm as well as owners’ beliefs and attitudes are determinants of financing 
behavior and firms’ capital structure (Michaelas, Chittenden, & Poutziouris, 1998; 
Michaelas et al., 1999; Gallo et al., 2004; Vos et al., 2007). Koropp, Grichnik and 
Kellermans (2013) have suggested that family firm owner–managers’ attitudes 
toward debt funding are influenced by financial knowledge and prior experience 
with creditors. As far as the use of debts is concerned, some studies find that fam-
ily firms use less debt to minimize the probability of bankruptcy and the risk of 
losing control (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialko, 
2001; Anderson et al., 2003), while other studies argue that family firms use debt 
as much as non-family firms (Coleman and Carsky, 1999) or that family firms use 
more debt (Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007). 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In firms with financial constraints, investment spending is positively related to 
internally generated funds (Georgen and Renneboog, 2001; Fazzari, Hubbard, 
and Petersen, 1988), while some other studies find opposite results (Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999; Kadapakkam et al., 1998). But, Kadapakkam et al. 
(1998) suggested that smaller firms may be forced to undertake investments inde-
pendent of funding due to lower flexibility of timing investments. Consequently, 
in small firms there might be a weaker link between investments and cash flows. 
In line with that, some other studies argue that investment–cash flow sensitiv-
ity is higher in medium-sized firms than in their smaller or larger counterparts 
(Audretsch & Elston, 2002). Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) argued that investment 
and cash flow are related in a non-monotonic way, while Hadlock (1998) found that 
investment–cash flow sensitivity increases with managerial alignment. Moreover, 
a positive relationship between investment and cash flow exists in family firms 
(Gugler, 2003). Contrary to this, Andres (2011) suggested that family firms are 
more responsive to investment opportunities, and investment decisions seem to 
be undertaken irrespective of availability of internal funds.  
But, are family firms then more or less likely to reject an investment than are 
non-family firms? Hutchinson (1995) suggested that, in small owner-managed 
firms, investment and financing strategies are interdependent. This is supported 
by Carpenter and Petersen (2002), who argued that the growth of small firms is 
constrained by internal finance. Small firms may have to reject investment op-
portunities in case of financial constraints (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Hyytinen & 
Väänänen, 2006) and because creditors include higher interest premiums in loans 
reflecting the risk of an average investment project (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Myers 
& Majluf, 1984). The main cost of debt may be caused by creditors when a firm is 
prevented from undertaking good projects because of debt covenants. 
Family firm characteristics that may impact investment behavior are: They are 
more risk-averse (Naldi et al., 2007), less growth-oriented (Poutziouris, 2001) and 
conservative in their funding behavior due to their personal preferences concern-
ing ownership-control (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996; Gallo et al., 2004). Consequently, 
family firms’ investments are based on the availability of internally generated 
funds (Hadlock, 1998; Poutziouris, 2001), because they avoid obtaining loans from 
financial institutions (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996; Romano et al., 2001; Poutziouris, 
2001). Furthermore, family firms may face financial constraints due to weaker loan 
availability (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Niskanen & Niskanen, 2010). When investment 
opportunities outstrip operating cash flows, firms with higher leverage forgo in-
vestments rather than raise equity (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Moreover, in order to 
protect the longevity of the business as well as to keep control in the family, family 
firms may forgo growth and other opportunities (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999), 
and they are more likely to postpone an investment rather than give up control 
over their company (Gugler, 2003). Based on these factors, the hypothesis is:
H1: Family firms are more likely to reject an investment than are non-family 
firms. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) implied that ownership structure affects firm value 
by its effect on investment. Empirical literature suggests a non-monotonic associa-
tion between the ownership structure and the value of the firm, implying that an 
increase in lower levels of managerial ownership increases the value of the firm 
(Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). In line with Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Cho (1998) suggested that ownership structure affects investments and, 
therefore, firm value. He found that a non-monotonic relationship exists between 
insider ownership and capital expenditures and between insider ownership and 
R&D expenditures. However, Croci, Doukas and Gonenc (2009) and Block (2012) 
proposed that family firms seem to invest more in low-risk, fixed-asset capital 
expenditure than in high-risk, R&D expenditure, which confirms their non-risk-
seeking behavior. As far as the amount is concerned, Gallo et al. (2004) argued 
that family businesses devote a smaller proportion of sales revenue to their own 
mid- and long-term development than non-family firms do. This could partly 
result from the fact that family firms are less growth-oriented (Poutziouris, 2001) 
and, therefore, they may invest less.
As noted earlier, family firms have both financial and non-financial goals 
(Chrisman et al., 2004), and their business represents a significant proportion of 
their wealth (Naldi et al., 2007). One of the primary objectives is to transfer busi-
ness ownership to the next generation (Anderson et al., 2003; Naldi et al., 2007). 
Consequently, family firms are concerned with the long-term survival and the 
reputation of their firms and the reputation of the family (Anderson et al., 2003), 
and family firm owner–managers’ decision making is influenced by family com-
mitment (Koropp et al., 2013). It has been argued that owner–managers make bet-
ter investment decisions because they have more specific knowledge of the firm 
(James, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Bartholomeusz & Tanewski, 2006). Furthermore, 
due to longer investment horizons, they are more likely to tackle investment op-
portunities (Zellweger, 2007). However, owner–managers consider the effect of 
decisions on other family members and their wealth in order to avoid endangering 
it (Koropp et al., 2013). 
In general, economic goal orientation may lead to higher risk taking. But, fam-
ily firms also have non-economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2004). Zellweger (2007) 
argued that family firms could accept riskier investments because family firms 
have longer investment horizons and consequently, marginal riskiness of an in-
vestment is lower. However, family business owners feel that business reputation 
is the same as individual and family reputation, i.e., business bankruptcy may be 
regarded as personal bankruptcy (Zellweger & Nason, 2008). As a result, family 
firms are more likely to adopt more conservative and less risk-oriented invest-
ment strategies, and they take risks to a lesser extent than do non-family firms 
(Naldi et al., 2007). This view is also supported by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and 
Hutchinson (1995), who argued that firms with large, undiversified investors and 
owner–managers will exercise risk-reduction investment strategies to moderate 
the level of business risk. 
As far as the relationship between financing and investment is concerned, in 
small firms financial constraints are one of the most important barriers to growth 
(Storey, 1994), and investment levels are more dependent on cash flows (Fazzari et 
al., 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap & Scharfstein, 1991; Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1995). This 
is supported by Niskanen et al. (2010b), who suggested that financial institutions 
are averse to lending to small and medium-sized firms that can be characterized 
as family firms. Consequently, this may lead to funding gaps unless family firms 
have sufficient internal funds to cover funding needs. Family firm owner–man-
agers have personal preferences concerning growth, risk and ownership control, 
which leads family firms to follow “peculiar financial logic” (Gallo et al., 2004). 
Because family firms avoid using external funding sources in terms of both debt 
and equity, it may lead to financial constraints and reduce firms’ resources to 
invest (Gallo et al., 2004). Based on the discussion, the hypothesis is:
H2: Family firms invest lesser amount than non-family firms do. 
Methods
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data for this study were collected through a private survey in autumn of 
2006, and the financial data were collected from the Voitto+ register, compiled 
by Asiakastieto Oy, a Finnish financial and credit information company. Voitto+ 
register is a commercial and comprehensive database with financial statement 
information. The sample consists of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
operating in four regions in Finland, and observations cover the years from 2000 
to 2005. Questionnaires were sent to the CEOs. Of the 3,262 questionnaires sent, a 
total of 621 responses were usable, which resulted in an effective response rate of 
19%. The final sample consists of 600 SMEs, because firms outside the European 
Union (EU) definition of small and medium-sized firms were dropped. According 
to the EU commission’s classification (96/280/CE), a micro-sized firm is a firm that 
employs fewer than 10 people and whose maximum annual turnover or total as-
sets are € 2m. A small firm is a firm that employs fewer than 50 people and whose 
maximum annual turnover or total assets are € 10m. A medium-sized firm is a 
firm that employs fewer than 250 people and whose maximum annual turnover 
is € 50m or maximum total assets are € 43m. 
The sample firms are limited-liability companies with at least two employees, 
and they represent all sectors of industry, excluding primary production. Other le-
gal forms than limited liabilities are excluded because the financial statement data 
is not available on them. Primary production is excluded because of its different 
nature compared to other businesses. The firms were asked to provide informa-
tion on their ownership structure, their willingness to grow and the amount of 
investments from 2000 to 2005 (for each year separately). The firms were also asked 
whether they had rejected investment opportunities during the years from 2000 
to 2005 and, if so, the reasons why. The total number of available observations per 
firm per year varies because, in some cases, information is available for less than 
six years. In individual regression models, the number of observations varies be-
cause of missing observations on some variables. Furthermore, the use of lagged 
values leads to a lower number of observations in regressions.
As far as macroeconomic conditions in Finland during this study period are 
concerned, the Statistics Finland indicate that during the years 2000–2005 the 
change in GDP was positive and varied between +1.2% and 6.4%. The Euribor 1 
month interest rate varied between 2.131% and 4.943% and was declining toward 
the year 2005. Based on the survey of the Central Bank of Finland, during the years 
2000–2005, availability of bank loans was very good and debt ratios and other 
funding terms were advantageous and inexpensive in Finland. A firm-specific 
availability of finance is captured in the regression models by adding the financial 
ratios such as profitability, liquidity and leverage as control variables. In Finland, 
tax incentives concerning investments are minor. Only firms representing manu-
facturing or tourism sectors in certain regions are allowed to higher depreciation. 
The sample firms are located in the regions where higher depreciation for certain 
sectors of business is possible. 
Because of the quantitative nature of the data, quantitative research methods 
are used to investigate whether the rejection of investments and the amount of 
investment differs between family firms and non-family firms. Logit regression 
is used to explore the association between the rejection of investment and family 
influence because the dependent variable is dichotomous. Ordinary least square 
regression (OLS) and the panel data estimation method, random effects method, 
are employed in analyzing the relationship between the amount of investments 
and family influence. Alpha .01, .05 and .10 are used to indicate Type 1 error rate. 
Non-respondent tests were performed for the database, and they suggest that the 
firms that responded to the survey are statistically significantly similar to the 
whole sample. The possibility of common method bias is also taken into account, 
and Harman’s single-factor test is applied. All variables are loaded into a princi-
pal component factor analysis, and a rotated factor solution is examined. None of 
the factors account for more than 15.98% of the total variance. The model is also 
investigated with a VIF-test to test for multicollinearity. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Rejection of investments 
Firms were asked whether they had rejected investments (fixed asset capital ex-
penditure) or not during the years 2000–2005. This variable is a dummy variable 
accorded the value of 1 if the firm had rejected an investment; otherwise, it was 
accorded a value of 0. 
LnInvestments 
Firms were asked to state the amount of investments (fixed asset capital expendi-
ture) for each year separately. The proxy for investment is the LnInvestments, 
which is the natural logarithm of investment. Prior empirical studies on invest-
ment behavior used proxies of investment extracted from financial statements 
(Cleary, 1999; Degryse & Jong, 2006; Andres, 2011). 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Family firms/non-family firms and family ownership rate 
This study uses alternative indicators of family influence. First, a binary variable 
is used to identify family firms and non-family firms. A firm is regarded as a 
family firm if family ownership exceeds 50%; otherwise, a firm is regarded as a 
non-family firm (Lòpez-Gracia & Sánchez-Andújar, 2007; Niskanen et al., 2010a). 
Second, a continuous variable, family ownership rate, is the alternative proxy. 
Third, an alternative family firm dummy, family firm 25, is constructed based on 
the ownership levels above and below 25%. A firm is regarded as a family firm if 
family ownership exceeds 25%; otherwise, a firm is regarded as a non-family firm. 
Fourth, the percentage of family members on the board is used as an explanatory 
variable. Finally, family ownership is also divided into four size categories by 
family ownership rates, 0–25%, 26–50%, 51–75% and 76–100%. For a robustness 
check (not reported), a binary variable large family, constructed based on family 
ownership and the presence of family on the board, and a dummy variable, the 
presence of family on the board, are also used. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Gibrat’s law implies that the expected growth rate is the same across all size 
classes of firms, although empirical evidence has yielded mixed results. Previous 
literature suggests that growth of small firms is constrained by the availability 
of finance and smaller firms may experience greater difficulty in getting fund-
ing than larger firms (Michaelas et al., 1999). Furthermore, larger firms may have 
greater flexibility in timing investments, and they may postpone investments un-
til internal funds are available (Kadapakkam et al., 1998). LnTotalassets is used as 
a proxy for firm size. 
Younger firms are more likely to grow more (Glancey, 1998). Younger firms 
are more likely to face information asymmetry with potential lenders because 
younger firms may have a lower level of assets to secure debts. The measure of 
firm age is expressed in years, specifically, the difference between the foundation 
year and the observation year. 
Sales capture output level, and sales growth reflects changes in the level of 
output (Gugler, 2003). The annual logarithmic growth rate of sales LnChSales is 
used as a measure of firm growth. 
Financial constraints have been suggested to be one of the most important bar-
riers to growth (Storey, 1994). Leverage is included as a control variable because 
high leverage typically makes it difficult for a firm to borrow additional money. 
The debt-to-total-assets ratio is used as a proxy for leverage. 
Georgen and Renneboog (2001) and Fazzari et al. (1988) suggested that in 
firms with financial constraints, investment spending is positively related to in-
ternally generated funds. The proxies for the firms’ internal funding resources 
are the return on assets (ROA), the current ratio and cash flow. Cash flow is also a 
proxy measure of the degree to which a firm is subjected to liquidity constraints 
(Audretsch & Elston, 2002). Cash flow is calculated as (earnings+depreciation). 
Lagged value of cash flow (t-1) is also used in models. 
According to Storey (1994), SMEs with above-average growth ambitions have 
better access to external finance. Willingness to grow is a dummy variable that 
is accorded a value of 1 if the firm is willing to grow; otherwise, it is accorded a 
value of 0. 
Harris and Raviv (1991) suggested that firms within an industry have more in 
common with each other than with firms in different industries, and that there 
are differences in industry leverage ratios. Coleman and Carsky (1999) found that 
firms in the service sector may need less capital and have less capital expenditure. 
Industry dummies are binary variables that capture industry-fixed effects. Seven 
industry dummies included in specifications are manufacturing, construction, 
trade, hotels and restaurants, transportation, knowledge intensive business ser-
vices (KIBS) and other services.
Results
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics by family ownership
Variables Family firm Non-family firm Probability 
of 
difference
n Mean 
(Std. 
deviation)
n Mean 
(Std.
deviation)
Family ownership % 1714 95.45 (11.829) 1535 4.26 (13.395) 0.000
Return on assets 1196 18.39 (22.667) 1042 15.01 (26.111) 0.001
Sales 1203 1658.155 
(5494.881)
1054 2194.754 
(7739.891)
0.056
Change in sales % 1055 23.92 (312.845) 902 38.33 
(354.453)
0.340
LnChange in sales 687 2.465 (1.349) 608 2.676 (1.513) 0.018
Total assets 1227 902.824 
(3610.245)
1073 2916.082 
(15920.020)
0.000
Retained earnings 1173 218.733 
(895.152)
1017 342.085 
(2373.642)
0.099
Depreciation 1207 58.587(233.409) 1041 94.031 
(515.160)
0.032
Firm age 1612 13.77 (12.242) 1456 14.65 
(14.566)
0.069
Current ratio 1195 2.199 (2.111) 1040 2.545 (4.889) 0.026
Leverage 1196 58.73 (30.527) 1042 66.62 
(72.219)
0.001
Cash flow 1207 138.859 
(523.656)
1036 236.241 
(1097.844)
0.006
Investments 771 111.16 
(513.346)
719 250.61 
(1084.846)
0.001
Rejection of investments 1597 0.09 (0.291) 1452 0.08 (0.274) 0.269
Willingness to grow % 1639 31.67 (0.460) 982 35.80 (0.476) 0.015
Manufacturing % 1678 21 1517 21 0.887
Construction % 1678 14 1517 14 0.836
Trade % 1678 21 1517 16 0.000
Accommodation and 
restaurants %
1678 5 1517 6 0.037
Transport % 1678 11 1517 10 0.483
KIBS % 1678 15 1517 20 0.000
Other services % 1678 7 1517 7 0.960
Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics for the key variables when firms are split into 
family and non-family firms. The numbers represent average rates across the entire 
period of the survey. Family firms seem to have, on average, higher return on assets 
but lower retained profits and growth rates than do non-family firms. Family firms 
are younger and smaller in terms of sales and total assets, but, on average, they have 
lower leverage, current ratio, amount of cash flows, depreciation and investments. 
Furthermore, family firms are less growth-oriented. Family firms are represented 
proportionally more in trade but less in KIBS than are non-family firms. 
This table presents the descriptive statistics on the sample firms. Column I 
presents the variables, column II presents descriptive statistics for the family firms 
and column III shows descriptive statistics for the non-family firms. Column IV 
presents the p-values of the t-test for the equality of means between the two sub-
samples. 
Table 2 presents the number of observations, means, standard deviations and 
Pearson correlations on all variables used in this study. The correlations between 
the variables are not high except between LnInvestments and LnTotalassets, be-
tween cash flows and investments and between cash flows and LnTotalassets. Any 
other serious correlations, i.e. those over 0.5, between the variables, are not ob-
served. Although the correlation results indicated no serious correlation between 
the variables, the model is investigated with a VIF-test. The highest VIF-value is 
2.380, except in industry dummies, which are control variables; VIF values indi-
cate no serious multicollinearity because they do not exceed the value of 10. 
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Table 2 : Correlation matrix
REJECTION OF INVESTMENT
Table 3 presents the results regarding the influence that family ownership 
may have on the rejection of investment using logit regression. The firms were 
asked whether they had rejected investments or not during the years 2000–2005. 
Rejection of investments is a dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the 
firm has rejected an investment; otherwise, it is given a value of 0. In column I 
the result shows that family firms are more likely to reject an investment. This 
finding supports Hypothesis 1 and is in line with the findings of Mishra and 
McConaughy (1999), Poutziouris (2001), Gugler (2003), Hyytinen and Väänänen 
(2006) and Naldi et al. (2007). In column II, the finding indicates that when family 
ownership increases, so does the likelihood that family firms are more likely to 
reject investment. Similarly, in column III, the result is similar when using family 
firm 25 dummy. However, column IV presents the result of family on the board, 
but the finding is insignificant.
As far as the control variables are concerned, the results show that firms that 
are older, have lower liquidity and have higher leverage are more likely to face a 
situation in which an investment will be rejected. This could imply that family 
firms may be more financially constrained than are non-family firms. Another 
potential explanation could be that family firms may be more risk-averse, and they 
avoid using more outside funding in terms of debts. For a robustness check, the 
model is run by using other family influence variables: a dummy variable denot-
ing the presence of family on the board, and a dummy variable composed of fam-
ily ownership and family ratio on the board. The results are qualitatively similar 
and, thus, are not reported. The rejection of investment is also investigated by 
using probit regression, and the results remain qualitatively similar (not reported).
The firms were also asked qualitative information about the rejection of in-
vestments. More precisely, they were asked an open question about why they had 
rejected investments: “If you have rejected investments, what has been the main 
reason for the rejection?” Their answers reveal that, both in family and in non-
family firms, the most common reason for rejecting investment was lack of fund-
ing, the second was reluctance to take risks, the third was an unwillingness to 
take loans and the fourth was lack of internal funds. Furthermore, in family firms, 
the other reasons for rejecting investments were unwillingness to invest, lack of 
collaterals and a requirement for personal security and pledging. These findings 
suggest that both family and non-family firms are financially constrained, but 
family firms may be even more constrained. 
Table 3 presents the results of regressing rejection of investment on explana-
tory variables using logit regression analysis. Rejection of investment is a dummy 
variable. Explanatory variables are a family/non-family firm 50 dummy, a continu-
ous variable family ownership, a family/non-family firm 25 dummy and family on 
the board. Column I presents the results of the family/non-family firm 50 dum-
my, column II on the family ownership rate, column III on the family/non-family 
firm 25 dummy and column IV on the ratio of family members on the board. 
Coefficients are unstandardized. Significance at: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10; p-values are 
shown in parentheses.
Table 3: Rejection of investment
Column 
I
Column 
II
Column 
III
Column 
IV
Rejection of 
investment
Rejection of 
investment
Rejection of 
investment
Rejection of 
investment
Coefficient
(p-value)
Coefficient
(p-value)
Coefficient
(p-value)
Coefficient
(p-value)
Constant -2.900
(0.061)
-2.632
(0.083)
-2.316
(.118)
-.929
(.490)
Explanatory variables
Family/non-family firm 
50
.972**
(.011)
Family ownership % .009**
(0.032)
Family /non-family firm 
25
.661*
(.081)
Family on the board % .003
(.526)
Firm characteristics
LnTotalassets .043
(.772)
.033
(.818)
.001
(.995)
-.075
(.487)
Firm age .020*
(.081)
.021*
(.063)
.021*
(.070)
.029***
(.007)
Growth .098
(.414)
.098
(.405)
.099
(.393)
.130
(.266)
ROA -.004
(.472)
-.004
(.464)
-.004
(.496)
-.005
(.344)
Leverage .010*
(.067)
.010*
(.079)
.009*
(.088)
.003
(.621)
Current ratio -.637**
(.015)
-.650**
(.013)
-.660**
(.012)
-.772***
(.005)
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES
Cox&Snell R2 .120 .117 .114 .088
Nagelgerke R2 .263 .255 .249 .194
Number of observations 528 528 528 545
Table 4 presents the results regarding the influence that family ownership may 
have on the rejection of investment using logit regression. The firms were asked 
whether they had rejected investments or not during the years 2000–2005. Rejection 
of investments is a dummy variable that is given a value of 1 if the firm has re-
jected an investment; otherwise, it is given a value of 0. The explanatory variable 
family ownership is divided into four categories based on the family ownership 
rates 0–25%, 26–50%, 51–75% and 76–100%. In column I, the result shows that 
at the lowest level of family ownership, 0–25%, the rejection of investment and 
family ownership are negatively associated. This finding supports Hypothesis 1. 
In columns II and III, findings are insignificant, but in column IV, at the highest 
level of family ownership rates, 76–100%, the rejection of investment and family 
ownership are positively related. These results confirm the results obtained and 
reported in Table 3. These findings support Hypothesis 1 and are in line with 
the findings of Mishra and McConaughy (1999), Poutziouris (2001), Gugler (2003), 
Hyytinen and Väänänen (2006) and Naldi et al. (2007). The findings suggest that 
as family ownership increases, firms are more likely to reject investments. Also, 
control variables reveal that older firms with higher leverage and lower liquidity 
are more likely to reject an investment.
Table 4: Rejection of investment
Column 
I
Column 
II
Column 
III
Column 
IV
Rejection of 
investment
Rejection of 
investment
Rejection of 
investment
Rejection of 
investment
Coefficient
(p-value)
Coefficient
(p-value)
Coefficient
(p-value)
Coefficient
(p-value)
Constant -1.655
(.237)
-1.732
(.235)
-1.641
(.248)
-2.393
(.107)
Explanatory variables
Family ownership 
0–25%
-.661*
(.081)
Family ownership 
26–50%
-18.784
(.998)
Family ownership 
51–75%
.484
(.444)
Family ownership 
76–100%
.794**
(.030)
Firm characteristics
LnTotalassets .001
(.995)
.022
(.881)
-.023
(.864)
.030
(.834)
Firm age .021*
(.070)
.023**
(.035)
.021*
(.069)
.024**
(.034)
Growth .099
(.393)
.096
(.425)
.098
(.395)
.095
(.421)
ROA -.004
(.496)
-.003
(.524)
-.003
(.574)
-.004
(.438)
Leverage .009*
(.088)
.006
(.220)
.007
(.159)
.009*
(.093)
Current ratio -.660**
(.012)
-.765***
(.005)
-.733***
(.006)
-.661**
(.011)
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES
Cox&Snell R2 .114 .118 .109 .117
Nagelgerke R2 .249 .258 .240 .255
Number of observa-
tions 
528 528 528 528
Table 4 presents the results of regressing rejection of investment on explanatory 
variables using logit regression analysis. Rejection of investment is a dummy vari-
able. Explanatory variables are the four family ownership categories. Column I 
presents the results on the family ownership 0–25%, column II on the family own-
ership 26–50%, column III on the family ownership 51–75% and column IV on 
the family ownership 76–100%. Coefficients are unstandardized. Significance at: 
***0.01, **0.05, *0.10; p-values are shown in parentheses.
THE AMOUNT OF INVESTMENT
The investment behaviors of family and non-family firms are explored by investi-
gating the amount invested and whether there are differences between family and 
non-family firms. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the amount 
of investment. Column I in Table 5 shows the results on Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression when regressing LnInvestments on family/non-family firm 50 
dummy. The result suggests that family firms invest more than non-family firms 
do. This finding is contrary to the hypothesis; that is, Hypothesis 2 is not support-
ed. This result is in line with the findings of Kadapakkam et al. (1998), Zellweger 
(2007) and Andres (2011) and contrary to those of Naldi et al. (2007) and Koropp 
et al. (2013). Furthermore, larger firms and firms with more willingness to grow 
and higher cash flow tend to invest more. This could imply that willingness to 
grow may enhance the level of investments. Furthermore, firms may make their 
investments based on cash flows and prefer to use internal funding sources, as 
suggested by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Poutziouris (2001). This finding is also 
in line with that of Jensen (1986), who argues that firms increase investment in 
response to the availability of cash flows. 
Columns II and III in Table 5 present the results on the amount of investments 
when using a random effects model. A family/non-family firm 50 dummy is used 
as an explanatory variable in column II, and a continuous family ownership rate is 
used in column III. The results in columns II and III show that neither the family/
non-family firm dummy nor the family ownership rate is statistically significant. 
This suggests that, although family ownership has an impact on rejection of in-
vestments, it does not have an impact on the amount of investment when firms 
have decided to invest. As far as firm characteristics are concerned, the results in 
Table 5 show that the level of investment is positively related to firm size and age, 
which suggests that larger and older firms invest more. 
For a robustness check, the model is run by using several alternative family 
influence variables. The model is also run by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression when regressing LnInvestments on family ownership, which is divid-
ed into four categories based on the family ownership levels of 0–25%, 26–50%, 
51–75% and 76–100%. The results (not reported) suggest that at the lower levels of 
family ownership, firms invest less, but at the higher levels of family ownership, 
they invest more. The model is also run by using random effects model when re-
gressing LnInvestments on the following alternative family influence variables: 
a family/non-family firm 50 dummy, a dummy variable family on the board and 
a dummy variable composed of family ownership and family’s presence on the 
board. The results (not reported) are qualitatively similar to those when using 
family/non-family firm 50 dummy or family ownership rate. 
 This table presents the results of regressing the amount of investment 
LnInvestments on family ownership variables. The OLS regression and random 
effects model are used in regressions. Explanatory variables are a family/non-
family firm 50 dummy and a continuous variable family ownership rate. Column 
I presents the results on OLS regression on the family firm dummy variable, and 
columns II and III present the results on the family firm dummy and the continu-
ous variable family ownership rate. Coefficients are unstandardized. Significance 
at: ***0.01, **0.05, *0.10.
Table 5: Amount of investment
 
Column I
OLS
Column II
Random effects
Column III
Random effects
 LnInvestments LnInvestments LnInvestments
Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p
Constant 1.73263 .133 -.29688 .864 -.30702 .859
Explanatory variables
Family/non-family firm 
50 .47835** .017 .23013 .402
Family ownership % .00180 .547
Firm characteristics
LnTotalassets .39062*** .000 .59634*** .000 .59962*** .000
Firm age -.00207 .814 .01471* .094 .01502* .087
Growth -.06210 .378 -.04295 .454 -.04272 .457
Leverage .00421 .295 .00648 .138 .00629 .150
Current ratio .02838 .690 .02199 .788 .02150 .793
ROA -.00039 .926 .00581 .114 .00574 .118
Willingness to grow .42129* .057 .41373 .193 .40757 .203
Cash flow .00024*** .010
Cash flow (t-1) .00004 .676 .00004 .711
Industry dummies YES YES YES
Adjusted R2 .3782
F statistics 9.39 0.000
R2 within .1503 .1497
R2 between .3708 .3694
R2 overall .3793 .3746
Wald chi2 73.18 .000 72.64 .000
Number of observations 208 208 208
Number of groups 106 106
Table 6 presents the results on regressing the amount of investment LnInvestments 
on family influence variables using random effects model and the same con-
trol variables as in models in Table 5 except that cash flow is not lagged value. 
Coefficients are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. In columns 
I–III, family influence, measured by the family/non-family firm 50 dummy, fam-
ily ownership rate and family on the board ratio is, again, insignificant. However, 
some control variables become significant in all regressions. The results on the 
control variables suggest that larger, older and more profitable firms invest more. 
Furthermore, a positive relationship exists between investments and cash flows, 
suggesting that investments are sensitive to cash flows. The result may imply 
that firms’ investment spending is based on cash flows, and firms prefer to use 
internal funds to finance their investments. Alternatively, this could be a sign of 
financial constraints, i.e., small firms not only prefer but also have to finance their 
investment needs by using internally generated funds. This is in line with peck-
ing order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) and Poutziouris (2001). Also, the finding 
supports Jensen (1986), who argues that firms increase investment in response to 
the availability of cash flows. 
Table 6 presents the results of regressing the amount of investment 
LnInvestments on family influence variables using the random effects model. 
Explanatory variables are a family/non-family firm 50 dummy, a continuous vari-
able family ownership rate and the ratio of family members on the board. Column 
I presents the results on the family firm 50 dummy variable, column II shows re-
sults on the family ownership rate and column III presents the results on the ratio 
of family members on the board when using random effects model. Coefficients 
are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. Significance at: ***0.01, 
**0.05, *0.10.
Table 6: Amount of investment
 
Column I Column II Column III
 LnInvestments LnInvestments LnInvestments
Coeff. p
 
Coeff. p Coeff. p
Constant 1.02047 .364 .99869 .371 .68155 .500
Explanatory variables
Family/non-family firm 50 .23782 .335
Family ownership % .00242 .356
Family on the board % -.00278 .265
Firm characteristics
LnTotalassets .48731*** .000 .49081*** .000 .53239*** .000
Firm age .01480** .028 .01494** .026 .01524** .022
Growth .02346 .601 .02245 .612 .02961 .486
Leverage .00544 .181 .00539 .179 .00489 .223
Current ratio .04120 .572 .04191 .563 .03455 .626
ROA .00574** .044 .00575** .043 .00545* .056
Willingness to grow .22983 .400 .23649 .387 .13780 .623
Cash flow .00018** .022 .00017** .025 .00016** .038
Industry dummies YES YES YES
R2 within .1427 .1454 .1486
R2 between .3797 .3772 .3924
R2 overall .3920 .3872 .4014
Wald chi2 733.34 .000 734.45 .000 715.81 .000
Number of observations 233 233 247
Number of groups 107 107 111
Discussion and Conclusions
This study explored the investment behaviors of family firms as opposed to those 
of non-family firms. More precisely, the aim was to investigate whether family 
ownership increases the likelihood that firms are more likely to reject an invest-
ment and whether family ownership is associated with the amount of investment. 
The findings indicate that family firms are more likely to reject an invest-
ment, as was hypothesized. Furthermore, the reasons why firms have rejected 
investments confirm that family firms may be more financially constrained than 
are non-family firms, and that family firms are more likely to face difficulties in 
obtaining financing, such as that from banks (Niskanen et al., 2010b). However, 
family firms may be reluctant to take more loans because lower debt levels are 
preferred to minimize the probability of bankruptcy and due to the fear of losing 
control (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999; McConaughy et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 
2003). However, avoidance of loans leads to the rejection of investments when suf-
ficient internal funds are not available. The rejection of investment seems also to 
stem from the fact that family firms are more risk-averse (Naldi et al., 2007) and, 
therefore, they follow more conservative funding behavior (Gallo & Vilaseca, 1996; 
Gallo et al. 2004). As a consequence, family firm investment spending may be more 
dependent on internally generated funds (Poutziouris, 2001). 
The result on the amount of investment when using OLS regression suggests 
that family firms may invest more than do non-family firms. This finding could 
further suggest that family firms may be more likely to tackle investment op-
portunities (Zellweger, 2007; Andres, 2011). However, the findings on the amount 
of investment when using a random effects model imply that no statistically sig-
nificant difference in the amount of investment exists between family firms and 
non-family firms. The result is similar when using a continuous variable family 
ownership rate. One potential explanation could be that, although family firms 
are more likely to reject an investment, they still invest the amount necessary to 
maintain their ability to generate future earnings when they have finally decided 
to invest. The result could also indicate that both family and non-family firms may 
be concerned with the firm’s future performance and ability to survive in com-
petition, thus affecting their investment behavior in a similar way. Furthermore, 
taking into account the data used and the average size of firms, smaller firms may 
be forced to undertake investments due to lower flexibility in the timing of invest-
ments, as suggested by Kadapakkam et al. (1998). The findings further suggest that 
firms tend to invest more when they have more cash flows available.
These findings add to the previous empirical literature on the investment be-
haviors of small private family and non-family firms. The findings of this study 
suggest that the investment behaviors of family and non-family firms differ, at 
least to some extent. Family firms are more likely to face financial constraints and 
a situation in which an investment project is rejected. The findings also propose 
that increases in family ownership increases the likelihood that firms are more 
likely to reject investments. The reasons for rejecting investments are associated 
with financial constraints, an unwillingness to take loans, risk-avoiding behav-
ior and an unwillingness to invest. These arguments support previous literature 
that family firms are more likely to face financial constraints due to agency prob-
lems between the firm and its potential outside suppliers of funds. This could be 
the case in the countries with bank-centered financial markets, such as Finland, 
where banks monitor customers more closely than in other kinds of financial 
markets. The availability of outside funding in terms of equity is more difficult to 
obtain. Also, family firms are reluctant to share ownership and lose control and, 
therefore, owner–managers find outside equity a less-attractive source of funding. 
Consequently, investment behaviors in small firms, both family and non-family 
firms, may be more sensitive to cash flows. 
This research may have some theoretical and practical implications. Agency 
theory and the pecking order approach seem to be relevant theories explaining the 
investment behaviors of small family and non-family firms. In bank-centered finan-
cial markets and in countries where banks are important sources of funding, family 
firms may be more susceptible to financial constraints, which limits or even hampers 
their investments. Potential money lenders should take into account the influence of 
family business characteristics and family commitment on a family firm’s decision 
making and strategic choices when considering granting funding to family firms. 
The importance of small firms to the national economic wealth creation and growth 
has been ignored, but not enough effort has been made to support firms’ growth and 
investments. Policy makers should consider creating some tax incentives or other fi-
nancial incentives that might enhance investment activity and mitigate financial con-
straints among small firms. Finally, the findings of this study may be generalizable in 
the countries with similar operating environments as Finland, that is, countries with 
similar financial market structures and legal protection of investors.
Although this study contributes to understanding the differences in the invest-
ment behavior between family and non-family firms, this study has several limita-
tions. First, it would have shed more light on investment behaviors and investment 
strategies between family and non-family firms if the investment—i.e., fixed asset 
capital expenditure—could have been classified as an extension, replacement or 
compulsory investment. Second, the quality of investment and information on 
R&D expenditure investments would also have provided more detailed infor-
mation on investment behaviors and strategies because R&D expenditures are 
regarded as riskier than other investments. Unfortunately, this information was 
not available. Third, in this study, family ownership is defined in terms of family 
members’ ownership rates and family’s presence on the board. However, more 
diverse definitions of family firms, such as generation in power and the role of 
the founding family and their members in the firm, could have been used if data 
had been available. The use of multidimensional variable F-PEC, as suggested by 
Klein, Astrachan and Smyrnios (2005), would also have shed more light on in-
vestment behavior of family firms. These data were, unfortunately, not available. 
This study investigated the investment behaviors of small private family and non-
family firms in one country: Finland. It invites a further study in other countries. 
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